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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY1 
This report responds to a request by Finance Ministers to the Commission on 16 October for a 
study on the Responses to the Challenges of Globalisation. In line with the terms of reference, 
the Commission has focused on two main issues: the discussion on the reform of the 
international monetary and financial architecture as a response to global financial crises and 
the issue of financing and promoting development as a means to reduce global inequality. 
While the report reviews some of the economic facts and features of the current globalisation 
process, it does not focus upon many other important aspects of globalisation in the fields of 
social policy, health and environment. These topics are addressed in the Commission’s 
Communication “Towards a Global Partnership for Sustainable Development”, which sets the 
parameters for a comprehensive and balanced approach by the EU towards a global deal.  
Given the limited time available and the broad scope of the terms of reference, the report does 
not include original research, but builds on existing literature. It attempts to reflect some of 
the ongoing debate among academics, policy makers and non-governmental groups as input 
for a policy discussion at Commission and Council level.  
Globalisation: Where Do We Stand? 
Globalisation is a process that has been ongoing, albeit not in a linear fashion, over a long 
period. Post-war globalisation has many facets. In the economic and financial sphere, which is 
the subject of this Communication, it has been characterised by a strong expansion of trade in 
goods and services and, more recently, by a strong expansion in capital flows. Several factors 
are underlying this growth process including technological progress, leading to dramatic 
reductions in transportation costs and an unprecedented increase in information processing 
capabilities, and public policy measures, such as a lowering of quantitative and tariff 
restrictions on trade and the liberalisation of capital movements. 
The process of globalisation over the past fifty years has been accompanied by a six-fold rise 
in world output while the global population increased about two and a half times. This 
translates into major improvements in the income of a substantial part of the world’s citizens 
and into increased resources with which to tackle policy challenges. The past fifty years have 
further witnessed major improvements in other indicators of human welfare and quality of life 
in a large number of countries, including significant improvements in life expectancies at 
birth.  
Although correlation does not imply causality, there is little doubt that the substantial 
increases in global per capita income that have been achieved would not have been possible 
without continued progress towards deeper economic integration. Recent studies from the 
World Bank confirm that developing countries that have opened up their economies over the 
last twenty years have had a growth performance superior to those that have not pursued 
international economic integration.  
____________________________________________ 
1. This executive summary is based on the Communication of the Commission to the Council, the 
Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Comite of the regions on ‘Responses to the 
Challenges of Globalisation: A Study on the International Monetary and Financial System’. 
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However, despite the overall increase in income and welfare, the gap between richer and 
poorer countries and between richer and poorer segments of the population within countries 
has probably widened. In particular, it should be recognised that while globalisation is likely 
to benefit overall those countries that are able to participate in it, it does create problems for 
certain categories of the population. An example of this is the mixture of reduced relative 
wages and employment opportunities that have affected low-skilled workers in industrialised 
countries. Public policies have an important role to play in tackling the difficulties faced by 
those that may lose from globalisation, while ensuring that those countries that integrate into 
the global economy are able to reap the overall benefits. 
There also remains a group of, mostly very poor, countries that are less integrated into the 
global economy and that continue to be largely excluded from the benefits of the globalisation 
process. South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa lag far behind regions such as East Asia and the 
Pacific. Their share in world trade has fallen, their terms of trade have deteriorated and they 
continue to be unable to attract foreign capital. Improving living standards and the economic 
situation in these countries is one of the major challenges for the global economy. 
In addition, globalisation is associated with other challenges such as communicable diseases, 
climate change, loss of biodiversity or lack of international security. Addressing these issues -
that is, providing the world with global public goods - can be seen as part of a strategy aiming 
at maximising the benefits of globalisation and minimising its negative effects. These global 
public goods benefit developing and industrial countries alike. They are an additional task to 
poverty reduction and their financing should be explored.  
The increased internationalisation of economic activity that globalisation has brought raises 
issues about the appropriate level of economic policy-making and the capacity of national 
governments to set rules and standards. In this context, the report notes that over the course of 
the 20th century, the role of the state in economic activity has increased significantly in many 
developed countries. This has been partly due to the post-war development of social safety 
nets and welfare systems that are seen to play an important risk-reducing role in societies that 
are exposed to international competition.  
The report also highlights the fact that since the end of the Second World War, major progress 
was made in establishing a set of international and regional institutions and fora that provide 
international economic and financial governance. The current institutional arrangements are 
seen to constitute a more robust set of institutions and fora to deal with global policy 
challenges than existed during previous waves of globalisation.  However, new emerging 
challenges point to a number of inadequacies in the system, and reform proposals concerning 
various aspects of this governance system are currently discussed. 
The International Monetary and Financial System in a Globalised World 
The Commission study looks in more detail into the evolution and the functioning of the 
international monetary and financial system and finds that, overall, the system has functioned 
well over the past half century. It has complemented the strong growth in trade of goods and 
services by channelling savings into productive investment world-wide through open and 
well-functioning financial markets and by providing efficient clearing and settlement systems. 
It has thereby contributed to global economic growth and has allowed countries embracing 
sound policies to raise the living standards of their population. The system has also been able 
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to cope with periods of disequilibria in balance-of-payments and has ensured monetary 
stability in times of financial stress. 
Nevertheless, recent experiences have brought to the fore a number of real or potential 
systemic weaknesses, posing new challenges to policymakers. Although the integration of 
financial markets and the institutional and regulatory frameworks in which they operate have 
spurred economic growth, the international monetary and financial system has continued to be 
crisis-prone. With the exception of the ERM crisis of 1993, the crises of the nineties have 
mainly affected emerging market economies and, for most of them, have had important 
consequences in terms of output loss, welfare, social conditions and unemployment. In 
addition, the changed international financial environment has been seen as allowing abuses in 
terms of money laundering, financing of illegal activities and tax evasion.  
Recent years have seen the emergence of numerous proposals on how best to adapt the 
international monetary and financial system to the changes and challenges of a global 
economy. The report reviews the current policy debate and provides a short analysis of the 
pros and cons of the main reform proposals, their political and practical feasibility as well as 
an assessment of the necessary conditions for success. The reform proposals have been 
grouped into four categories: modalities of crisis prevention and management, initiatives to 
reduce the abuses of the international financial system, regional and global co-operation, and 
reform of the institutional framework. 
Modalities of Crisis Prevention and Management 
The proposed solutions are numerous: they range from very modest ones, such as increasing 
and improving the flow of information to market participants, to very ambitious ones such as 
the creation of a single world currency. Some initiatives are in the process of being 
implemented, reflecting a high degree of consensus among the international financial 
community; others lack at present sufficient political support or would imply a too high level 
of public interference in the markets. Whereas most of the proposed changes could be dealt 
with within the existing framework, some of the more ambitious ones would require the 
creation of a new institution or a much more profound reform of the international financial 
architecture. 
At the crisis prevention level, suggestions for further progress that are broadly accepted 
include increasing transparency in policy design and implementation, and improving the flow 
of information to market participants; developing and deepening financial markets and 
strengthening domestic financial systems to make countries less vulnerable to crises; and 
strengthening the foreign exchange reserves of emerging market economies. Their 
implementation by many countries is already contributing to making the system more 
predictable and more resilient to shocks. 
Progress is also being made on other fronts but at a slower pace because these proposals are 
either of a less consensual nature or more difficult to implement in practice. These proposals 
include the development of early warning systems; the introduction of collective action 
clauses into new international bond issues of emerging market economies; the creation of 
Clubs of Creditors; the development and use by emerging market economies of financing 
instruments that can be used as a first line of defence in case of crisis; and the need to ensure 
an orderly and well-sequenced capital account liberalisation process. 
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Finally, there are a number of proposals that have yet to gather sufficient support by 
policymakers and which often require important institutional changes, the merits of which 
need to be carefully weighed. Establishing an international debt insurance agency, creating an 
international prudential supervisory agency or introducing a currency transactions tax are 
among the more visible proposals. 
While not claiming to be exhaustive, the report pays particular attention to the use of a 
currency transaction tax as a tool to stabilise exchange markets. Proponents of a tax on 
international currency transactions argue that it would contribute to exchange rate stability by 
reducing arbitrage and speculation. The literature, however, suggests that the tax may actually 
increase volatility, as trading volumes are likely to fall significantly following its introduction.  
At the crisis resolution level, a topic high on the international agenda is to find the proper 
balance between adjustment by the debtor country, official financing, and private financing. 
This balancing exercise has become much more complex than 20 years ago. The question also 
arises whether, and to what extent, the balance should be tailored to specific country 
circumstances. This highlights the importance of making further progress in clarifying and 
developing further the principles for private sector involvement in both the prevention and the 
resolution of financial crises. The international community has also recently recognised the 
need to analyse how a clearer and more solid legal framework for debt standstill, debt 
restructuring, and debt reduction could contribute to facilitate orderly crisis resolution. Here 
too, some proposals imply more significant institutional changes. 
Reducing the Abuses of the International Financial System 
The use of the international financial system for illicit purposes has become a major concern. 
Characterised by a high degree of openness and decentralisation, the system is being used for 
criminal activities, including money laundering and the financing of terrorism, for tax evasion 
and for the circumvention of regulations. In some cases, corporate entities are deliberately 
created for such purposes. The abuse problem is compounded by the existence of a number of 
countries and judicial territories that see their comparative advantage in granting favourable 
tax and regulatory environments for non-residents funds. Financial abuses can threaten the 
credibility and undermine the integrity of the international financial system and affect 
countries at every stage of development. 
In response to these challenges international collaboration has been intensified through 
existing fora and organisations, such as the G7 Finance Ministers, OECD work on harmful tax 
practices and the Financial Action Task Force on money laundering and on the financing of 
terrorism. The Financial Stability Forum established in 1999 has worked on a variety of 
questions, including the activities of highly leveraged institutions and offshore financial 
centres. Specific actions have been taken against terrorist financing. In line with UN Security 
Council Resolutions, assets of targeted persons and organisations associated with the Taliban 
have been frozen. Increased corporate transparency and better integrated supervisory systems 
are seen as necessary conditions to prevent the misuse of corporate vehicles for illicit 
purposes.  
A common challenge to most of the proposals reviewed is the question of how to ensure 
compliance of non-signatory third partners. It is sometimes argued that better compliance 
with international rules and practices could result from improved co-ordination between the 
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existing institutions engaged in related projects. Furthermore, the fight against unfair practices 
has to be placed in the broader context of a coherent and sustainable approach to 
development. 
Regional and Global Co-operation 
The study also reviews initiatives to enhance the stability of the international monetary 
system through intensified macro-economic co-ordination within the context of regional 
groupings and among the three major currency areas (G3). Regional macroeconomic and 
monetary co-operation are frequently seen as a way of strengthening economic integration, 
growth and stability. The introduction of the euro provides an example of successful regional 
integration that has not only been beneficial for Europe but also is likely to contribute to the 
stability of the international monetary and financial system. Although the European 
experience cannot be translated directly, it provides an example to other regions of the world. 
While Asian economies have made progress in enhancing financial and monetary co-
operation in the region, monetary co-operation policy has, so far, played no or only a 
negligible role in the design of regional economic integration schemes in the Americas. This 
raises questions about the compatibility of different exchange rate systems with the objective 
of regional integration. 
Against the background of growing economic and financial interdependence, and the potential 
for more sudden and deeper spill-overs of shocks between the three major currency areas, a 
number of proposals advocate some kind of exchange rate co-ordination between the G3. 
Proponents argue that the targeting of exchange rates among the G3 currencies would increase 
the overall stability of the international monetary and finance system, implying fewer crises 
and higher growth for both the major currency areas as well as for emerging economies and 
developing countries. Others claim that this would imply that monetary policy authorities 
would lose to a significant degree the ability to react independently to external shocks and 
domestic policy priorities.  
Towards Improved Governance of the International Monetary and Financial System 
Discussions on improving the governance of the international monetary and financial system 
often focus on the International Monetary Fund (IMF), where significant decision making 
power related to the international monetary and financial system is vested. Over the past fifty 
years, the institution has been able to accommodate a substantial increase in both its 
membership, thereby becoming a quasi-universal institution, and in the scope of its mandate. 
Recently, however, there have been calls from emerging market economies, NGOs and 
national parliaments for more legitimacy, more accountability, and better governance for the 
Fund. Progress has been made to address these concerns, including through increased 
transparency of the IMF decision process; through the creation, outside the IMF, of groups 
such as the Financial Stability Forum and the G20; and through the transformation of the 
Fund’s Interim Committee into a more permanent International Monetary and Financial 
Committee. However, proposals with a greater institutional content, such as transforming the 
International Monetary and Financial Committee into a Council with decision power and re-
balancing the decision power within the Fund have made little progress or are still under 
review.  
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The report also reviews proposals to create new overarching bodies, such as a Global 
Governance Group or a UN Economic Security Council. Such initiatives would require 
widespread political support to be initiated. 
Promoting and Financing Development 
A number of poor countries have been largely unable to participate in the benefits of 
globalisation. They are trapped in a situation of low income and poverty, low levels of 
education and investment and sometimes high indebtedness. For these countries, international 
assistance is crucial. The report reviews four existing development instruments: official 
development assistance; debt relief; trade measures; and promotion of foreign direct 
investment. In addition, the report discusses some alternative sources of financing for 
development, including proposals for international taxes.  
Official Development Assistance 
Overall, trends in official development assistance (ODA) have been disappointing. Official 
development assistance by major donors in terms of their GNP declined from 0.33% in 1990 
to 0.22% in 2000 (0.33% for the EC) and thus further away from the aid target of 0.7% 
originally put forward by the 1969 Pearson Report. The measurement of ODA has also been 
criticised for over-estimating the true level of ODA relative to that which would have been 
recorded had the original definition been strictly applied. The World Bank has recently 
estimated that current levels of ODA would need to be doubled in order to help low-income 
countries to reach their millennium development goals of halving poverty between 1990 and 
2015. 
In addition to concerns related to the level of ODA, there is a need to ensure an effective use 
of existing ODA resources. The debate on the effectiveness and quality of aid has led to the 
identification of a number of important elements, such as prioritisation, co-ordination, 
conditionality and ownership of policies, policy coherence and untying of aid, which are 
increasingly being taken into account by the EU and other major bilateral and multilateral 
donors. 
One example is the debate on conditionality and ownership, which is related to the 
observation that economic reforms can be supported but “cannot be bought”. This implies that 
conditionality on adjustment lending will stimulate reforms better if they are in line with the 
government’s own programme. As a result, bilateral and multilateral donors now emphasise 
partnerships among governments, development co-operation agencies, civil society, and the 
private sector, in order to stress country ownership of the process. There is also a tendency 
towards refocusing aid towards “good policy - high poverty” countries, where the 
effectiveness of aid is seen to be highest. 
The effectiveness debate also focuses on the requirement by some donor countries that the 
recipient country sources public procurement from companies in the donor country. OECD 
studies demonstrate that tied aid increases the cost to recipient countries of many goods and 
services by between 15 and 30%. There are therefore strong arguments in favour of “untying” 
aid, which were given new momentum when, in May 2001, donors agreed on a DAC 
(Development Assistance Committee) recommendation to untie ODA to the least developed 
countries as of 1st January 2002. 
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The fragmentation of aid and poor co-ordination have frequently been a major obstacle to aid 
effectiveness. The process of recipient country-led poverty reduction strategies should 
provide common ground for improving donor action at the country level in many of the 
poorest countries. Within donor countries, the promotion of coherence between development 
policies and those of trade, security, investment, social policies and the environment 
continues to be a major challenge. 
Debt Relief 
The report reviews progress with respect to alleviating the debt burden of developing 
countries, which saw their debt relative to GNP double between 1981 and 1998, with a slight 
decline in the following years. After repeated debt relief actions provided by official bilateral 
and private creditors, the HIPC debt initiative launched in 1996 dealt for the first time with 
the debt owed to multilateral institutions. The HIPC initiative was enhanced in 1999 to 
provide deeper, broader and faster debt relief and it is generally recognised that the initiative 
constitutes an important step in the right direction towards helping poverty reduction. 
Apart from the issue of ensuring a rapid implementation of this initiative, there is a continued 
debate whether this action is sufficient to ensure sustainability and poverty reduction, even 
though the responsibility of the beneficiary countries in pursuing the right policies remains 
key to its long-lasting impact. There is also a discussion on whether enough countries are 
covered by this initiative. For poor countries in conflict, which are in principle eligible, but 
have not yet qualified, action has been taken by the G7 to reinforce political dialogue. 
Proposals have also been made to extend the initiative to more countries than the 42 HIPCs, 
but this comes up against significant financing constraints. 
Trade Measures 
As several studies reviewed in the report have shown, trade openness is a necessary, albeit not 
sufficient, condition for economic growth and thereby poverty reduction. Progress in this 
respect is conditional upon appropriate flanking policies, supported by trade related capacity 
building and further trade liberalisation by all countries, including developing countries 
themselves.  
Although a number of developing countries have become more integrated into the world 
economy in recent years, they are too often disadvantaged as regards market access. 
Agricultural and labour-intensive manufactured goods (such as textiles), where developing 
countries’ comparative advantage often lies, frequently face the highest trade barriers in 
developed and developing country markets, although the impact of such tariff peaks is to 
some extent offset by preferential access to developed economies. Initiatives such as the EU’s 
‘Everything But Arms’ initiative launched in early 2001, help to remove these distortions for 
least developed countries (LDCs)’ exports to the EU. The adoption of such initiatives by other 
major developed countries, in line with commitments taken at the 3rd UN Conference on 
LDCs in 2001, could bring further benefits to LDCs. 
At the multilateral level, the Doha WTO Ministerial Conference in November 2001 launched 
an ambitious negotiating agenda of trade liberalisation underpinned by strong and transparent 
multilateral rules – the Doha Development Agenda – which offers the prospect of significant 
gains to all WTO members, with a particular focus on the needs of developing countries. At 
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the regional level, regional trade agreements can provide an important stimulus to integration 
with the global economy and can reinforce regulatory co-operation, locking in reforms and 
providing clarity and consistency to potential investors. Such regulatory co-operation should, 
whenever possible, be based on agreed multilateral norms and attention should be given to 
potential additional administrative costs for developing countries and the provision of 
adequate technical assistance.  
Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment 
In recent years, foreign direct investment (FDI) has received increasing interest from policy-
makers due to its growing importance for both developed and developing countries. Flows of 
direct investment towards developing countries increased seven-fold between 1990 and 2000, 
although they have been heavily concentrated in a limited number of countries (middle 
income countries capture 93 percent) and make up for less than one fifth of world flows. FDI 
can potentially play an important role for economic development and hence poverty reduction 
through employment creation, technology transfers, productivity increases and enhancement 
of export capacity. However, according to the studies reviewed, some specific conditions are 
needed for this potential to be realised. The notion of ‘absorptive capacity’ arises, as it has 
been demonstrated that a minimum level of knowledge is necessary to absorb the foreign 
technology. Similarly, to avoid monopolistic behaviour by powerful multinational firms, 
appropriate use of competition policies and their effective enforcement can be a useful 
instrument. Finally, a liberalised trade regime is a complementary tool to maximise efficiency 
and fully benefit from the potential of FDI to enhance the export capacity of the host country. 
As far as active government investment-promotion policies are concerned, their desirability is 
not entirely clear. FDI is primarily determined by exogenous factors, such as geographical 
position, market size and availability of natural resources. Beyond these, necessary conditions 
include economic, political and regulatory fundamentals (such as the rule of law) that ensure a 
stable environment for foreign investors. These factors are mainly the responsibility of local 
governments. The main role and challenge for international institutions is to create 
mechanisms that facilitate FDI more globally. Many also argue that developing countries 
would benefit from a multilateral framework of rules for investment that would be cost-
effective, transparent and stable and ensure non-discrimination. 
Alternative Financing Instruments 
The report looks into several alternative sources of financing that have been proposed, 
including international taxes, the De-tax and the allocation of Special Drawing Rights 
(SDRs). In addition to generating financing for development, international taxes are being 
discussed as a way to contribute to the provision of global public goods. The taxes discussed 
in the report are a tax on international currency transaction, a tax on carbon dioxide 
emissions, a tax on aviation fuel and a tax on arms exports. 
All the international tax proposals reviewed in the report follow a dual objective. While they 
aim to raise revenue as a means of funding development and/or the provision of global public 
goods, they also have the purpose to motivate changes in behaviour by modifying relative 
prices and hence to correct international economic distortions and contribute to the provision 
of global policy objectives, such as financial stability, the protection of the global 
environment and the prevention of conflict. 
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While as a source of additional revenue a currency transaction tax may look appealing, its 
feasibility is, however, not demonstrated. Various proposals have been put forward, but even 
if applied in the settlement system, issues such as the enforcement of the tax and the 
preservation of the tax base need to be addressed. To be sustainable, such a tax would most 
likely require a multilateral approach, including the compliance of the major international 
financial centres. 
An international carbon tax as well as a tax on the consumption of aviation fuel have been 
discussed as means to internalise the negative environmental effects of carbon dioxide and 
other types of emissions by increasing the costs of emission. In terms of potential revenue, a 
global carbon dioxide tax might be the most promising; at international level, however, the 
political momentum has shifted to non-tax economic instruments such as emissions trading. 
There is general acceptance that the international proliferation of arms has significant 
negative implications for international security and the taxation of trade in arms has been 
suggested as a way to curb this trade. While in principle the taxable base (production or trade) 
can be defined, there are various challenges and obstacles in practice. These include the lack 
of transparency in international arms trading and the voluntary nature of the existing 
international frameworks. Taking into account the data uncertainties characteristic of the 
international arms market, the revenue potential of a tax on arms trading is expected to be 
limited. 
International taxes need to be administered. Collection at national level will require a very 
high degree of co-ordination among countries, while establishing a new international body 
raises a lot of additional issues, including those related to democratic control and 
transparency. 
While more work needs to be done to validate these provisional conclusions on international 
taxes, it seems that meeting needs for enhanced financing of development and for the 
provision of global public goods in the short- to medium term will require more substantial 
contributions from national budgets and a further increase in the efficiency of resource use 
than is presently the case. 
Proposed as an alternative to compulsory financing through taxation, the “1% De-tax” scheme 
advocated by the Italian government builds on voluntary consumer and vendor decisions to 
earmark one percent of the purchase at retail level to an international development project. 
The government would exempt this contribution (“de-tax”) from VAT and company income 
tax. While this source of enhanced voluntary contributions lacks the predictability of tax-
based revenues, it has the advantage that it can be introduced unilaterally.  
An SDR allocation (a selective one targeted at the poor countries or a general one whereby 
industrialised countries pool their new SDRs for use by developing countries) has also been 
proposed as a way to provide additional financing for development purposes. Ultimately, 
however, SDRs are not a free lunch. They constitute a right of a country to obtain a short-term 
credit with another country, the one that it buys currency from, at a specified interest rate. 
Conceived in the sixties as a tool to supplement a perceived shortage of international liquidity 
at world level, using an SDR allocation as a way to provide unconcessional long-term credit 
to developing countries does not seem to be a suitable approach. 
  15   
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ACP – African, Caribbean and Pacific countries 
ADB – Asian Development Bank 
ALA – Asian and Latin American developing countries 
ASEAN - Association of South-East Asian Nations 
ATW – Air Transport World 
BAD –Banque Africaine de Développement  
BIS – Bank for International Settlements 
BITs – Bilateral Investment Treaties 
CAC – Collective Action Clauses 
CAEMC – Central African Economic and Monetary Community 
CCL – Contingent Credit Line 
CDF – Comprehensive Development Framework 
CEEC – Central and Eastern European Countries 
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United Kingdom, United States) 
G8 – G7 plus Russia 
G20 – Group of Twenty 
GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GDDS – General Data Dissemination System 
GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
GFCF – Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
GNP – Gross National Product 
GSP – Generalised System of Preferences 
HIPC –Heavily Indebted Poor Country 
HLI – Highly Leveraged Institution 
IBRD – International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
ICAO – International Civil Aviation Organisation 
ICT – Information and Communication Technologies 
IDA – International Development Association 
IDB – Inter-American Development Bank 
IFMS – International Financial and Monetary System 
ILO – International Labour Organisation 
IMF – International Monetary Fund 
IPCC – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
ITO – International Tax Organisation 
LDC – Least Developed Country 
LIC – Low Income Countries 
LOLR – Lender of Last Resort 
LTCM – Long Term Capital Management 
ODA – Official Development Assistance 
OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OTC – Over-the-Counter 
MAI – Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
MEDA – Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
MFN – Most Favoured Nation 
MIGA – Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
MNE – Multi-National Enterprise 
NAFTA - North American Free Trade Agreement 
NPV – Net Present Value 
  17   
PIN – Public Information Notice 
PRGF – Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
PRSC – Poverty Reduction Strategy Credit 
PRSP – Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
PSI – Private Sector Involvement 
RTA – Regional Trading Agreement 
SDDS – Special Data Dissemination Standards 
SDR -  Special Drawing Right 
SPS – Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures  
STABEX – System to Stabilise Export Earnings 
SYSMIN - System for Safeguarding and Developing Mineral Production  
TBT – Technical Barriers to Trade 
WAEMU – West African Economic and Monetary Union 
UN – United Nations 
UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme 
UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
US – United States of America 
VAT – Value Added Tax  
WB – World Bank 
WEO – World Economic Outlook 
WTO – World Trade Organisation 
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Responses to the Challenges of Globalisation 
 
A Study on the International Monetary and Financial System 
and on Financing for Development 
CHAPTER I: GLOBALISATION: WHERE DO WE STAND? 
Globalisation can be characterised as a trend towards greater integration and interdependence 
between countries and regions of the globe. These growing linkages are often economic and 
political, but globalisation also has important social, environmental and cultural aspects. This 
introductory chapter focuses upon the economic aspects of globalisation, by looking at trends 
in international flows of goods and services, capital and labour (section A) and seeking to 
identify some of the driving forces (section B). It highlights the benefits that accrue to 
countries and regions that integrate successfully with the global economy (section C), but also 
identifies some of the limitations of current globalisation and the important public policy 
challenges that remain (section D).  
A. Current Globalisation Trends 
This section of the chapter describes trends in international flows of economic factors of 
production: goods and services, capital and labour. 
Trade in Goods and Services 
Figure 1: Trends in World Trade in Goods (volume) vs. GDP (1990 = 100) 
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Source: Commission services based on WTO (2001) 
When examining the economic interdependence of the globe, one obvious approach is to look 
at trade flows. Figure 1 compares the post-war evolution of world trade volumes in goods 
compared to world real GDP. A six-fold increase in global output has been accompanied by a 
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20-fold expansion of global merchandise trade flows2. Merchandise trade growth was 
particularly strong during the 1990s. World trade in services also grew at a fast rate through 
the 1990s: more than doubling from 530bn ECU/ euro to 1194bn euro3 between 1992 and 
2000. Whilst some services are inherently difficult to trade (the classic example being a 
haircut), more and more services are becoming tradable4. 
The composition of trade in goods and services has also evolved over time. Rich countries 
increasingly trade similar, but differentiated, goods and services between themselves (intra-
industry trade). Multinational firms now play an important role in the global economy and are 
frequently able to slice their production chain internationally, thus contributing to the estimate 
that roughly 30 per cent of world trade in manufactures is in intermediate rather than final 
goods (Yeats, 1998). Developing countries are playing an increasingly significant role in 
manufactures trade. The World Bank (2002) reports that the share of manufactures in 
developing country exports rose from 25% in 1980 to 80% in 1998. Increasing amounts of 
trade now flow between developing countries5, but the poorest countries continue to play only 
a marginal role in international trade6. Some countries, in particular those of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, have seen their share in world trade drop during the last two decades and have 
experienced a deterioration of their terms of trade. 
International Flows of Capital 
The extent of international flows of capital and of the information needed to make investment 
decisions can provide further evidence of international economic interdependence. Today, 
gross flows of short-term capital in particular are huge by long-term historical standards. The 
latest Bank of International Settlements data report average daily foreign exchange market 
turnover at US$ 1210bn in April 2001. This is roughly double the figure for 1989, but a 
decline of 19% on 19987. Daily turnover in over-the-counter derivatives, such as swaps and 
options, reached US$ 575bn in April 2001, compared to US$ 151bn in 1995 and US$ 265bn 
in 1998. A report by the Ministry of Finance, Finland (2001) notes8 that gross direct 
investments by industrial countries rose steadily between 1993 and 1998, from US$ 212bn to 
US$ 585bn per year. The financial information that underpins investment decisions flows 
around the globe to investors who possess the appropriate technology almost instantaneously 
and in huge volumes nowadays. International capital now also flows into a wider range of 
economic activities than previously (CEPR, 2001). Late 19th century international capital 
flows, for example, were heavily focused upon infrastructure construction projects, such as 
railways. 
There remains, however, a debate about the true extent of current global capital market 
integration relative to previous historical periods. Bordo et al (1999) argue that a combination 
of slower technology for transferring funds, information asymmetries, legal uncertainties, and 
the absence of adequate accounting standards limited the true extent of financial market 
                                                
2 There is a sizeable literature that argues that increased trade leads to higher economic growth , e.g. 
Frankel and Romer (1999).  
3 Eurostat news release 117/2001 (2001). Note that this data excludes intra-EU trade. 
4 The dynamic growth of trade in services is boosted by growth in FDI, discussed later in the section. 
5 IMF and World Bank Staff (April 2001). 
6 For example, WTO (2001) reports that in 2000 the merchandise exports of Africa, excluding South 
Africa, were US$ 115bn, compared to EU exports of some US$ 2251bn. 
7 Daily turnover in 1998 was US$ 1490bn. The BIS cites the launch of the euro, the growing importance 
of electronic broking, and banking consolidation as likely factors for the decrease in 2001. 
8 Based on IMF (1999). 
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integration in the late 19th century. In general, these imperfections are less significant today, 
but persist to some degree.  
One way of assessing the degree of international capital market integration is to look at the 
absolute size of the current account relative to GDP. This is equivalent to the net capital in- or 
outflow, and thus provides a simple, if somewhat crude, indication of capital market 
integration9. Another indicator of international capital mobility is the correlation between 
domestic saving and domestic investment. In a world of perfect capital mobility, there should 
exist no systematic relationship between domestic saving and domestic investment10, since the 
savings of residents in any given country should be allocated to the investment project 
yielding the highest return, wherever it is geographically located. 
Figure 2: Correlation Between Domestic Saving and Domestic Investment, and Current 
Account as a % of GDP for 12 Major Countries 
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Source: Commission services based on Baldwin and Martin (1999) 
Figure 2 presents these two indicators averaged across 12 major countries11 for the period 
1870 to 1989. The current account data (the unweighted mean absolute average relative to 
GDP) show that larger proportional net flows of capital were occurring at the beginning of the 
20th century than during the 1980s. According to the data on domestic savings/domestic 
investment correlation, international capital market integration was only beginning in the 
1980s to get back to the level of the late nineteenth century. However, the data-set contains 
only a limited group of countries and there remains much debate about the appropriate 
methodology for assessing and comparing international capital mobility12. 
                                                
9 Note that a country which both exports and imports large amounts of capital could still record an 
absolute current account balance of zero, if the debits and credits match and thus “cancel out”. More 
generally, it is important to underline that, because of these compensatory flows, net capital flows, as 
commonly used, give a vision of financial integration which is heavily underestimated. This is 
particularly visible in the case of short-term capital flows between affiliated companies, which are part 
of FDI and have reached very high levels, but don’t generally appear in net flows, although recent 
trends to centralise financial departments in multinational companies have made them more visible. 
10 This idea is often referred to as the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle after a 1980 paper that examined it. 
11 Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, UK, US. 
12 Taylor (1996) discusses some of these issues. 
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The structure of the capital flows described above has been evolving over time. In the Gold 
Standard era up until World War I, bonds were the dominant means of raising long-term 
capital. After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, syndicated bank 
lending became the dominant instrument. The position changed again in the 1990s as foreign-
direct investment (FDI) grew markedly in importance, with equity finance, bonds and bank 
lending also playing a role (figure 3). Financial crises featured in all of these periods13. 
Figure 3: Composition of Private Capital Flows (1973-81, 1990-97) 
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Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance (2000) 
Crafts (2000) highlights the growing importance of FDI and points out that multinational 
enterprises nowadays play an increasingly important role in the global economy. UNCTAD 
numbers multinationals in the tens of thousands today, compared to only a few hundred at the 
end of the 19th century. Craft notes that the value of the US FDI stock in 1996 stood at around 
20% of GNP; compared to roughly 7% in 1914. More generally, it is estimated that 
production by overseas facilities of multinationals represents a sixth of global industrial 
production.  
A recent study by Venables et al. (2001) for the European Commission also emphasises that 
FDI flows may link economies more strongly than trade flows alone suggest. For instance, it 
is reported that EU companies’ subsidiaries in the US have sales in the US that are 3.6 times 
greater than the EU’s exports to the US. This increased FDI is not evenly distributed globally, 
however. The UNCTAD World Investment Report (2001) points out that for 1998 to 2000, 
the EU, Japan and US accounted for 75% of inflows and 85% of outflows of FDI. The same 
regions combined account for roughly three-fifths of world-wide inward FDI stocks and four-
fifths of outward stocks.  
International Flows of Labour 
As a result of much lower transport costs, people travel around the globe far more than they 
used to. As a basic indication, the ATW World Airline Report (2000) states that in 2000, total 
world traffic reached 1.82 billion passengers. A significant proportion of these journeys will 
                                                
13 Kindleberger (1996). 
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not have been made for work purposes, but international business trips and short-term stays in 
foreign countries are facets of current globalisation. 
However, long-term, international economic migration is not occurring on a huge scale by 
historical standards, in spite of the significant migration pressures that exist currently in a 
global economy in which wages for workers with similar skills vary hugely between countries 
at different stages of development14. The data in figure 4 clearly show that immigration into 
the US was much higher at the beginning of the 20th century than more recently15. 
Figure 4: Long-term Trends in US Immigration 
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Source: Crafts (2000) based on US Bureau of the Census data 
Large-scale legal immigration into Western Europe was at its height in the high-growth 
decades that followed the Second World War, as countries such as France and the UK 
accepted many immigrants from their former colonies. Germany also accepted large numbers 
of guest workers during this period. From 1960 to 1973, the proportion of foreign workers 
rose from 3% to 6% of the workforce (Hall, 2000). This so-called “primary” immigration 
reduced very considerably after 1973.  
B. Forces Driving Globalisation 
Globalisation is a process that has been ongoing, albeit not in a linear fashion, over a long 
period16. The process is facilitated and driven by inter-related changes in technology, 
especially in communications and transportation, public policy – both domestically and at 
                                                
14 World Bank (2002), p. 44 cites a study that followed individual legal migrants. Workers moving from 
Mexico to the USA found they could increase their wages from $31 per week to $278 per week. 
15 Hall (2000) reports an estimate that the US accepted about 1million immigrants - of which roughly 300 
000 are illegal immigrants and refugees - annually in the late 1990s, relative to a population of about 
275m. 
16 World Bank (2002) argues that the term “globalization” is not appropriate pre 1870, whereas Mussa 
(2000) considers that the process has been ongoing since at least the Renaissance. 
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international level - and the preferences of individual citizens regarding what and where they 
wish to consume, save and work17.  
Technological Progress  
Figure 5: Relative Transportation and Communications Costs 
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Source: World Bank (1995)  
Technological progress has boosted the efficiency with which goods, services, capital, ideas 
and people move around the globe and has been a major driving force behind many of the 
phenomena described in the previous section. Figure 5 shows some of the technologies that 
have spurred this globalisation and demonstrates the steep price falls that occurred through 
the 20th century. More recent advances in information technology are discussed in detail in 
IMF WEO (Autumn 2001). An example of the precipitous price falls that have occurred for 
this technology is provided in Masson (2001): between 1960 and 2000, the price of 
“computers and peripheral equipment” relative to the GDP deflator fell by a factor of over 
1800. Relative cost reductions on this scale make the technology widely available and have 
been instrumental in hugely increasing global information flows, for instance via the World 
Wide Web, which allow knowledge and new ideas to be disseminated around the globe more 
rapidly and in greater volume. 
Public Policy  
In addition to technological progress, public policy continues to play a crucial role in 
determining the extent to which countries participate in globalisation. As the inter-war period 
demonstrates, policy measures have at least the potential to reduce greatly the extent to which 
nations interact with one another, and so, at least temporarily, to reverse the course of 
globalisation. Since the Second World War, policies in many countries, albeit with 
                                                
17 An example of these inter-linkages is provided in Mussa (2000): “…centuries ago, wealthy people in 
Europe first learned about the tea and spices of the East as the consequence of limited and very 
expensive trade. The broadening desire for these products … hastened the search for easier and cheaper 
means of securing them. As a by-product of these efforts, America was discovered, and new frontiers of 
integration were opened up in the economic and other domains.” 
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exceptions, have generally been supportive of international economic integration. Over this 
period, industrialised countries progressively opened their economies and a number of 
developing economies also began a process of external liberalisation, particularly after 
198018. In addition, the historic policy changes that signalled the end of the cold war in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s meant that a substantial number of countries became, to a far 
greater extent than had previously been the case, open to international flows of goods, 
services, people and ideas.  
There remains, nevertheless, a significant group of countries that, partly due to policy choices, 
are not participating in the process of globalisation. However, dramatically improved 
communications technology means that citizens, even in very poor countries, are much better 
informed about political conditions and standards of living elsewhere. Technological progress 
itself may thus contribute to pressures for policy changes.  
More generally, some authors have made a link between increased globalisation and the 
growth of the role of states in economic activity over the course of the last century (figure 6).  
Figure 6: Total Government Outlays relative to GDP (1913, 1960, 2000) 
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Source: Commission services based on IMF and OECD data 
Rodrik (1996) provides a theoretical justification for this by claiming that higher government 
consumption and intra-societal transfers play a risk-reducing role in societies exposed to 
greater external competition and thus uncertainty.  
In addition, the 20th century, and in particular the period immediately after the Second World 
War, witnessed the creation of several international institutions and fora that provide 
governance at a level beyond national borders. These include the Bretton Woods institutions, 
the GATT/WTO and the wider United Nations system, which provides governance 
mechanisms in many fields through its programmes, funds and specialised agencies. Regional 
governance initiatives have also flourished in the 20th century, with the EU by far the most 
advanced regional example of supra-national governance.  
                                                
18 World Bank (2002a). 
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Part of the growth in the number of international organisations and agreements in many policy 
areas is due to attempts to deliver coherent international rules. Another major driver for the 
increasing economic role of governments and the creation of international bodies has been the 
ex post recognition of the limitations and failures of the previously existing institutional 
arrangements. This is particularly true of the period immediately after the Second World War. 
If the process of globalisation continues in future as it has during the past 50 years, it would 
seem likely that yet more traditionally domestic issues will become “international”, implying 
that the trend towards the need for increased supra-national decision-making has yet to run its 
course. 
The remainder of this section looks at some specific technological and public policy factors 
that have influenced the developments in international trade, capital and labour integration 
described above. 
Trade Flows 
The rapid growth in post-war international trade has partly been due to reductions in transport 
costs, such as those described in figure 5, but has also been the result of lower tariffs and trade 
barriers. Table 1 shows the evolution in the tariffs of selected major industrialised countries 
over the past 125 years. The positive post-war developments shown are not without their 
limitations, however. Protection remains high in agricultural and textiles sectors in most 
countries, and industrialised countries continue to apply relatively high tariffs on a small 
number of manufacturing sectors. Most developing countries continue to apply comparatively 
high tariffs across the board19 even in manufactures. The poorest countries generally trade 
very little. With the reduction in tariff levels, non-tariff barriers to trade, such as product 
standards and anti-dumping regulations, have also become more important in recent years. 
Table 1: Selected Tariff Levels Over the Past 125 Years 
France 12-15 20 30 18
Germany 4-6 17 21 26
United Kingdom 0 0 17 23
United States 40-50 44 48 14 4,6 3,0
EU 5,7 4,6
Post Uruguay 
Round1875 1913 1930 1950 1989
 
Source: Crafts (2000) 
Nevertheless, the GATT/ WTO, set up shortly after World War II , has been a major 
innovation to the global trading system compared to the pre-war situation. Table 1 shows the 
rise in protectionism that occurred during the 1930s. No similar rise has occurred to date 
under GATT/ WTO, which has delivered consecutive reductions in the applied tariffs of its 
members and contributed to the elimination of quantitative restrictions, in parallel to creating 
a rules framework that provides greater predictability and transparency in international trade 
relations. Although heavily criticised from certain quarters in recent years, the GATT/ WTO, 
via the fundamental principles of MFN (Most Favoured Nation) treatment, non-discrimination 
                                                
19 For example, India’s simple average bound tariff for manufactures after the Uruguay Round is 58.7%, 
WTO (2000). 
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and transparency and the binding of tariff obligations, has delivered a significantly more 
robust trading architecture than had existed previously. 
Regional trading agreements (RTAs) have grown in number since the Second World War, 
particularly during the 1970s and 1990s. The EU, for example, has succeeded in completely 
removing tariff and quota restrictions on trade between members and has removed many non-
tariff barriers to internal trade. Although a second best compared to multilateral liberalisation 
(bilateral agreements mean that non-members are discriminated against) the regional 
integration path can be used as a stepping stone towards developing countries’ full integration 
in the international trade system. In particular, such arrangements can be an effective means 
of supporting the improvement of their domestic policy environment and their ability to create 
a climate conducive to economic growth and social development. In this context, there are 
strong arguments that “deep” RTAs that involve services and regulatory liberalisation should 
be based upon agreed multilateral norms. 
Regional integration may also allow for efficiency gains in the regional market, which can 
pave the way for enhanced competitiveness in the world market and higher levels of 
investment and growth. In addition, RTAs offer useful fora for smaller countries to make their 
views heard internationally. However, unchecked regionalism has at least the potential to 
divert more trade than it creates and to undermine the primacy of the WTO as the multilateral 
rule-making body for international trade. 
Capital Flows 
The extent of international capital market integration depends heavily upon which policy 
instrument of international macroeconomics’ “impossible trinity” of monetary policy, 
exchange rate policy and capital account convertibility countries choose to relinquish. At the 
end of the nineteenth century and up to 1914, the single global currency of the Gold Standard 
meant no domestic monetary policies, but encouraged international capital flows. The post-
war Bretton Woods system on the other hand, allowed domestic monetary flexibility and 
fixed exchange rates given capital controls. Since the break-up of the Bretton Woods system, 
flexible exchange rate systems have made a comeback20 and so have international capital 
flows, as countries have been able to liberalise their capital account. These policy choices 
partly explain the trends in figure 2. 
Technological progress has played a key role in fostering faster and more efficient trading of 
traditional financial instruments and in the development of more complex financial products. 
Information technology has also enabled huge quantities of data to be sent around the world 
instantaneously and at minimal per unit cost. The gross daily trading volumes reported above 
are largely facilitated by information technology. Better information flows also facilitate the 
geographical and sectoral broadening of capital flows as lenders are better able to monitor 
borrowers. 
Technological advances and innovations in methods of doing financial business provide part 
of the explanation for the changing composition of private capital flows. The 1990s surge in 
FDI is partly due to the growth of multinational enterprises and to many countries adopting 
favourable policies towards FDI. The trend was further supported by new FDI opportunities 
                                                
20 Within the EU, Member States first linked their currencies through the European Monetary System and 
ERM, and 12 Member States have now pooled their monetary sovereignty by adopting the euro as their 
single currency. 
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as a result of the “opening up” of numerous former Soviet Bloc countries, and the continued 
opening of countries such as China. 
As in the trade sphere, the aftermath of the Second World War saw the creation of institutions 
(the IMF, in particular) to promote more stable international financial interaction. Further 
bodies were added to the governance structure of international finance as the century 
progressed. Although these institutions and bodies must adapt and develop to external 
developments, as in the trade sphere, global financial policymakers have a more mature set of 
financial bodies and institutions at their disposal now than at the beginning of the 20th century. 
Labour Flows 
Before the First World War individuals faced few policy restrictions upon where they chose 
to travel and work and levels of international migration were relatively high. However, in 
addition to linguistic and cultural difficulties, which continue to persist today for many 
migrants, the major barrier to international migration was that international travel was 
extremely expensive relative to ordinary incomes.  
The situation at the beginning of the 21st century is quite different. Technological advances 
have dramatically reduced the costs of international travel. Short-term business (and holiday) 
travellers in general face relatively light restrictions in many countries. However, public 
policy in many countries restricts the rights that individuals have to settle and work in a 
foreign country21. Many EU countries welcomed economic immigrants in the high-growth 
period that followed World War II, but these policies were generally curtailed after the first 
oil price shock of 1973. The US continues to adopt a more liberal approach to economic 
immigration than the EU, and is estimated to admit about 1m million immigrants per year. 
Some EU countries have recently taken limited measures to encourage inward migration of 
skilled workers. 
C. The Benefits of Globalisation 
How has globalisation affected human welfare? The second half of the 20th century, a period 
of increasing global economic integration, saw a six-fold increase in world GDP (figure 1) 
while the global population increased about two and a half times over the same period22. 
These numbers translate into major improvements in the welfare and quality of life of many 
of the world’s citizens, and not just in the richest countries. The past fifty years have seen 
major improvements in human life expectancies, basic hygiene, vaccinations against many 
communicable diseases, and lower rates of infant mortality. The period also witnessed 
improvements in domestic governance in many countries and a more robust set of 
international institutions and fora to deal with global policy challenges than existed during 
previous waves of globalisation. 
Figure 7 shows the improvements that have been achieved in life expectancies between 1970 
and 1997. The bars, relating to the left-hand axis, depict life expectancy at birth in industrial, 
middle-, and low-income countries23 in 1997. Although low and middle income countries 
continue to lag the industrial countries, the catch-up indicated by the percentage increase in 
life expectancies since 1970, shown by the line relating to the right-hand axis, is striking. In 
                                                
21 The EU guarantees free movement of labour between members, but EU member states generally place 
strong restrictions on economic immigration by third country (non-EEA) nationals. 
22 IMF WEO (Spring 2000). 
23 World Bank definitions. 
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terms of numbers of years, low and middle income country citizens born in 1997 could 
expect, on average, to live 10 years longer than had they been born in 1970, whereas those 
born in industrial countries in 1997 could expect to live 5 years longer on average. These are 
major improvements, largely due to better hygiene and health standards, that globalisation has 
helped to spread24. 
Figure 7: Life Expectancy by Country Grouping in 1997 and Increase on 1970 
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Source: Commission services, based on World Development Indicators and IMF (2000a) 
Correlation is, of course, much easier to observe than causation is to demonstrate and it is not 
simple to prove that the many benefits outlined above are also due to globalisation. 
Nevertheless, research indicates that countries that are able to pursue policies of external 
openness to foreign trade and capital, thus permitting the adoption of new technology and 
know-how, combined with respect for property rights and the rule of law domestically, have 
the best chance of rapid economic development. It is unlikely that any of these conditions is 
individually sufficient to deliver economic development, yet one of the most powerful 
observations in this debate is that there is not one example of a country that has achieved 
sustained economic growth by pursuing import-substitution policies of high trade protection 
(e.g. Masson, 2001). A reasonable degree of external openness would seem to be a necessary 
condition for sustained economic growth and continued poverty reduction. 
Recent analysis from the World Bank identifies a group of developing countries - including 
China, India, Bangladesh, Vietnam and Uganda - which have opened up their economies to 
trade and investment in the last twenty years. Figure 8 compares the growth performance of 
these “post-1980 globalisers” with that of the rich countries and those developing countries 
that have not pursued international economic integration, the “non-globalisers”. The figure 
clearly shows the superior growth performance of the “post-1980 globalisers” since they 
changed their policies. Of course, not all of the newly globalising countries have changed all 
of their international economic policies in favour of greater liberalisation. However, the 
research provides strong evidence of the beneficial effects upon developing countries’ growth 
prospects of policies of international economic integration. 
                                                
24 The AIDS epidemic has seriously slowed improvements in life expectancies in those countries worst 
affected by it. 
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Figure 8: GDP Growth by Country Grouping (1960 – 2000) 
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Source: Commission services based on Dollar (2001) 
D. Challenges Facing the System 
The major benefits that globalisation has brought to many have not come without costs. Major 
policy challenges remain to be tackled. These challenges include the leverage that national 
governments have in a world where competition may lead to a race to the bottom on social, 
environmental and other policies. A related issue is the provision of global public goods, 
which is seen as requiring close cooperation among governments and substantial amounts of 
financing. In this study, the focus is limited to those challenges that are related to the 
international financial and monetary system and to the issue of financing for development. In 
this context, three major concerns are related to trends in global income distribution, the 
increased volatility that may be associated with increased exposure to international trade and 
capital flows, and abuses of an essentially open international system. 
National Governments in a Globalised World 
Concerns have been expressed that the nature of today’s liberal international financial system 
and the enhanced international competition implied by global market integration would 
increasingly curb the power of national governments to set rules and standards according to 
domestic public preferences and needs. While internationally mobile capital and regulatory 
competition between countries can help to discipline governments and enhance the efficiency 
of public institutions, it is argued that the political pressures created by the process of 
globalisation could place national governments in a regulatory race to the bottom that reaches 
well beyond the sphere of financial markets. Although economists25 neither find significant 
evidence for governments losing power nor of a race to the bottom in environmental policies, 
labour market regulation or tax competition, the quality of labour and social standards, 
consumer and environmental protection are seen at risk26. This concern raises a host of 
questions, including the optimum level of decision-taking, i.e. national versus supra-national. 
Summers (1999) argues that a country that pursues greater international integration and 
                                                
25 See CEPR (2001). 
26 Deutscher Bundestag (2001).  
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ensures appropriate domestic policies can no longer pursue many national policy goals 
independently.  
Global Public Goods 
Some aspects of this perceived need for international multilateral collaboration in a 
globalising economy are highlighted in the concept of global public goods. Stability of the 
international financial and monetary system, an open trading system or the protection of 
global environmental commons (e.g. climate, bio-diversity) are seen as goods that can only be 
provided and maintained on the basis of international co-operative behaviour and support. 
These goods as well as other goals, such as communicable diseases control, knowledge, peace 
and security, can be interpreted as international or global public goods (Box 1). Their 
provision generates important externalities to the benefit of, in principle, all people around the 
world regardless of their individual contribution to the production of these goods. In the 
absence of a supranational enforcement power, this creates an incentive for the individual, or 
the individual state, to free-ride. As a result, investment in the provision of global public 
goods tends to be sub-optimal if the allocation decision is left to markets alone. An efficient 
supply of these goods would thus require the development and implementation of 
internationally accepted rules and standards as well as adequate financing.27 
 
Box 1: Global Public Goods 
Public goods can be classified according to their spatial dimension in local (e.g. streetlights), national 
(e.g. national defence), regional (e.g. environmental protection of in the Baltic Sea) and global public 
goods (e.g. the ozone layer). A global public good is defined as a public good, the benefits of which 
accrue to essentially all geographical regions. Depending on the type of public good, its benefits can 
accrue to present as well as to future generations. Examples of widely accepted global public goods 
include the protection of the global environment, communicable disease control, the fight against 
internationally organised crime and terrorism, international trade, international financial and monetary 
stability and international security. Others advocate adding elements that are considered key for the 
development process of low-income countries such as basic education, knowledge diffusion and 
public research.    
In contrast to private goods, a public good is characterised by two typical properties: (1) non-rivalry or 
non-congestion and (2) non-excludability in consumption. Non-rivalry or non-congestion implies that 
a public good can be consumed (used or enjoyed) by any individual without (significantly) 
diminishing the possibility of consumption for others. Non-excludability means that it is either very 
costly or technically impossible to exclude non-payers from consuming the public good. In other 
words, the provision of public goods generates positive externalities for non-payers. Goods that 
feature both attributes are referred to as pure public goods. Most public goods are impure and permit 
either some degree of selective exclusion of non-payers or incur some rivalry in consumption. 
National defence is regarded as a typical (national) public good as no resident can be excluded from 
nor do residents compete for its benefits. The opposite from a public good is a public bad, which is 
equally defined by non-rivalry and non-excludability. Examples of a public bad are communicable 
diseases, organised crime and pollution. The provision of a public good can often be considered in 
terms of reducing or removing a public bad.  
The provision of public goods constitutes a formidable policy challenge. As the allocation mechanism 
of the market is failing, the optimum supply level of public goods is essentially determined by public 
                                                
27  See for example Sandler (1997) and Kaul, Grunberg and Stern (1999). 
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choice. For pure public goods the lack of rivalry makes it unlikely for market clearing prices to 
emerge, and the problems of excluding non-payers from consumption make it difficult to establish 
property rights. These properties provide also a systematic incentive for consumers to understate the 
true value of their marginal benefit of consuming the public good and encourage free-riding. As a 
consequence, the provision of pure public goods on the basis of (voluntary) individual contribution 
through private agents alone tends to be sub-optimal.  
In order to achieve socially desired levels, the public sector needs to support private contributions 
and/or provide adequate incentives to enhance voluntary private sector contributions. At the local and 
national level, governments support the provision of public goods through taxes levied on its citizens. 
At the global level, this collective action problem is compounded by several factors. Due to the lack of 
a supranational government, the provision of global public goods is the result of international decision 
making among sovereign states or entities and hence based on voluntary contributions from those 
states. Given the diversity of actors and depending on the nature of the global public good, the benefits 
and costs related to the provision of global public goods as well as the ability to contribute to their 
provision are distributed asymmetrically across countries and across generations. Although the 
benefits of global public goods essentially spread globally, there can be significant differences in their 
visibility across countries, regions  and over time. In some cases such as curbing global warming, the 
bulk of the benefits will accrue to future generations, while the present generation bears the costs 
related to the provision of the global public good today.  
The type and magnitude of resources required to support the provision of global public goods depends 
essentially on the nature of the public good and the way it is produced. The World Banka estimates 
that annually some $ 16 billion go to finance international public goods in developing countries 
around the world and complementary domestic infrastructure that allows the absorption of these 
goods. These resources mainly support activities in health, environmental protection, knowledge 
creation and diffusion, and international peacekeeping. Instead of large-scale financing, the provision 
of public goods established on the basis of internationally agreed rules and regulations require the 
implementation of incentives for international co-operation and compliance. In some areas, such as 
international trade and the international financial and monetary system, multilateral institutions are in 
place to provide for the global public good and to discourage non-co-operative behaviour.  
a) The World Bank, Global Development Finance (2001). 
Trends in Global Income Distribution  
There has been a great deal of recent academic work looking at the distribution and evolution 
of incomes across the globe and at the impact that globalisation, and in particular more liberal 
trade, has had upon income distribution. The literature stresses several important distinctions. 
Global income inequality can occur due to a mixture of income inequality between countries 
and within countries. It can occur because all are growing, but the rich are growing faster 
(absolute improvement, but relative worsening) or because the poor are getting poorer in 
absolute terms. In assessing whether or not globalisation has caused more or less income 
inequality, a distinction needs to be drawn between those countries that have pursued policies 
of increasing international integration and those that have not. Further, it is important to try to 
distinguish the effects of “globalisation policies” of increased openness that countries may or 
may not have pursued from other simultaneous (domestic) policy changes that may also have 
affected income distribution. 
Given differences in measurement methods and data problems, different authors emphasise 
different aspects of trends in income inequality. Between 1900 and 2000 the world Gini 
coefficient rose from 0.40 to 0.48, implying an increase in global income inequality over the 
period (IMF, 2000). Lindert and Williamson (2001), using data from Bourguignon and 
Morrisson (1999), report that between 1820 and 1992, global income inequality rose and was 
almost entirely due to increased inequality between countries, since within-country inequality 
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has shown no marked trend. However, the picture may have begun to change in recent years. 
World Bank (2002) emphasises the post-war convergence in real incomes among developed 
countries and notes that the “post-1980 globalisers” have also begun to catch up with the rich 
countries (Figure 8), although there has been a simultaneous increase in within-country 
inequality in a number of countries. CEPR (2001) takes the view that global income 
inequality increased greatly during the 19th century, as some countries industrialised and 
others did not, continued to rise in the first half of the 20th century, but has changed little 
during the past fifty years. In terms of broader measures of welfare, life expectancies have 
increased significantly over the past fifty years in many developing countries, such that life 
expectancy convergence with the developed world has been much greater than income 
divergence.  
However, extreme poverty continues to exist. The World Bank estimates that the number of 
people living on less than 1 dollar per day was roughly constant through the 1990s at 1.2 
billion. At the regional level, East Asia and the Pacific have made sustained progress in most 
areas, while South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa lag far behind. The impressive growth of 
East Asia and the Pacific is reflected in the improvements in the ratio of its income to that of 
high-income OECD countries, from around 1/10 to nearly 1/5 over 1960-98. In Sub-Saharan 
Africa the situation has worsened dramatically: per capita income, around of 1/9 of that in 
high-income OECD countries in 1960, deteriorated to around 1/18 by 1998. The share of 
people living on less than $1 a day is as high as 46% in Sub-Saharan Africa and 40% in South 
Asia, compared with 15% in East Asia and the Pacific and Latin America. In terms of growth, 
the performance of Sub-Saharan Africa has been disastrous: between 1975 and 1999 GDP per 
capita growth averaged –1%. 
Economic theory suggests that liberalising trade should equalise factor incomes between 
countries, yet it is not clear that this is occurring28. The recent work of the World Bank (2002) 
and Dollar and Kray (2001) argues that one must look at whether countries have embraced 
market opening “globalisation policies”. As noted above, “post-1980 globalisers” have 
achieved superior growth performance compared to both rich countries and “non-globalising” 
developing countries. In addition, the “globalisers” did not, on average, experience higher 
income inequality. As a result, the poor shared in the benefits of higher per-capita GDP 
growth. However, some economists have criticised the methodologies used in cross-country 
work of this nature29, and others have noted the lack of good case studies in this area30. 
The Dollar and Kray work focuses on the globalisation policies of developing countries. 
However, this chapter has noted that technological progress is a major driving force of 
globalisation. This process may well be increasing the premium available to skilled workers 
in all countries. This may tend to increase inequality between the skilled and the unskilled 
within countries, including in rich countries. Globalisation may thus increase the need for 
appropriate domestic policies to deal with the problems faced by low-skilled workers. 
Whilst the evidence on recent trends in income inequality is not clear-cut, modern media 
technology means that all are aware of the differences in standards of living between rich and 
poor countries and regions. As such, it is a pressing policy issue. The effects of “globalisation 
policies” are probably too subtle to be categorised as simply good or bad for income 
                                                
28 International labour migration is, in theory, a substitute for liberal trade policy that should also lead to 
more equal factor incomes, but, as shown above, current globalisation is better characterised by freer 
trade than freer international migration. 
29 Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001). 
30 Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1999). 
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inequality. Globalisation is likely to benefit substantially in aggregate those countries that are 
able to participate in it, but it does create adjustment costs which may be concentrated on 
some segments of the population, such as low-skilled workers in industrialised countries. The 
policy challenge is therefore to think through these complex interactions of policy and 
technological change and to conceive of mechanisms that can help those that may lose from 
globalisation, whilst allowing countries to reap the aggregate benefits.  
Increased Exposure to Volatility 
Increased external economic integration as a result of globalisation brings with it increased 
exposure to international economic events and thus economic shocks. Perhaps the most 
obvious manifestation of these shocks comes in the form of financial crises that have affected 
both rich and developing countries. In times of crisis there is a tendency in financial markets 
for a “flight to quality” of international capital, such as to the sovereign debt of rich, stable 
economies. This can leave emerging market economies and developing countries without 
access to new short-term international capital or at prohibitive rates. More generally, 
internationally traded commodities and exchange rates may diverge sharply from 
“fundamentals” due to swings in market sentiment. These swings may be particularly difficult 
for countries without diversified production structures to accommodate.  
Price volatility is, of course, not only an international phenomenon. A diversified set of 
international buyers for the output of an open economy may serve to limit price fluctuations 
faced by domestic producers relative to those that would prevail in a closed economy. 
International economic integration may also bring access to international markets in insurance 
(e.g. futures markets) that smaller, closed domestic markets would not be able to support. 
In spite of this, recent financial shocks in developing countries and emerging market 
economies have had significant negative economic consequences (Masson, 2001). In 
particular, actual or potential macroeconomic instability may severely limit the extent to 
which private individuals are willing to engage in long-term investment in an economy. The 
next chapter will discuss in detail possible reforms to macroeconomic and financial 
frameworks that could improve upon the current situation. 
Abuses of the International Financial System 
There is increasing concern about the international financial system’s vulnerability to 
abuses31. Characterised by a high degree of openness and by the rapid development of new 
financing and payment tools, it has become more difficult to control the international financial 
system against abuses such as money laundering, the financing of criminal and terrorist 
activities, tax evasion and the circumvention of rules and standards. In some cases, corporate 
entities are deliberately established for such purposes. 
Financial abuses can threaten the credibility and undermine the integrity of the international 
financial system. Their consequences affect countries at every stage of development and 
involve both onshore and offshore financial centres. The existence of abuses encourages 
illegal and criminal behaviour, including bribery and corruption. Moreover, there is concern 
that harmful tax practices could trigger reductions in tax revenues and limit the ability of 
governments to provide for public goods at the socially desired levels.  
                                                
31 See for example Group of Seven (2000b). 
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CHAPTER II: THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN A GLOBALISED WORLD 
The occurrence of financial crises in various parts of the world in the last decade, and their 
impact on the economies of the affected countries and their population’s living standards, has 
led to an intense debate about the causes of this new wave of financial instability. Much of the 
focus of policy makers has been on the soundness of the local financial sector, the 
consistencies in macroeconomic and structural reforms policies of the countries concerned 
and the appropriateness of their exchange rate regime. In addition, however, the question has 
arisen whether the international financial and monetary system more generally is still 
adequate to face the challenges of our time, in particular the globalisation of business and 
finance.  
At the very general level, the international financial system consists of a set of principles, 
rules, decision-making procedures and institutions structuring the relations between states and 
private entities in the financial area. It provides the structure in which economic and financial 
activity takes place. While sound policies at the country level are clearly central pre-
requisites, the main focus of this chapter will be on the role of an efficient international 
financial system for ensuring global financial stability. The chapter will first briefly 
characterise the evolution of the international financial environment (section A). Following a 
typology of the functions one could expect from a ‘first-best’ international financial system, 
adapted to the existing conditions of a globalised world economy, it will then present an 
analysis of some of the challenges that the current system poses to policy makers (section B). 
Section C will review proposals for dealing with these problems and for improving the overall 
architecture of the system. 
A. Trends and Achievements 
Globalisation has changed many aspects of how people, organisations and businesses operate. 
It affects societies and countries all over the planet in ways that are often difficult to predict. 
Perhaps more than in any other domain of economic activity, globalisation has had profound 
repercussions on the financial sector and on international financial and monetary relations. As 
a result, the rules, principles, and decision-making procedures that govern the system differ 
today quite substantially from those prevailing at the time of the Bretton Woods agreements 
in 1944.  
Trends that characterise the evolution of the international financial system include: 
• Deeper integration of international financial markets, where major assets are 
traded almost continuously by a wide number of operators. In addition to the 
large financial enterprises that are connected to essentially all major financial 
centres, a growing number of increasingly diverse operators participate in 
international financial markets, including individual investors, pension and mutual 
funds, industrial enterprises and hedge funds. The emergence of this global financial 
market place owes much to the accelerating pace of technological progress in the 
field of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), which has resulted in 
the availability of vast amounts of information32, and in increasingly cheaper 
technical means to process it. This integration process is, however, far from being 
completed. Cross-border transactions remain generally more costly than domestic 
                                                
32 See for example Hull and Tesar (2001). 
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ones; regulations continue to differ across countries and market participants do not 
share similar access to information and/or processing capabilities. 
• Evolution of the role and function of exchange rate regimes. The Bretton Woods 
system was based on fixed but adjustable exchange rates to avoid excessive volatility 
and to prevent competitive devaluations while allowing for adjustment within an 
international framework. Today, exchange rates between the three major currencies 
fluctuate freely. Many industrial countries and emerging market economies have 
opted either for hard pegs (such as currency board arrangements, dollarisation or a 
single currency) or for floating rates resulting in a “hollowing out of the centre of 
fixed but adjustable rates”.33  
• Fuller liberalisation of capital markets. This again contrasts with the features of 
the Bretton Woods system, where capital movements were heavily restricted (and 
continued to be even in some industrialised countries until the eighties). Capital 
controls have been dismantled in many countries because they were viewed as 
significant barriers to further economic development. In addition, they were 
increasingly perceived as ineffective instruments for maintaining exchange rate 
stability and an independent monetary policy. The pace of the drive towards capital 
liberalisation has, however, slowed down substantially following the emergence of 
financial crises in the middle of the nineties. It is now widely recognised that a strong 
domestic financial sector is a prerequisite for successful capital account 
liberalisation, which itself should be properly sequenced. The debate on capital flow 
liberalisation is now, inter alia, focusing on the possibility of introducing temporary 
capital controls in crisis situation and on the use of capital controls on inflows (such 
as in Chile) as part of a banking and financial system strengthening effort.34 
• The development of a large pool of savings in the developed world in search of 
returns and risk diversification. Income growth, the ageing of populations, the 
development of pension and mutual funds and the liberalisation of capital 
movements in many parts of the world have been among the factors enticing cross-
border investment. The availability of these large pools of savings in search of 
returns and diversification is often regarded as a two-edged sword35. On the one 
hand, when global markets correctly price the risks and returns associated with 
different investment opportunities, cross-border capital flows promote an efficient 
allocation of global savings to its most productive uses. It also allows developing 
countries, which may have low levels of saving, access to a larger pool of 
international capital. In particular, it allows developing countries to complement their 
domestic savings, thereby enhancing their growth potential. On the other hand, cross-
border capital flows are also highly sensitive to relative yields and risk developments 
and are thus prone to substantial swings. In addition, these funds can exceed the 
“absorptive” capacity of developing countries and their financial system.  
• A change in the level and composition of capital flows to developing and 
emerging market economies. Gross capital flows to these countries have risen 
considerably as a share of GDP since the early 1980s. At the same time, net private 
flows to these countries that hovered around 0.5 % of GDP during the 1970s and the 
                                                
33 For an in-depth discussion of the phenomenon, see Tavlas and Ulan (2002). 
34 Eichengreen (1999). 
35 See for example Buch and Pierdzioch (2001). 
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beginning of the 1980s rose sharply to reach 3% of GDP in the mid 1990s but fell 
back to 1.5% at the end of the decade.36 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and equity 
flows have been playing an increasingly important role while syndicated bank 
lending and official assistance are declining. This phenomenon has been particularly 
visible during the last decade. FDI flows have become the most important and stable 
source of financing for these countries. This might be attributable, on the supply side, 
to the reduction of restrictions on cross-border equity investment and improvement in 
communications that have reduced the costs of acquiring information on assets 
abroad. On the demand side, explanatory factors are the broad improvements in the 
overall macro-economic fundamentals of developing countries, their opening to 
international capital flows and the wave of privatisations37. However, these increased 
FDI and equity flows are heavily concentrated on a limited number of countries. The 
structure of external debt flows has also changed substantially with bonds 
substituting for a decline in bank lending.  
• The development of a wider array of increasingly complex financial 
instruments. The rapid growth and development of new and more complex financial 
instruments, such as over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, has run in parallel with the 
emergence and development of internationally active financial institutions. These 
changes were made possible by spectacular advances in ICT. These new instruments, 
by allowing financial risks to be better tailored to yield expectations and risk 
preferences, have contributed to a more comprehensive set of market instruments and 
have improved market liquidity and depth. However, they require increasingly 
sophisticated management tools of financial risk assessment which often use the 
same mathematical models and techniques. Also, “OTC derivatives activities can 
contribute to the build up of vulnerabilities and to adverse market dynamics in some 
circumstances”38, as demonstrated by the 1998 Long Term Capital management 
(LTCM) incident. 
• The emergence of new international fora and the development of sets of 
multilateral and national rules, codes and standards. Besides the evolution of the 
existing institutions, the last decade has seen the creation of a number of 
international fora and bodies and the establishment of new sets of standards, rules 
and codes including data dissemination, fiscal, monetary and financial policy 
transparency, banking regulation and supervision, foreign exchange management, 
securities and insurance regulation, accounting, auditing, bankruptcy and corporate 
governance. This creation of new fora and the establishment of new rules runs in 
parallel with a deregulation process of the economy characterised by a drive towards 
more flexibility (in labour, product and services markets) and the liberalisation of 
trade and financial flows. It might also be the result of the inadequacy of older rules 
to the working of the present system and the need for new ones. Associated with this 
trend is a debate about the legitimacy and efficiency of both existing bodies and 
newly created fora.  
                                                
36 Mussa, op.cit. 
37 Lane, Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria (2000). 
38 Schinasi (2000). 
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B. Systemic Issues 
The characteristics of the current international financial market place make it different and to 
a large extent more challenging than the one prevailing up to the 1980s. As a result, the ability 
of the international economic and financial system (that was built in the aftermath of World 
War II and that was partly modified in the early seventies) to deal with current challenges has 
become the object of close scrutiny.  
Any assessment of the performance of the present system is, explicitly or implicitly, based on 
views on the main functions that the international financial system should perform. These 
views are, by definition, normative. For the purpose of this report, the following assumptions 
have been made about the functions, objectives and requirements that a first-best international 
system should fulfil: 
• It should promote the international distribution of savings. It is in the interest of 
all countries that the large pool of worldwide savings, mostly originating from 
developed countries, can be invested in those countries with more profitable 
investment opportunities. This includes developing countries, which are often short 
of domestic capital, and offer high returns on investment. A smooth flow of savings 
would require an efficient payment, clearing and settlement system; solid financial 
institutions and markets that are able to intermediate international savings flows 
efficiently; recognised legal standards and norms for international contracts; and 
well-developed information and communication infrastructures. 
• It should support the adjustment of payments disequilibria. For a multitude of 
reasons, countries do sometimes face unsustainable debt levels and/or large payments 
imbalances that can lead to liquidity or solvency crises. In these circumstances, while 
the burden of adjustment must fall mostly on the country itself, other countries have 
an interest in ensuring that the international spill-over effects of domestic adjustment 
are contained. Examples of this common interest include large depreciations of the 
exchange rate of a country, where tensions may arise between the exchange rate 
adjustment supporting the adjustment process and the impact of the depreciation on 
other countries’ trade and economic positions. More generally, in a world of floating 
exchange rates, there can be instances of strong negative externalities if all countries 
follow strategies of competitive devaluations. This requires the existence of policy 
co-ordination mechanisms to avoid the occurrence of such a non-co-operative and 
sub-optimal equilibrium.  
The same holds for cases where a country follows an inconsistent macroeconomic 
policy that can lead to a rushed exit of foreign investors and precipitate an external 
payments crisis which can affect other countries. Also, it is important for the 
international system to ensure that countries’ external debt and/or deficits do not 
become too large and unsustainable. This calls for international support for domestic 
adjustment efforts, through international mechanisms of policy surveillance and 
dialogue, and, were justified, external financial assistance. 
• It should help to promote financial stability, i.e. avoidance of excessive volatility 
and boom-bust financing cycles39. Sound and sustainable domestic macroeconomic 
and financial policies are of primary importance to ensure financial stability. For 
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countries willing to attract international capital (be it in the form of portfolio 
investment, direct investment in industrial or services businesses or through the 
issuance of international securities) it is important that investors have a clear 
understanding of the direction of economic policy, the state of the economy and the 
policy framework of the authorities. This would argue, inter alia, for international 
standards and rules on issues such as transparency, accounting and disclosure of data.  
• In times of financial stress, it should ensure monetary stability, meaning the 
provision of international liquidity when there are risks of a generalised blockage of 
international financial relations because of the unwillingness or incapability of 
economic agents to conduct financial transactions or to take on financial risks. Given 
the deep interlinkages between modern financial markets and financial institutions, a 
serious shock to the financial system can lead to the quick disappearance of liquidity. 
Provisions are then needed to prevent financial and economic crises40. This may be 
seen as an example of the need for an international public good41, which is not 
provided necessarily by government in normal times but becomes necessary in time 
of crisis. Recent years have seen at least two occurrences of such severe financial 
shocks. In the case of the failure of LTCM, no lender of last resort intervention was 
needed but the US central bank did intervene to assemble a coalition of domestic and 
foreign financial institutions to come to the rescue of the failed institutions, 
highlighting the need for international liquidity support. Second, in the wake of the 
11 September attacks against the US, the need for international liquidity was met by 
swap arrangements between the Federal Reserve Bank of the US and the European 
Central Bank42. 
• It should have an efficient governance framework. The above mentioned 
functions of the international financial system may require common bodies and 
institutions, mechanisms of co-operation and co-ordination and - where required - 
mechanisms that support and set penalties for the implementation, or lack thereof, of 
the commonly agreed rules. Such a framework will raise questions of efficiency and 
legitimacy.  
Overall, the system has functioned well in channelling savings into productive investment and 
fostering prosperity and productivity growth in both developing and developed economies. 
Market discipline has generated a growing consensus regarding the merits of stability-
oriented macroeconomic policies. Broad and deep markets are seen as key for the efficient 
pricing and management of risks, which in turn is looked at as a necessary condition to 
expand the range of financing opportunities at the disposal of actors, including in developing 
countries, many of which would otherwise be perceived as too risky by individual investors. 
Moreover, international competition in the financial sector has helped to reduce financing 
costs, rendering the intermediation of savings to investment more efficient and disciplining 
economic policies.  
Nevertheless, recent experiences have brought to the fore a number of real or potential 
systemic weaknesses. The recurrence of financial crises in recent years has suggested that the 
system is not fully adequate any more to cope with the changed environment. In addition, it 
                                                
40 Or an international financial crisis manager, as per Rogoff (1999).  
41 Kindleberger (1988).  
42 Indeed, as argued by Rogoff (1999), page 22, there is no need for a new global institution to provide 
such liquidity. Cooperation among the key central banks is however crucial.  
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has been seen as allowing abuses in terms of money laundering, financing of illegal activities 
and tax evasion, and has segments that are largely unregulated.  
B.1. International Monetary Stability 
Although the integration of financial markets and the institutional and regulatory framework 
in which they operate have spurred economic growth, the international monetary and financial 
system has continued to be criticised for being crisis-prone. With the exception of the ERM 
crisis of 1993, the crises of the nineties have mainly affected developing countries and, for 
most of them, have had important consequences in terms of output loss, welfare, social 
conditions and unemployment. While there have been other historical periods when crises 
occurred at a relatively high frequency, in particular in the late 19th century and the 1920s and 
1930s, the nature and systemic impact of crises in recent years has become a cause for 
concern. 
Key features of the crises and of the environment in which they took place include: 
An increased frequency and intensity. Compared to the Bretton Woods period, the 
frequency of crises post 1973 has doubled Bordo (2000). Crises have continued in the 
nineties, including Mexico (1994), East Asia (1997-1998) and Russia (1998). Turkey (2001) 
and Argentina (2001) are the most recent examples. While it is often claimed that in addition 
to becoming more frequent, modern crises have become more damaging, Bordo (2000) does 
not find evidence that recent crises have grown longer or output losses have become larger.  
The multiplication of actors involved. Compared to the debt crises of the eighties, the 
current wave of financial crises are more difficult to deal with given the dominance of market-
based financing, which involve a large number and variety of investors. When bank and 
official lending dominated international financing, the number of actors involved was much 
lower and it was easier to reach a co-operative solution. In the absence of a clear framework 
of crisis resolution, there is in addition an issue of moral hazard that has been linked to the 
provision of large international financial rescue packages to countries affected by capital 
flight. 
The increased risk of crises becoming contagious and self-fulfilling. Contagion is not a 
new phenomenon; in the past, financial crises have often spread across countries. However, 
under the Bretton Woods regime of low capital mobility and limited linkages among key 
financial markets, contagion was less pervasive. On the contrary, recent years have seen a 
new wave of contagion crises, where countries that had relatively sound economic 
fundamentals were subject to speculative attacks. Contagion happens when market 
participants, because of developments in other countries, consider that economic 
fundamentals in a country have to be fundamentally re-assessed and that the price of its 
financial assets have become overvalued. Contagion has been most evident in the ERM crisis 
of 1992/1993, in Asia in 1997 and in Latin America in 2001. Contagion has also been 
exacerbated by financial market participants’ tendency towards herd behaviour, i.e. the 
preference to follow the market’s directions in order to minimise the risks associated with 
more extreme positions. The advances in information technology and risk management 
techniques, which have been adopted by most of the financial industry and often rely on 
similar models of risk evaluation and management, have reinforced the scope for this type of 
behaviour. 
In addition, if market participants become convinced that there is some underlying factor 
justifying the possibility of a crisis, a crisis can become self-fulfilling. For example, foreign 
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investors may sell the financial assets of a country that seems in good condition because this 
country is affected by a similar economic shock, it shares similar structural conditions 
(financial sector structure, debt levels) or it belongs to the same class of assets as an affected 
country. It is usually impossible to anticipate in advance which macroeconomic element or 
structural condition the markets will focus on to justify their expectation of a crisis, since 
almost all countries have economic weaknesses in some form or another. 
Lastly, it has been claimed that the globalisation of financial markets has led to the faster 
transmission of economic and financial disturbances more generally with, in addition to the 
trade channel as a transmission mechanism, a greater synchronisation of business cycles 
across the world (IMF WEO Autumn 2001). Moreover, flexible exchange rate systems have 
only partly succeeded in insulating economies from international disturbances. 
The increasing scope for information asymmetries. Information asymmetries mean that 
participants in a financial transaction do not have the same quality of information to evaluate 
the prospects of the transactions being carried out successfully. Typically, for example, a 
borrower has more information on his financial perspectives than the lender. With the 
globalisation of markets, the multiplication and diversity of investors involved in international 
financial transactions, the dominance of market-based finance relative to the more traditional 
bank financing, and the vast amount of information to be processed, information asymmetries 
have become more pervasive.  
Pervasive information asymmetries have had two broad types of concrete consequences in the 
international financial area in recent years.43 First, they tend to lead to credit rationing when 
lenders believe that they do not have the proper information to evaluate properly the riskiness 
of a proposed financial transaction. This may lead for example to a situation whereby good 
corporate risks in developing countries cannot access external financing directly because 
lenders do not possess enough information about the country, the company and its business. 
Second, and conversely, information asymmetries have led to boom cycles of capital towards 
some types of financial assets, for example, emerging market bonds or shares of 
telecommunications companies, as investors only focussed on the positive information. 
The increased size and volatility of private capital flows towards developing countries. 
Following the two oil shocks, developing countries attracted record amounts of foreign 
capital, mostly in the form of traditional bank loans (syndicated or not). The prospects of 
default by Mexico and Argentina in the early eighties precipitated the end of this cycle of 
large capital inflows. In the early nineties, however, following the liberalisation of their 
capital accounts, a new cycle of private capital flow to developing countries began, but was 
stopped and reversed towards the middle of the decade in the wake of the Asian crisis.  
A characteristic of this more recent reliance on external financing has been that a number of 
countries have taken on large debt-creating inflows with short-term maturities. Because they 
are often unable to borrow locally and with long term maturities, it is tempting for developing 
countries’ governments and enterprises to borrow on international markets. Most of the 
borrowing takes place in foreign currencies (because of lower interest rates and easier 
availability than when borrowing on the local market in the domestic currency) and at 
relatively short term maturities (reflecting foreign lenders’ preference for reducing their 
risks).  
                                                
43  See for example Devenow and Welch (1996). 
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Foreign borrowing is particularly attractive under fixed exchange rates. However, if foreign 
investors decide to withdraw capital ‘en masse’, the economy is presented with a two-faced 
crisis. The first one is a traditional liquidity crisis; current financial resources are insufficient 
in the face of short-term maturing obligations and refinancing becomes difficult, if not 
impossible. In addition, because of the currency and maturity mismatches in the balance 
sheets of local banks and enterprises resulting from borrowing short term in foreign currency, 
the liquidity crisis can very rapidly translate into a solvency crisis. If a devaluation results and 
under the new macroeconomic conditions, the expected cash flows generated by the 
operations of local banks and companies are not adequate to meet their financial obligations. 
B.2. Abuses of the Global Financial System  
The global financial system has increasingly been used to ‘launder’ revenues generated by 
illegal activities, such as drugs related crime, and to channel funds to people and organisations 
involved in illegal activities, such as terrorism. The increasing ease of transferring funds 
across borders, the very extensive networks of all main banks (through their correspondents) 
and the growing number of countries that have opened their capital account imply that it has 
become more difficult to control the origin and the ultimate destination of funds entering the 
global financial system. Moreover, it has become increasingly clear that corporate vehicles 
are being used in money laundering and tax evasion schemes, organised criminal activity, and 
as a way to circumvent regulations and manipulate equity markets. 
There are no estimates of the amount of money that is being processed in the international 
financial system to finance terrorist activities. With respect to money laundering, the IMF is 
quoted as estimating the aggregate size of money laundering in the world as being between 
two and five percent of global GDP, or roughly 600 to 1500 bn USD44. 
The abuse problem has been compounded by a number of countries and jurisdictions that 
have built their competitive advantage through very favourable tax and regulatory 
environments for non-residents funds, while at the same time limiting their co-operation with 
the judicial, tax and police authorities of other countries. In addition to providing an 
accommodating environment for money laundering and other crime-related financial 
activities, these jurisdictions undermine the ability of other governments to finance essential 
public goods and services by providing easy opportunities for tax evasion by non-residents. 
As a result, decisions on where to locate economic activities are distorted and the tax burden 
in the affected countries is shifted towards law-abiding taxpayers. 
There are few estimates of the size of financial flows to financial and tax havens, and the 
available figures do not distinguish legitimate investments from investments resulting from 
the harmful features of these jurisdictions. However, they clearly highlight the growing 
importance of financial flows to these jurisdictions while showing the peculiarities of these 
flows. Hines and Rice (1994) note that tax havens account for only 1.2% of world population 
and 3% of world GDP, but they attract 26% of assets and 31% of profits of American 
multinationals45. According to the OECD, foreign direct investment by companies in G7 
countries in a number of low-tax jurisdictions in the Caribbean and in South Pacific island 
states increased more than five-fold over the period 1985-1994, to more than $200 billion, a 
rate of increase well in excess of the growth of total outbound Foreign Direct Investment46. 
                                                
44 See http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/. 
45 Hines and Rice (1994). 
46 OECD (1998). 
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In addition to the concerns associated with the misuse of the financial system, there are other 
worries that are related to the intensified linkages between markets, intermediaries and 
infrastructure and which may become sources of risk to systemic stability and hence to the 
economic stability of countries that participate in the international financial system. These 
worries relate to the growing use of sophisticated financial management techniques, a greater 
reliance on in-house procedures for risk assessment and, in particular, the regular recourse to 
leverage as a means to magnify potential gains on investment positions.  
Highly leveraged institutions – mainly hedge funds - play an important role in the 
international financial system by facilitating the efficient sharing of investor risk. However, 
the activities of hedge funds are often characterised by highly speculative behaviour. This 
behaviour of hedge funds, which are typically constructed so as to avoid regulation, has long 
been a source of concern to policymakers. The background to the most recent bout of concern 
about highly leveraged institutions was the destabilising effects of the Long Term Credit 
Management crisis in the autumn of 1998 and the earlier crises in South-east Asia and Russia.  
The abuses, misuses and lack of regulation of the global financial system have been made 
easier because of the slow and difficult co-operation among cross-border judicial, tax and 
policy authorities. It should, however, be noted that the events of 11 September have 
significantly changed the position of some policy makers, in particular the US administration 
with regard to their assessment of the costs (in terms of compliance costs for financial 
institutions) and benefits (in terms of preventing illegal activity) of greater international 
oversight on financial flows as well as pressure on non-cooperative countries where practices 
have been adjudged to favour illegal financial activity. As the next section will show, there 
are increased efforts being made at international level to address these challenges. 
C. Towards a More Stable and Better Functioning International Monetary and 
Financial System 
Recent years have seen the emergence of numerous proposals on how best to adapt the 
international financial and monetary system (IFMS) to the changes and challenges of a global 
economy. While this reform drive was accelerated by - and became more public with - the 
frequency of financial crises in the 1990s, it is not a new phenomenon. Previous decades had 
seen other proposals to reform and adapt the IFMS to the evolution of economic and financial 
relations and to changes in relative economic and political powers. Examples include the 
creation of the WTO, which was preceded by the GATT but which became a fully-fledged 
international organisation only in the mid-1990s.47 Others, even highly publicised ones, have 
had rather limited effects: already in 1974, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration 
and the Action Plan for a new world economic order.  
This section on proposals for reforming the system limits itself to the current policy debate 
and to the main proposals. It provides a short analysis of the pros and cons of these proposals, 
their political and practical feasibility as well as an assessment of the necessary conditions for 
success.  
For the purpose of this report, the reform proposals have been grouped into four categories: 
modalities of crisis prevention and management (C.1), initiatives to reduce the abuses of the 
international financial system (C.2), regional and global co-operation (C.3), and reform of the 
                                                
47 See for example Gardner (1980). 
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institutional framework (C.4). These broad categories address to some extent the perceived 
failures in the working of the IFMS that were developed in the previous chapter.  
C.1. Modalities of Crisis Prevention and Management 
In the wake of the financial crises of Mexico in 1994/1995 and in South-East Asia in 1997/98, 
a discussion re-emerged about the instability of the IFMS and its proneness to financial crises. 
The financial crises were seen to expose significant problems in the functioning of 
international financial markets and of the system governing them. These problems included 
the following:  
• Most participants (the IMF, like most other international institutions, major 
policymakers and credit rating agencies and private investors) were taken by 
surprise;  
• Capital inflows had been mismanaged by emerging market economies, with 
excessive short-term indebtedness provoking a rush for the exit by investors, thereby 
accentuating the severity of the crisis; 
• Private creditors were perceived to have taken excessive risks, a fact which was 
attributed to deficiencies in information provision and processing but also to the 
creation of expectations about an official bail-out (either by the debtor country or the 
international community) – the ‘moral-hazard-problem’; 
• IMF-led assistance packages were perceived to be both huge from an historical 
perspective and in relation to the financial resources of the Fund and “too limited” to 
contain panic and prevent very severe fall-outs in crisis countries; 
• There was a sentiment that whereas gains from risky investments - that contributed to 
the crises - were accrued by the private sector, the official community (i.e. ultimately 
the taxpayer) had to pick up the bill when investments turned sour. While this was 
not true across-the-board (equity holders suffered huge losses in many crisis 
countries), the concern was valid with respect to short-term creditors, who had to a 
significant extent been able to limit their losses.  
Against this background, calls were made to adapt the set of rules and practices governing the 
IFMS, and the role of the International Monetary Fund in it, to the challenges of free and 
large capital flows. These calls for reform were not only made by academics, journalists, or 
civil society but also came from the G7, other governments and indeed from the Fund itself.  
Some of the proposals to make the international monetary and financial system less prone to 
crises are listed below, separating probably somewhat artificially the ones pertaining to crisis 
prevention from the ones related to crisis resolution. Some initiatives are in the process of 
being implemented reflecting a high degree of consensus of the international financial 
community; others lack at present sufficient political support or would imply a too high level 
of public intrusion in the markets. Whereas most of the proposed changes are being dealt with 
in the existing framework, some of the more ambitious ones require the creation of a new 
institution or a much more profound reform of the architecture. 
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C.1.1. Crisis Prevention  
At crisis prevention level, i.e. ex-ante measures to improve market participants’ risk 
assessment, strengthen market discipline and thereby minimise the risk of crises, much has 
been achieved but some suggestions for further action and progress have been made. 
• There is general recognition that pursuit of sound policies and the existence of sound 
macroeconomic and structural framework remains the major and essential condition 
for reducing the occurrence of financial crises. Sound policies require a continuous 
effort to which the IMF, through its surveillance, and private market participants, 
through the feedback they give to authorities, can contribute. Sound policies are, 
however, not always sufficient since financial market participants may fail to 
differentiate sufficiently between good performers and bad ones, are sometimes 
prone to herd behaviour or need sometimes to withdraw their funds from sound 
investments to meet margin calls in other markets48. 
• Many efforts have been devoted to improving the flow of information to market 
participants. Initiatives were taken in order to obtain better quality and more timely 
information from countries (such as the IMF Special Data Dissemination Standard 
(SDDS) and General Data Dissemination System (GDDS), and the Data Quality 
Reference sites (DQRS)49, at improving information disclosure by policymakers to 
markets (such as Public Information Notices (PINs), publication of Letters of Intent 
and Article IV Staff reports, fiscal, monetary and financial transparency codes) and 
at getting feedback from markets through the organisation of a more permanent 
dialogue between the IMF and market participants. This drive towards better 
information is also reflected in the progress with respect to information processing 
by the IMF itself through improved Fund surveillance and the development of early 
warning, or vulnerability, indicator systems. 
However, this approach also has its limits. Perfect information is an illusion. The 
existence of information asymmetries in capital markets is a well known fact of 
financial life since a borrower, whatever the standards and his willingness to respect 
them, will always be better informed about his situation than his creditors. Standards 
can also sometimes induce perverse behaviour by creating a false sense of 
confidence and/or introducing a bias towards some type of capital flows or in favour 
of some specific countries without proper risk assessment. Moreover, standards and 
codes are not value-less and major political differences continue to exist about what 
they should cover, how normative they should be and how they should be 
implemented and/or enforced. Also, since the need for information on the economic 
situation and policies of a country depends, to some extent, on its access to financial 
markets and levels of development, an appropriate balance needs to be found 
between the voluntary or compulsory character of standards. Finally, efforts have so 
far concentrated on information to the markets, while it has been suggested that 
                                                
48 For an more in-depth discussion of capital market dynamics in both mature and emerging markets, see 
for example the bi-yearly IMF publication “International Capital Markets, Developments, Prospects and 
Policy issues” and in particular the September 1998 issue. 
49 The SDDS was established in 1996 to guide countries that have, or that might seek, access to 
international capital markets in the dissemination of economic and financial data to the public. And the 
GDDS was established in 1997 to guide countries in the provision to the public of comprehensive, 
timely, accessible, and reliable economic, financial, and socio-demographic data. 
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creditors could also be more transparent by releasing information on the composition 
of their asset portfolios.  
• Efforts to make countries less vulnerable to crises have also been geared at 
developing deeper and more liquid financial markets and at strengthening 
domestic financial systems. These efforts have been made by, or are underway in, 
not only emerging market economies but also in advanced countries since many of 
them experienced during the recent past or are experiencing (Japan) more or less 
acute forms of banking or financial crises50. However, as recently demonstrated51, 
banking crises tend to have a bigger negative impact, in GDP terms, in emerging 
market economies than in advanced countries because the former tend to rely more 
on bank financing in light of their level of economic and institutional development. 
Banking crises, because they tend to spread to the whole financial sector and to the 
whole economy, have generally much more acute (direct and indirect) costs for the 
economy than stock or bond price variations52.  
 
Strengthening prudential regulation and supervision are among the most important 
micro-prudential tools to foster financial stability and to prevent financial crises. 
World-wide, supervisory efforts are currently directed at developing a sharper focus 
on the risks within a financial institution. G-10 countries, under the auspices of the 
Bank of International Settlements, have reinforced their role in preparing regulatory 
recommendations in the banking field that will set capital adequacy standards for the 
international community at large. Work is also underway on the convergence of 
supervisory practices.   
 
These efforts are complemented by the extension of IMF surveillance to domestic 
banking and financial systems through Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) 
and Financial System Stability Assessments (FSSA). These exercises aim at 
identifying ex-ante the strengths and vulnerabilities of a country's financial system 
and how to address them. Increasing the governance and regulation of financial 
institutions in developing countries and emerging market economies is another 
priority, which runs in parallel with these IMF efforts.  
 
In addition, some policymakers argue that the development of a securities market 
should become a priority for emerging market economies53. Deep and liquid 
securities and bond markets, however, require a legal and institutional framework 
(including disclosure requirements, contract enforcement, market rules and corporate 
governance) that takes time and costs to develop. 
• In the framework of the G-20 it has been argued that the strengthening of the 
country’s foreign exchange reserves should become a priority for emerging market 
economies’ policymakers. In that view, emerging market economies need a sufficient 
buffer of foreign exchange reserves relative to their debt (short term debt generally) 
in order to re-assure market participants about their ability to service their debt. 
While there is agreement that adequate foreign reserves are obviously confidence 
                                                
50  Several European countries were hit by financial crises in the beginning the 1990s, notably Sweden, 
Finland and Norway (Bank of Finland 2001).  
51 For instance in Goldstein (1998). 
52 See IMF (1998). 
53 See for instance Tsang (1998). 
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enhancing, it is difficult to determine a single level that would, irrespective of 
circumstances, provide insurance against market attacks. Moreover, holding 
excessive reserves can be costly for the central bank and the economy.  
Progress is also being made on the following fronts but at a slower pace because these 
proposals are either of a less consensual nature or more difficult to implement in practice. 
• The IMF is stepping up its efforts to develop an early warning system54 but also to 
stimulate emerging market economies’ policy makers to clarify, during Article IV 
consultations, their possible policy responses to crises. While this approach has the 
advantage of increasing the preparedness of the IMF and debtor countries to potential 
crises, economic and political circumstances evolve rapidly and the intrinsic element 
of a crisis is surprise. Moreover, care needs to be taken to avoid that an IMF 
assessment would itself precipitate a crisis. 
• Though there seems to be a wide consensus on the theoretical merits of including 
collective action clauses (CAC) (majority action clauses, sharing clauses and 
representation arrangements) into new international bond issues of emerging market 
economies, implementation has been rather limited. CACs are expected to facilitate 
the inclusion of international bonds into comprehensive debt restructuring 
operations, and to improve the pricing of risks by bondholders. Some, however, fear 
that the inclusion of such clauses will increase the financing cost to emerging market 
economies. Industrialised countries also differ on the idea of “leading by example” 
by introducing these clauses in their own international bond issues. Progress on CAC 
clearly necessitates a ‘critical mass’ of countries to move forward.  
• The idea of creating Clubs of Creditors is also appealing.55 Such clubs would bring 
together all creditors of sovereign debtors and would allow to disseminate 
information among them on the situation of the debtor country so that they could 
collectively adopt more rapidly and efficiently the best solution in case of crisis. It 
would be preferable to establish them prior to crises and they could usefully 
complement CAC. These clubs would play a role similar to the ones of bank 
advisory committees in the eighties or the so-called London clubs in the first part of 
the century. Private market participants have so far been reluctant in organising 
themselves in such a way because they fear that by doing so they would implicitly 
facilitate default by sovereign debtors. Without international official financial 
community lobbying, there is little chance that they would take the initiative.  
• There is also a wide agreement that emerging market economies should develop 
and/or broaden the use of financing instruments that can be used as a first line of 
defence in case of crisis. Such instruments include private contingent credit lines (as 
already established e.g. by Argentina and Mexico) and call options in inter-bank loan 
contracts that would enable debtors to ‘lock in’ loans in the event of a crisis. As such, 
they reinforce official foreign exchange reserves, allow a better pricing of risk by 
market participants and enable debtors to hedge against their risks more efficiently. 
They are, however, quite costly and difficult to operate in practice since the ‘trigger 
event’ should neither create self-fulfilling crises nor moral hazard. Moreover, recent 
                                                
54 See Köhler (2001). 
55 See for example Eichengreen et al (1995a) and Eichengreen (1999). Some countries, such as Brazil 
unsuccessfully tried this approach.  
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experience such as in Argentina has shown that calling on these credit lines might 
cause a full risk re-assessment by private creditors thereby provoking capital 
outflows and/or the evaporation of other sources of capital inflows.  
• Though the principle of free international flows remains solidly anchored in the 
IMFS and is considered to be a final objective for all countries, capital account 
liberalisation has been heavily discussed. International private capital flows have 
become the major source of finance and investment for essentially all emerging 
market economies. This process will probably extend itself to developing countries, 
perhaps with the exception of the poorest ones. The merits of opening up to capital 
inflows are widely acknowledged. However, while countries should be encouraged 
to open their capital markets, it is necessary to ensure that this takes place within an 
orderly and well-sequenced process. Whether and to what degree multilateral 
institutions should promote this process or even be given jurisdiction over capital 
movements remains an issue for discussion.  
 
There is widespread consensus that capital account liberalisation needs to be orderly 
and well-sequenced, starting preferably at the long end (including with FDI) and that 
the process should be consistent with the overall stability of the economy and, in 
particular, the soundness of its financial system. At the same time, one needs also to 
recognise the distortional effects of capital controls and the tendency to see their 
effectiveness erode over time. This provides an incentive to liberalise further the 
capital account.  
 
The role of the international community in the capital account liberalisation process 
has not been fully settled. The Asian crisis, which was widely perceived as linked to 
inappropriately sequenced capital account liberalisation, has reduced support for 
proposals to amend the IMF Articles of Agreement to make capital account 
liberalisation one of the purposes of the Fund. Such an amendment would not only 
provide an explicit legal base for the inclusion of capital account issues into Fund 
surveillance, which is taking place anyway, but would also enable the Fund to 
include capital account liberalisation into program conditionality and give the Fund 
jurisdiction over capital movements. The latter option would establish an obligation 
for members to liberalise them, which would broadly mirror the Fund’s competence 
with regard to current account transactions. 
• Within that debate of capital account liberalisation, the question of taxes on capital 
inflows has received renewed attention. These taxes can take the form, as in Chile, of 
non-remunerated deposits for capital inflows but could also proceed as taxes or 
quantitative ceilings on short term foreign financial flows. They can, as shown by 
various studies56, encourage longer term financing from international investors and 
thus discourage more volatile capital inflows. It is argued, however, that they need to 
be broad-based to avoid creating loopholes; temporary since their persistence would 
encourage tax evasion; and complemented by measures to strengthen the financial 
system.  
Finally, a number of proposals have yet to gather sufficient support. 
                                                
56 Eichengreen and Mussa (1998). 
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• Soros proposed in the midst of the 1997-1998 crisis of emerging markets the 
creation of an international debt insurance agency scheme that would be financed 
by a fee paid by borrowing countries57. The mechanism would operate on the basis of 
a country-specific ceiling on international borrowing that would be assessed by the 
IMF in light of the country’s financial and economic situation. This mechanism 
would require that the IMF would only be prepared to provide assistance to countries 
respecting the ceiling. If debtor countries were to borrow in excess of the ceiling, 
markets would be expected to request a higher risk premium to cover default. 
The advantages of this proposal are a better pricing of risk (if the ceilings are 
assessed correctly); the avoidance of rush to exit in countries respecting the ceiling; 
and the implicit rejection of bail outs for countries disregarding the ceiling. However, 
it is quite difficult to set an economically sound ceiling, independent of changing 
economic and political circumstances and based on economic considerations only. 
Moreover, a few large international borrowers have already borrowed in excess of 
what could be reasonably considered as an economically sound ceiling and would 
thus not qualify. There are also doubts about the actual relevance of differentiating 
domestic/international borrowing and private/public debt and about whether the IMF 
(and the international financial community) would be in a position to refrain from 
intervening in support of countries disregarding the ceiling, particularly the systemic 
ones. The cost of borrowing for all emerging market economies (insurance fee and 
risk premium for unsinsured) would increase.  
• The creation of an international prudential supervisory agency has recently been 
proposed as a way to address the dichotomy between national supervision and 
globally operating financial institutions58. As financial markets become more 
integrated, new rules are being developed within various fora such as the BIS, the 
FSF, the IMF/WB, the FATF and the OECD. These rules, codes of conduct, and 
standards to be implemented rely most of the time on the goodwill of countries. 
Under the proposal, they could be made compulsory and would be monitored by the 
international agency. This would have the advantage of making the rules more 
explicit, ensuring a level playing field, thereby possibly increasing information about 
the health of internationally active financial institutions. In case of crisis, co-
ordination will be facilitated and the risk of contagion would diminish. The idea, 
however, requires a high degree of global political consensus since questions about 
the legal and enforcement powers of this international agency over financial 
institutions, national supervisors and central bankers would have to be settled.  
C.1.2. Crisis Resolution  
At crisis resolution level, progress has been more limited. The balancing exercise between 
adjustment by the debtor country, official financing, and private financing has become more 
complex than 20 years ago. Financial markets have grown more rapidly than the financial 
resources at the disposal of the Fund and the reserve assets of creditor countries. Capital 
market participants are more diverse and numerous and reaching a co-operative solution 
among them and the debtor country is much more arduous. Moreover, whereas sovereign 
borrowing used to dominate emerging market country financing, borrowers are now public 
institutions, financial companies and corporate entities, which sometimes benefit from an 
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implicit or explicit public guarantee. Finally, most capital account restrictions have been 
removed, facilitating the use of official assistance money for capital outflows.  
The question also arises whether, and to what extent, the balance should be tailored to specific 
country circumstances. While it has been claimed that the wide and varying number of actors, 
both on the debtor and creditor side, increases the need for a common framework for crisis 
resolution in order to ensure some fairness, some of the reform proposals acknowledge, 
sometimes explicitly59, that “systemic” countries - those that could trigger contagion or are 
politically most important - need to be treated differently. Such a case-by-case approach to 
crisis resolution, however, gives the main IMF shareholder an advantage in influencing the 
terms of each rescue operation. 
The IMF is currently engaged in a process of reviewing the conditionality attached to its 
financing. There is broad agreement that conditionality needs to focus on those policies that 
are critical to achieving the macroeconomic objectives of the programme60. The question of 
how to associate the private sector in the resolution of crises has also received a lot of 
attention. Related to this discussion, proposals have also been formulated for a more radical 
change in the role of the IMF in handling country crises. 
• There is a consensus, at least on paper, on the need to further develop the 
principles for Private Sector Involvement, that were laid down in the IMFC 
Prague framework to involve the private sector in both the prevention and the 
resolution of financial crises. The objective is to provide clearer guidance for market 
participants, debtor countries and the official creditors. The key principles of the 
framework include:  
– the commitment to honour contracts whenever possible;  
– equitable burden sharing between the public and private sectors;  
– comparable treatment of different classes of creditors;  
– main responsibility for restructuring with debtor countries;  
– assessment of the need for PSI on the basis of (a) the country’s medium-term 
payment capacity and (b) its chances of regaining market access quickly. 
Depending on the situation, the program could then either (1) rely on the 
catalytic capacity of the Fund, without PSI, (2) call for voluntary and 
temporary arrangements to overcome problems of creditor co-ordination or (3) 
involve an actual debt restructuring or reduction. 
However, this framework is work in progress and needs to be further operationalised.  
• The international community has until now failed to devise a clearer and more solid 
legal framework for standstill, debt restructuring, and debt reduction, in case a 
country cannot secure adequate voluntary participation in crisis resolution from its 
private creditors. Under a standstill, a country would be allowed to suspend 
temporarily payments on some, or all, of its external obligations. This would force 
market participants to reconsider and could reduce herd behaviour.  
                                                
59 International Financial Institutions Advisory Commission (2000).  
60 IMF Public Information Notice No. 01/125. 
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The option of a standstill could be made more credible if IMF access limits were 
applied more strictly. Market participants would realise that huge bailout packages 
by the Fund would become unlikely and that, unless a voluntary agreement is 
reached, a standstill would be possible.  
 
A standstill could also gain acceptance if accompanied by an extension of the Fund’s 
policy of lending into arrears for bonded debt. This policy initiated in the eighties for 
commercial bank debt allows the IMF to provide financial support to a country 
which is in arrears but is negotiating in good faith with its creditors. By doing so, the 
Fund encourages a positive outcome from discussions between the debtor country 
and its creditors. However, such a policy for bonded debt could trigger lawsuits by 
creditors with the objective to attach the IMF money, a risk less present with 
commercial banks that can be subject to official moral suasion.  
 
The Fund could also consider backing a standstill by making use of Article VI of its 
Articles of Agreement, which allows the institution to request a member to exercise 
controls on capital outflows in order to be eligible for the Fund’s general resources. 
A Fund endorsement of a standstill would mitigate somewhat the detrimental long-
term effects on a country’s international standing. However, this might also prove 
insufficient to prevent litigation.  
 
Preventing litigation would probably require an amendment of the IMF Articles of 
Agreement. This approach is being debated following a speech by the IMF Deputy 
Managing Director at the end of November 200161 when she presented a proposal for 
an international debt workout mechanism. This mechanism would take the form of a 
framework offering a debtor country legal protection from creditors that stand in the 
way of a necessary restructuring, provided that the debtor negotiates with its 
creditors in good faith and to put in place policies that would prevent a similar 
problem from arising in the future.  
 
This approach would have the advantage of avoiding disorderly debt restructuring. It 
could also contribute to a more stable international financial system if it could help to 
correct market perceptions that the official sector will bail out private investors in 
case of crisis. The approach could lead, in a first instance, to a reduction of capital 
flows to emerging markets but simultaneously also to a better risk assessment by 
creditors.  
 
However, an international debt workout mechanism requires a very broad consensus 
(85 % voting power majority for an amendment of the IMF Articles) since these 
rules would have to be applied by the whole membership. If the Fund, and not 
another international institution, is empowered to sanction temporary capital 
controls, it could also be seen as playing the rather irreconcilable roles of referee and 
financial provider. This could create a climate in which a crisis could be triggered 
when the Fund starts to be involved in a problem country. Moreover, reflection will 
be needed on how to determine if and when the mechanism is formally set in motion; 
how to ensure the debtor behaves appropriately while he is enjoying protection from 
his creditors; the level of financing that should be provided by the IMF; and the type 
of debt to which the stay and the binding-in of minority creditors would apply. 
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• A different approach is the proposal of fundamentally changing the IMF lending 
rules to transform the IMF into a international lender of last resort (LOLR) 
(See Calomiris62 initial proposal which led to the Meltzer proposal63). The IMF (or 
the to-be-created international central bank) should only lend short term, at a penalty 
rate and with collateral to its member countries meeting a set of pre-conditions 
related essentially to a well- capitalised and open banking system (Calomiris) or to 
sound economic fundamentals (Meltzer). The LOLR approach attempts to address 
the moral hazard problem associated with IMF assistance, by restricting IMF lending 
to sound (illiquid but solvent) debtors that face contagion. Both authors assume that 
the incentive to pre-qualify - and thus for pursuing sound policies or having a sound 
financial system - would be strong since this would be the only financing window 
available to countries. Being perceived by financial markets as having sound policies 
and a sound financial system would be a permanent requisite for emerging market 
economies since losing the pre-qualification status would almost automatically imply 
huge capital outflows. Private capital markets would indeed be expected to request a 
higher risk premium for countries that do not pre-qualify and thus reduce the 
incentive for over-investment in emerging markets.  
 
The question remains open as to what should be done with countries that do not meet 
the conditions any more and with countries that do not yet meet the pre-conditions. 
The proposal would also deprive most of the IMF membership of financial support in 
their adjustment efforts. Most importantly, the LOLR proposal assumes that the 
international official financial community would abstain from reacting if a non pre-
qualified country would be hit by a crisis. The country would have to face its 
adjustment process and the interaction with private creditors without Fund support. 
The problems of the LOLR function are illustrated in someway by the fate of the 
Contingent Credit Line (CCL), a facility which has some features of a LOLR. The 
CCL shows how difficult it is to have pre-qualification be a substitute for ex-post 
conditionality and how hard it will be for emerging market economies to continue 
being perceived as having sound policies.  
C.1.3. Excursion: Currency Transactions Taxes 
International currency transactions taxes (CTT) have been proposed as a way to reduce 
exchange rate volatility and undesired fluctuations in short-term capital movements. This 
section will review some of the major CTT proposals from the perspective of their relative 
effectiveness and efficiency in achieving these objectives.  
Within the development community, including development NGOs, proponents of currency 
transaction taxes have emphasised their potential capacity to generate public revenue. This 
aspect will be discussed in the context of promotion and financing of development in chapter 
III.  
The Concept of Currency Transaction Taxes  
The basic idea of discouraging speculative capital transactions through taxation has a long 
history in economic theory. Against the background of the differences of investment practices 
in the UK and the US prevailing at that time, Keynes already in the thirties presented the idea 
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of a transactions tax to counter speculation64. Nobel-prize winner James Tobin re-launched 
the idea in 1972 and refined it in 1978, when he proposed "to throw some sand in the wheels 
of our excessively efficient international money market".65  
In light of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the liberalisation of capital 
movements, Tobin’s primary objective was to give individual countries greater autonomy 
over monetary policy. By limiting the scope of capital movements, a currency transaction tax 
would be expected to expand the room for independent monetary policy. The currency 
transactions tax would discourage short-term capital movements by making the rapid taking 
and unwinding of financial positions more costly. Tobin argued that most of the daily 
transactions were speculation and arbitrage, and contributed little to the efficient allocation of 
long-term investment world-wide.66 
According to Tobin’s original proposal, the general levy of a flat and low tax rate (1 percent) 
on all spot transactions would imply a much stronger disincentive for the taking of short-term 
positions than for transactions related to longer-term investment and financing horizons. 
There was thus no need to distinguish between speculative and non-speculative transactions 
and the administration of the tax could be simplified. Proceeds of the tax would remain with 
national authorities. 
While the idea of a currency transaction tax did not receive much attention in the eighties, it 
came to the forefront of the international debate in the mid-nineties. It was argued that short-
term capital movements were at the root of financial and economic crises, hampering 
development and nourishing poverty in many developing countries.  
In 1996, Spahn proposed a variant of the Tobin tax. In his view, Tobin’s original scheme 
would create liquidity problems for the day-to-day operations of financial markets while not 
being effective in case of strong speculative forces. The Spahn version is based on a two-tier 
approach: while a tax would apply to all foreign exchange transactions and to all financial 
transactions taking place in the secondary market of financial derivatives at a normal rate of 
0.02%, a special exchange surcharge would be levied in periods of exceptional exchange rate 
turbulence. This implies the ex-ante adoption of some kind of target zone for the exchange 
rate around a (moving) central rate. The surcharge would apply only when the exchange rate 
was moving beyond the limits of the agreed fluctuation band. The tax base for the surcharge 
would correspond to the fraction of the value of the transactions carried out above or below 
the defined exchange rate band. 
Schmidt (1999) argued that the implementation of a Tobin-type tax was technically feasible, 
provided that the tax would be levied at the level of the centralised payments systems. This 
system is also used for interbank foreign exchange transactions and has details of all gross 
transactions in its electronic transfer systems. Schmidt also suggests that implementation of 
the tax by offshore financial centres can be enforced because of the strong links between 
developed countries’ central banks and offshore netting systems and securities exchanges. In 
                                                
64 "The introduction of a substantial Government transfer tax on all transactions might prove the most 
serviceable reform available, with a view to mitigating the predominance of speculation over enterprise 
in the United States. […] Casinos should, in the public interest, be inaccessible and expensive, perhaps 
the same is true of Stock Exchanges…". However, Keynes also pointed to the dilemma that "if 
individual purchases of investments were rendered illiquid, this might seriously impede new 
investment". See Keynes (1936) as quoted in paperback edition Keynes (1964) pp.159-160.  
65 Tobin (1978) and (1984). See also Summers and Summers (1989). 
66 United Nations Development Programme (1994). 
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order to foster compliance with the tax, central banks could refuse access to their payment and 
settlement systems if a jurisdiction would not comply with the rules. Central banks would act 
as tax collectors, making a new international institution for collecting the tax proceeds 
unnecessary. 
Impact on Financial Markets 
Impact on trade volumes, liquidity and volatility  
Assuming that reducing exchange rate volatility is indeed a desirable goal67, concerns have 
been expressed that by reducing the volume of market transactions, liquidity will tighten and 
as a consequence volatility actually may increase instead of being reduced as intended.68 A 
universal currency transactions tax is expected to increase the bid-ask spreads, deterring 
primarily arbitrage transactions. Arbitrage transactions form a large share of foreign exchange 
transactions. They take advantage of very small differences in the prices or yields of assets of 
similar types. These transactions are usually associated with very low costs (i.e. very low bid-
ask spreads). They take place in the context of financial institutions’ risks management daily 
operations. Such daily foreign exchange transactions have a similar equivalent in daily 
liquidity management operations in domestic currencies, where banks exchange vast amounts 
of money on the inter-bank money market. 
According to studies carried out by the French Treasury69 and under the auspices of the 
Finnish Ministry of Finance70, both of which use similar methodologies for their estimates, 
trading volumes are expected to fall significantly following the introduction of a currency 
transaction tax. For example, with a price elasticity of one71 and an initial bid-spread rate of 
0.02% (i.e. the typical transaction cost before tax on the inter-bank and bank/dealers foreign 
exchange market), the introduction of a 0.1% tax would reduce the volume of transactions by 
83%. With an elasticity of 0.5, the reduction would still amount to 69%72. The volume of 
transactions is expected to decline more the higher the tax rate, the higher the elasticity and 
the smaller the initial transactions cost73.  
The reduction in arbitrage trading would affect the liquidity of all markets. Markets in 
developed countries and trading among developed countries’ currencies would be mostly 
affected, because the lion’s share of currency transactions are carried out among developed 
countries’ currencies. The following eight currencies pairs (USD/EUR, USD/JPY, USD/GBP, 
USD/CHF, USD/CAD, EUR/GBP, EUR/CHF and EUR/JPY) accounted for 76% of the daily foreign 
exchange turnover in April 2001, with the two first pairs alone representing 50%74.  
Transactions among developed and developing countries’ currencies or transactions among 
currencies of developing countries account for a much lower share of the total foreign 
                                                
67 Some argue that a certain amount of volatility is inherent in the normal functioning of the national and 
global financial systems, as it reflects differences in business cycles, discrete shocks, the evolution of 
risk premia, and changes in expectations (see Financial Stability Forum (2000)). 
68 See Group of Seven (2001). 
69 French Government (2000). 
70 Ministry of Finance, Finland (2000). 
71 An elasticity of one means that the volume of trading falls by one percent when the transaction cost 
rises by one percent. 
72 See Ministry of Finance, Finland (2000), Table A4, page 56. 
73 Indeed, the smaller the initial transaction costs, the more the total cost increases after the introduction of 
the tax. 
74 See BIS (2001b). 
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exchange turnover. Trading in local currencies in emerging markets represented about 4.5 
percent of all transactions in 2001, compared with 3.1 percent three years earlier. The Hong 
Kong dollar, the Singapore dollar, the South African rand and the Mexican peso were the 
most widely traded emerging market currencies, accounting together for 5.3 percent of the 
average daily turnover in April 2001.  
In general, lower liquidity bears the risk of higher price volatility, which is the opposite of the 
desired effect. Despite their relatively low share in international foreign exchange markets, 
higher transactions costs related to the introduction of CTT could have disproportionately 
strong effects on the markets of developing countries, where liquidity and trade volumes are 
already comparatively small. Empirically, however, no simple link between the volume of 
trading and volatility can be established. For instance, while the trading volumes on the US 
dollar/yen market fell between 1998 and 2001, the volatility of the bilateral exchange rate in 
this period did not substantially fall from that observed in the preceding period75.  
Impact on market structure and costs 
Analysis suggests that a CTT is likely to contribute to the acceleration of the changes in the 
structural characteristics of the foreign exchange markets.76 Characterised by the decentralised 
nature of transactions and the predominance of dealer-to-dealer transactions until now, the 
introduction of a CTT is expected to further encourage the concentration of the market, which 
is already taking place under the joint forces of Internet trading platforms and concentration in 
the banking industry. 
CTTs may also drive up costs of financing across the board. Eichengreen (1996) argues that 
the higher cost of currency transactions due to CTTs would be felt by all economic agents, 
including those developing countries’ exporters and importers that rely on foreign trade and 
cannot use their own currencies in their operations. This may have an impact on their price 
competitiveness, which could counterbalance potential cost savings from reduced exchange 
rate volatility. In addition, depending on the degree of competition in the market and the ratio 
of price-supply and price-demand elasticities, the higher cost of foreign transactions may be 
passed on to final customers. 
Impact on speculative flows 
Proponents of currency transaction taxes often argue that, apart from reducing volatility, the 
tax could help in discouraging large speculative trading operations77. There is obviously a 
trade-off between on the one hand effectively discouraging potentially undesired capital flows 
and on the other hand not to unduly discouraging international transactions and ensuring 
sufficient liquidity to the markets.78 It is generally acknowledged that at a low rate, the tax 
would be an insignificant cost in times of currency turmoil. But even at the relatively high 
rate of 1% (2% on a round trip), a currency transaction tax might not prevent speculation, 
which is usually associated with the expectation of strong exchange rate movements, e.g. 
                                                
75 Between April 1995 and April 1998, the exchange rate of the yen fluctuated between 81 yen for one 
dollar and a peak of about 135 yen to a dollar. Between April 1998 and April 2001, the fluctuations 
were within the 101-147 range. See BIS (2001b). 
76 See Conseil supérieur des Finances du Royaume de Belgique (2001), page 64. 
77 Again, some argue that this should not be by definition beneficial to the countries themselves; see for 
instance Soros (2001), who points out that the adoption of CTTs could reduce the disciplining function 
of integrated capital markets. 
78 See for example the report of the French Government (2000) or the report from the European Banking 
Federation (2001). 
  55   
when market participants consider that a country’s fixed exchange rate has become 
unsustainable and is on the verge of being abandoned. A simple calculation shows that, at a 
rate of 1%, the tax would not deter a one-week speculative position if there were a 50% 
probability of a 4% devaluation during the week. A higher probability and/or a higher 
expected exchange rate change would make the speculative position taking more profitable 
than the tax.  
Taking this challenge into account, Jetin (2001) argues within the framework of Spahn’s two-
tiered approach, that the tax rate would need to be allowed to increase to “ (…) much higher 
levels than was expected until now”. Alternatively, he suggests to design a variable CTT with 
the tax rate being a function of the depreciation or appreciation rate of the foreign exchange 
rate. Depending on the details of the function, this could imply a prohibitively high 
transaction taxes in times of crisis, essentially mimicking the effect of a standstill.  
C.2. Reducing the Abuses of the Financial System 
Money Laundering and Harmful Tax Practices 
There is an increasing awareness of the need to tackle all sources of international financial 
abuse in order to guarantee a fair and more efficient economic system. Opaque tax and 
financial systems and the absence of effective co-operation with foreign authorities in some 
jurisdictions - in particular a number of financial and tax havens - make it very difficult to 
curb tax evasion or money laundering. Most states have, however, realised that it is in their 
best interest to agree on a number of common standards in the financial and tax fields and 
recognise that a certain co-ordination of fiscal or financial policies can increase their 
autonomy regarding domestic policies.  
A number of fora aimed at improving standards of financial regulation and at eliminating 
harmful practices are now in place. These include the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) of the 
G7, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Forum on harmful tax practices of the 
OECD. 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was established in 1989 and comprises 31 members, 
including the European Commission and the 15 EU Member States. It adopted in June 2000 a 
report aimed at identifying unco-operative states and territories in the fight against money 
laundering. Until now, 19 countries and territories have been considered unco-operative. A 
dialogue has started with these jurisdictions to encourage them to put an end to their unco-
operative practices and modify their legislation. For the countries and territories that maintain 
their harmful practices, defensive measures will be implemented. So far, defensive measures 
have only been proposed against Nauru which take effect from 30 November 2001. 
The G7 Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was created in 1999 with the objective of assessing 
vulnerabilities in the international financial system, identifying and overseeing action needed 
to address those vulnerabilities, and improving co-ordination and information exchange 
among the various authorities responsible for financial stability.79 The FSF has worked on 
several topics, including the activities of highly leveraged institutions and offshore financial 
centres. In a report published in April 2000, the FSF identified three groups of jurisdictions 
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carry out its functions. 
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with regard to adhesion to minimum standards of transparency and co-operation. The group 
III, which is characterised by a lack of transparency and co-operation, includes 25 
jurisdictions towards which the FSF proposes co-ordination of international initiatives.  
The OECD Forum on Harmful Tax Practices was set up in 1998 following the publication of 
the OECD report "Harmful tax competition. An emerging global issue". A list of 35 
jurisdictions meeting the tax havens identification criteria set out in that report has been 
published in June 2000. A dialogue aiming at encouraging these jurisdictions to adopt fair tax 
practices is currently undertaken. Since the start of its work, the Forum has obtained 11 
political commitments to co-operation80. In 2002, the adoption of defensive measures towards 
unco-operative jurisdictions will be proposed on the basis of a list of unco-operative 
jurisdictions established as at 28 February 2002. 
Within the European Community, important progress has been achieved in the fight against 
money laundering and harmful tax practices. The Council and the European Parliament 
adopted a revised and improved directive on money laundering on 4 December 2001, in order 
to make it more comprehensive and to ease the fight against international terrorism and other 
criminal activities. In the tax field, substantial progress towards the elimination of harmful tax 
practices has been achieved in the framework of the tax package endorsed by the Council on 
the 1st of December 1997. The European Commission has presented an amended proposal for 
a directive on the taxation of savings income in July 2001 and has now entered into 
negotiations with key third countries in order to ensure that equivalent measures are taken 
there. Progress is also being made in the field of corporate income taxation. The Code of 
Conduct for business taxation should lead to the progressive roll back of 66 harmful tax 
measures in this field.  
Fighting Financing for Terrorism 
Specific action against terrorist financing has increasingly come into focus. Several measures 
have been taken following UN Security Council Resolution 1333 to freeze assets of targeted 
persons and organisations associated with the Taliban. In addition, parallel work at the FATF 
and among supervisors has started as well as the strengthening of provisions used to combat 
money laundering. While no claim can be made that such measures will eliminate terrorist 
financing, they have led to increased co-operation between relevant authorities and additional 
pressure on illicit financing circuits.  
Although money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities have some features in 
common, they are substantially different in nature. While the first one involves laundering 
illegally obtained money (hence disguising its origin), the other represents almost the inverse 
i.e. the processing of funds, often from legitimate origins, to be used for future crimes. A 
further complication is that completely legal donors can fund terrorist groups through 
perfectly legitimate-looking charity donations that could ultimately end up in the hands of 
terrorists. Thus legitimate money can finance activity which might be illegal but the intention 
in respect of the donor cannot be established.  
With respect to fighting financing for terrorism, the Council adopted in March 2001, on the 
basis of a Council Common Position81, Regulation 467/200182 strengthening measures in 
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the Taliban (OJ L57, 27.2.2001, p.1). 
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respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1333. 
The applicable lists of entities and individuals, the accounts of which were frozen in the EU, 
included the Al-Qaida organisation and Usama Bin Laden as well as nine other associates. 
The Regulation was amended several times to reflect a consolidated list of persons and 
entities, established by the UN Taliban Sanctions Committee, to whom the freeze of funds 
would apply.  
Misuse of Corporate Entities 
The prevention of the misuse of corporate vehicles83 for illicit purposes is seen as an 
important element of a successful strategy to curb the abuses of the international financial 
system.84 While the diversity of corporate entities, comprising corporations, trusts, 
foundations and partnerships with limited liability features, is a well-established feature of the 
global economic system, some corporate vehicles are set up mainly to conceal the identity of 
the owners and/or beneficiaries of such entities. They can thus be misused for illicit purposes, 
including money laundering, the circumvention of disclosure requirements, bribery and 
corruption, hiding and shielding assets from creditors and supporting unlawful tax practices85.  
Proposals to combat the unlawful use of corporate structures stress the need to enhance their 
transparency. In particular, several mechanisms are proposed to obtain the necessary 
information on beneficial ownership and corporate control86. The first approach would be to 
introduce disclosure requirements about the beneficial owners and the control structure upon 
the establishment of a new corporate entity as well as each time the corporate structure is 
modified. A second approach would rely on intermediaries as the main source to supply the 
desired information. Such intermediaries would include formation agents, trust companies, 
and lawyers etc. involved in the formation and management of corporate vehicles. The third 
approach would operate through investigative measures such as court subpoenas and house 
searches. Depending on the conditions and traditions prevailing in different jurisdictions, the 
three mechanisms could be combined to re-enforce their effectiveness. 
In addition to increasing the transparency of corporate structures, the OECD recommends 
ensuring that appropriate and sufficiently integrated oversight capacities are in place. 
Moreover, non-public information on beneficial owners and corporate control should be 
shared with other relevant supervisors and law enforcement authorities, both domestically and 
internationally, for the purpose of investigating illicit activities, fulfilling their supervisory 
functions and facilitating compliance with the requirements embodied in anti-money 
laundering laws, such as customer identification.  
Towards Better Co-ordination  
Some have claimed that the international fight against abuses would benefit from a more co-
ordinated approach. One option would be to set up new international institutions to cope with 
                                                                                                                                                   
82 Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 of 6 March 2001 prohibiting the export of certain goods and 
services to Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending the freeze of funds and other 
financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan, and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 
337/2000 (OJ L 67, 9.3.2001, p.1). 
83 The OECD (2001) in its report on the misuse of coporate entities for illicit purposes defines corporate 
vehicles as « legal entities through which a wide variety of commercial acitivities are conducted and 
assets are held. » 
84 Financial Stability Forum (2000) and G7 Finance Ministers (2000b). 
85 OECD (2001e). 
86 OECD (2001e). 
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these matters. In that view, global problems, such as in the tax and financial fields, are better 
dealt with at the global level and using "global" instruments. Also, in a truly international 
forum, developing countries - which have arguably suffered as much as any country from the 
effects of financial abuses- would have a greater voice, as of course would many of the 
financial and tax havens and off-shore centres. In this way, the perception of a “rich man’s 
club” ganging up on smaller, and in some cases poorer, countries would be overcome. 
However, it should be underlined that most tax and financial havens are relatively well-off 
countries, while the adverse consequences of unfair practices are borne by both developed and 
developing countries.  
An alternative would be to work with existing institutions and ensure better co-ordination of 
regional and international organisations. Existing institutions such as the FATF or the OECD 
have already obtained considerable results; a number of jurisdictions are now moving towards 
fairer practices in the financial and tax fields as a result of their work. If a new organisation 
were to assume the lead in areas such as harmful tax competition, there is a strong risk of 
losing much of the momentum already achieved and positive results, such as commitments by 
a number of jurisdictions to remove harmful features of their tax regimes, could be put in 
jeopardy. Furthermore, it is also possible that harmful criteria and the remedies could be made 
much weaker than at present due to the mere participation of tax and financial havens in the 
decision-taking of the new institution. Lastly, it is unlikely that creating new organisations 
would overcome the aforementioned legitimacy problems. Indeed, such organisations would 
require both a wide country membership to give their proposals legitimacy and either the 
ability to reach a consensus or some other means of enforcing the majority view. Complex 
decision-taking processes may ultimately lead to unsatisfactory results from the point of view 
of both developed and developing countries. 
C.3. Regional and Global Co-operation 
This section discusses initiatives to enhance the stability of the international monetary system 
by intensified macro-economic co-ordination within the context of regional groupings and 
among the G3.  
Regional Macro-Economic and Monetary Co-operation 
Regional macroeconomic and monetary co-operation have been advocated as a way forward 
to spur regional economic integration and making small and relatively open economies more 
resilient to external disturbances87. While for large economies, such as the US, Japan and the 
euro area, the repercussions of large swings in exchange rates on the real economy tend to be 
moderate, for emerging market economies and developing countries the impact can be 
significant. They may thus have a particularly strong interest in an exchange rate system that 
ensures a maximum level of stability.  
However, the Asian crisis has underlined that the globalisation of financial markets and the 
high level of international capital mobility are rendering the policy requirements for 
maintaining pegged exchange rates more demanding. It is often argued that for open emerging 
market economies, floating exchange rates are the most viable solution.88 There is, however, 
universal recognition that any viable exchange rate policy needs to be consistent with and 
backed up by domestic economic and financial policies.  
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Dornbusch (2001) stresses the importance of regional financial market integration. He argues 
that as capital markets are broadening and deepening in response to progressing integration, 
the exchange rate becomes less important as an instrument of adjustment in the case of a 
negative shock. The capital market would be able to take over an important part of the buffer 
functions typically assigned to exchange rates. 
This line of reasoning is consistent with the European experience. European Economic and 
Monetary Union has created a pole of monetary and financial stability for Europe fuelling 
further market integration and growth dynamics. Enhanced macroeconomic and exchange rate 
co-operation among the Members of the European Community has complemented and 
reinforced the Internal Market project to generate growth and stability for the European 
Union. The experience of financial turbulence and strong intra-European exchange rate 
swings in the beginning of the 1990s have enhanced the commitment to move ahead with 
monetary union. The modest impact on EU financial markets of the 11 September attacks 
indicate that Member States with their move to a single currency have successfully reduced 
the vulnerability of their economies to external financial turbulence.  
While the EU situation cannot be translated to other regions without qualification, the 
experience of the European Community on its way to Economic and Monetary Union 
provides a good benchmark to analyse the sequencing and the necessary conditions of 
successful regional monetary co-operation. Essential ingredients include policy co-ordination 
on the basis of a shared philosophy on fiscal discipline; shared views on price stability; and 
some form of institutionalised multilateral monitoring. Given the free movement of capital 
and the desire to stabilise the exchange rate between Member States, the convergence of 
monetary policy rules is inevitable.  
Bearing in mind the lessons from the Asian crisis, the Asian economies in the context of the 
Manila Framework and the Chiang Mai initiative have made some progress in enhancing 
financial and monetary co-operation in the region89. Some argue that it could be beneficial for 
East Asian emerging market economies, particularly ASEAN countries, to move towards a 
regional system of managed exchange rates. In order to stabilise the system in the beginning, 
appropriate measures to curb excessive capital flows could be envisaged. Over time, however, 
as the system would become more robust, these restrictions could be removed to ensure the 
development of a functioning capital market in the region.90  
In the Americas, the approach to monetary co-operation appears to be less systematic. 
Monetary co-ordination is not included in the framework establishing the North American 
Free Trade Agreement. The US, Canada and Mexico operate exchange rate regimes of free 
floating with different degrees of de fact management. Within Mercosur, a wide range of 
exchange rate regimes exist. While Brazil has adopted a system of free float, Ecuador and El 
Salvador, and until recently Argentina, chose a currency board or have decided to unilaterally 
adopt the US dollar as their home currency. This raises questions whether the existence of 
different exchange rate regimes is compatible with the objective of regional economic 
integration. 
                                                
89 The Manila Framework sets the ground for regional financial and monetary surveillance and foresees 
co-operative financial arrangements for participating countries in times of financial crisis. Members 
include Asian and non-Asian countries, such as the U.S. The Chiang Mai Initiative is designed to 
expand existing swap arrangement among ASEAN countries, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. 
90 See Kuroda (2001). 
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For regions with a dominant regional economy such as the euro area for Europe and the US 
for North America, it has been claimed that improved monetary co-operation and progressing 
currency consolidation on the periphery can deliver important systemic gains. Some authors 
suggest that NAFTA provides a good argument for closer co-operation between the US, 
Canada and Mexico. Dornbusch (2001) argues that particularly the latter could benefit from 
permanently pegging its currency to the US-dollar via the introduction of a currency board. 
With the prospect of fewer crises on the periphery, improved regional stability and growth 
potential, the centre, therefore should take an active interest if not leadership in promoting 
regional monetary co-operation.91  
Macroeconomic Policy Co-operation among the G3 
The economic developments of the three major currency areas have substantial repercussions 
on the world economy as a whole. Against the background of growing economic and financial 
interdependence, and the increased potential for more sudden and deeper spill-over of shocks, 
a number of proposals have been made to enhance macroeconomic and particularly exchange 
rate policy co-ordination among the G3.92 
Most proposals advocate the creation of a target zone for bilateral (nominal) exchange rates. 
As unilateral targeting tends to be less effective than mutual action, a G3 target zone would 
typically require a trilateral agreement on bilateral target rates; a mutual understanding about 
who is doing what in case of the observed exchange rate moving away from the agreed target 
rate as well as about the margins beyond which action is required. Target zone proposals can 
thus vary regarding the size of the band and the rules for intervention (with or without inter-
marginal intervention, symmetric or asymmetric intervention etc.).  
The mechanism proposed by Wolf (1999) is less ambitious by comparison. He proposes for 
the euro area and Japan to unilaterally define a ceiling on their respective bilateral exchange 
rates vis à vis the dollar. In that scenario, the ECB and the Bank of Japan would conduct 
monetary policy in such a way as to ensure that the respective bilateral exchange rates would 
not exceed a certain threshold. This proposal was motivated by the view that the appreciation 
of the bilateral euro/dollar and the yen/dollar rates above desirable levels was more likely than 
a depreciation to undesired levels and that the risks associated with a possible overvaluation 
of the euro and the yen are bigger than the risks associated with a weakening of both 
currencies. In contrast with the concept of a target band, Wolf’s proposal is an asymmetric 
approach, which could be effective for the euro area and Japan to avoid that their exchange 
rates rise to levels considered unhealthy for their respective economies. However, it provides 
no rule in case of swings in the opposite direction.  
The design for a new global exchange rate system advocated by Mundell (2001) is the most 
ambitious. Given the high degree of inflation convergence among the major currency areas, 
he argues that some sort of monetary union of the G3, that is a single world currency, is 
feasible and desirable. This would require, a common inflation target, a joint rule for 
monetary policy and agreement on the distribution of seigniorage. Mundell’s proposal has 
triggered an ongoing academic debate about the desirability of a single world currency. In 
addition to the economic arguments raised against fixed exchange rates, Rogoff (2001) 
                                                
91 See Portes (2001) and Dornbusch (2001). Concerning the euro the ECB (1999), p. 45, does not share 
these conclusions and reports that the Eurosystem has adopted “…a neutral stance, neither hindering 
nor fostering the international use of its currency.” 
92 For example Volcker (1995), Williamson (1986), McKinnon, R. (1997), Wolf (1999) and Mundell 
(2001). For a survey of some of the proposals see Clarida (1999). 
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identifies a number of fundamental reasons against a global currency unification, including: 
(i) no adequate checks and balances on the global central bank due to the absence of a global 
government; (ii) international decision making could make it difficult to agree on appointing 
central bankers who place a strong weight on price stability; (iii) global currency competition 
provides a check on inflation. 
In general, proponents of an engineered stabilisation of exchange rates argue that the targeting 
of exchange rates among the G3 currencies would increase the overall stability of the 
international monetary and finance system, implying fewer crises and higher growth for both 
the major currency areas as well as the emerging market economies and developing countries. 
The cost for international transactions would diminish, boosting economic integration. For 
economies located at the periphery of the major currency areas, it would become less risky to 
peg their currency to one or to a basket of key currencies. In some cases, countries would be 
expected to give up their home currency altogether to be substituted by one of the major 
currencies.  
However, empirical evidence seems to suggest that for the G3 the repercussions of exchange 
rate swings on trade and investment are much slower and less pronounced than one would 
expect by looking at the extent of changes implied in variations of bilateral nominal exchange 
rates93. In addition, under fixed exchange rate systems, monetary policy authorities lose to a 
significant degree the ability to react independently to external shocks and domestic policy 
priorities. This can imply significant welfare losses in case of asymmetric shocks.94 Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (2000) argue that “continued improvement of monetary policy institutions at the 
domestic level, coupled with the further broadening of world capital markets, may render 
efforts towards closer exchange rate co-ordination superfluous or even counterproductive.”  
Moreover, some claim that under a regime of fixed exchange rates, monetary policy itself can 
become a genuine source of policy shocks. 95 With free capital movements, G3 authorities 
have to use domestic monetary policy as a tool to stabilise exchange rates. As a result, the 
variability of interest rates and monetary induced changes in domestic income and demand 
may rise. Against this background, the benefits for emerging market economies from 
stabilising exchange rates between the G3 countries are therefore not clear cut. While under a 
system of target zones, the relative prices for emerging market economies may become more 
stable as G3 exchange rates become more predictable, the increased variability of interest 
rates and G3 income may increase uncertainties for emerging market economies related to 
external financing and external demand. The welfare effect for an emerging market economy 
of a G3 target zone depends on how this zone is designed and on the particularities of the 
small country’s output, trading partners and debt structure. To the extent that an emerging 
market economy is vulnerable to high and volatile world interest rates, the consequences of 
the trade-off implied by a G3 target may be considerable. 
                                                
93 See Rogoff (2001). Contrary to the link between volatility and trade, Sekkat (1997) reports that there is 
a consensus in the economic literature on the negative impact of exchange rate misalignment on trade. 
94 The relevance and magnitude of this effect depends on various factors, such as the degree of economic 
integration and correlation of macroeconomic conditions. Advocates of target zones, such as Bergsten 
and Henning (1996) argue also that a) adjustment to shocks should be dealt with by the real economy, 
b) target bands leave some room for independent monetary policy and c) that if necessary revisions of 
the target rate are not excluded.  
95 Reinhart and Reinhart (2001).  
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C.4. Towards Improved Governance 
The IMF has until now remained the institution where the formal decision power related to 
the international monetary and financial system is vested. The substantial increase in its 
membership has transformed it into a global institution and the broadening scope of IMF tasks 
have been accommodated without substantial changes in the institutional setting or the 
decision process. The relative quota share of the founding members, mainly industrial 
countries, has reduced but advanced countries continue to retain a comfortable majority in 
voting power, with the US still enjoying a de facto veto with respect to major decisions96. 
New members were added to existing constituencies chaired by one of the founding members 
or, if the new member was economically important like Russia, China, and Switzerland, were 
allowed to form new constituencies through a gradual increase in the number of Executive 
Directors and Members of the International Monetary and Financial Committee to 24.  
The calls for more legitimacy, more accountability, and better governance for the Fund take 
place in the context of growing concerns of emerging market economies about the continued 
predominance of advanced countries in the IMF decision process and in informal fora with 
limited membership, such as the G7. They go in parallel with requests from NGOs and 
national parliaments for increased accountability since the IMF is also perceived by some as 
an excessively technocratic and not-transparent institution.  
Various proposals have been made to address these concerns. Some of them have been partly 
or fully implemented, others lack sufficient political support. The complexity of the issues 
and the conflicting objectives explain why so far changes in this area have been relatively 
limited. More recent changes and proposals include: 
• The creation, outside the IMF, of groups such as the FSF (see section C.2.) and 
the G20. The G20 was created in September 1999 as an informal mechanism for 
dialogue among 20 major industrialised and emerging market economies. While both 
fora serve a useful purpose, increasing the number of informal groups risks adding to 
the confusion and ultimately complicating the decision process since these fora lack 
legitimacy and non-participants do not feel involved. 
• Increasing the transparency of the decision process. The IMF has made efforts to 
publish its Board proceedings and to explain its decisions to the public. Transparency 
has, however, its limits: difficult decisions may require a certain degree of 
confidential dialogue before being taken. Moreover, NGOs and national parliaments 
not only want transparency but also wish to be in a position to influence decisions 
taken by the IMF. It is not entirely clear whether indeed the legitimacy of decisions 
taken by the Fund would be increased if the Fund's operations were taken on the 
basis of other than 'objective' criteria or if the Fund would be accountable to more 
groups. Furthermore, making the Fund accountable to anything else but its 
membership (as is now the case through the Board of Governors) seems a rather 
unworkable principle. Whereas having for instance national parliaments endorse 
decisions would probably help to increase legitimacy, it would most likely bring the 
operations of the institution to a halt.  
                                                
96 Major decisions are taken by a majority of 85 percent of the total voting power. 
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• Transforming the IMFC into a Council with decision power97. This would have 
the advantage of giving more political weight to the IMF and increasing 
accountability by leaving important decisions to be taken by Ministers, rather than by 
the Executive Board. The creation of the permanent IMFC, replacing the Interim 
Committee is a step in this direction. Creating a Council would transform the IMF 
into a much more political institution. It would also risk complicating the relations 
between the Board and the Council.  
• Re-balancing the decision power within the Fund. Various avenues have been 
suggested, including changing the quota formulas or increasing the number of basic 
votes. Progress on that front is conditional upon the recognition that calls for a more 
balanced involvement of emerging market economies are legitimate and should be 
supported. 
• Clarifying relations between the IMF and the World Bank. Though there is a 
widely acknowledged need for improved co-operation and clearer division of labour 
between the Fund and the World Bank and other development agencies, proposals to 
that end differ substantially. Some would like to separate more clearly IMF and 
World Bank functions (Meltzer Commission). This would translate into shifting 
concessional or development financing by the Fund to the World Bank and by having 
the IMF focus narrowly on its monetary and crisis role. However, others stress that 
the IMF is a quasi global institution that should assist all its members. It also has a 
unique expertise in designing sound and consistent macro-economic policies and in 
putting in place the key elements for a global growth strategy. Without financial 
support to these countries, the IMF would have no leverage. Again others would like 
to see a merger of some IMF and World Bank departments to deal with development 
issues. Practical arrangements risk, however, being quite complex. 
• Creating new overarching bodies, such as a Global Governance Group or a UN 
Economic Security Council. In a recent report on global governance Camdessus and 
others98 recommend to complement the current G7/8 mechanism by a high-level 
Global Governance Group (3G). This group would include the 24 Heads of State 
and Government that have Executive Directors in the Boards of the IMF and the 
World Bank. In their view, this would balance the double objective of efficiency in 
decision making and maximum representativity, as all countries would be 
represented either directly – the five countries holding the largest share of quotas – or 
within the established framework of regional constituencies. The 3G would monitor 
trends and policy developments in the field of global economic, social and 
environmental issues, and assure coherence, co-ordination and arbitration among the 
major international organisations. Like in similar proposals, annual meetings at Head 
of State level would decide on key issues of strategic concern, such as the creation of 
new institutions. 3G Summits would be jointly prepared by a network of Sherpas and 
the staff of the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions, the WTO, the ILO and the to be 
established World Environment Organisation. The Heads of these institutions would 
participate in the meetings.  
 
 
                                                
97 As suggested in 1998 by Minister Strauss-Kahn. 
98 COMECE ad-hoc Group on Global Governance (2001). 
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A variety of sources have advocated the creation of a UN Economic Security 
Council (ESC)99. As with the 3G, the purpose of such a Council would be to provide 
leadership on global economic, social and environmental issues; in contrast with the 
previous proposal it would be established under the auspices of the UN by 
complementing the Security Council. The Council would continuously assess the 
state of the world economy and the interaction between the major policy areas; 
provide a long-term strategic policy framework in order to promote stable, balanced 
and sustainable development; and secure consistency between the policy goals of the 
major international organisations, particularly the Bretton Woods institutions and the 
WTO, while recognising their distinct roles.  
 
Proponents of an ESC argue that it could enhance the authority of the IMF and the 
World Bank and make their work more effective, by providing guidance, which is 
based on conclusions of a more representative body than the Group of Seven. The 
Council would have no legally binding power, but would act as a steering group for 
global governance and provide leadership through the quality of argument and the 
authority derived from its membership. Membership would be limited to some 23 
members. It would include the largest economies (in terms of GDP measured in 
purchasing power parity) and be open to representatives of significant regional 
organisations such as the European Union and ASEAN. Meetings would be held 
once a year at the level of Heads and more frequently at the level of ministers of 
finance and/or economics and trade. A constituency system, rotation and consultation 
mechanisms are envisaged to ensure that the broader membership of the UN is 
represented in the decision making of the ESC. Moreover, the relationship between 
the General Assembly and the ESC would need to be defined. 
                                                
99 See, for instance, the Commission on Global Governance (2001), www.cgg.ch. Initiated by the former 
chairs of various UN related commissions on development, the Commission on Global Governance was 
established in 1992 comprising of 24 members, including former heads of government, international 
organisations, and ministers. They serve in their personal capacity. Ingvar Carlsson, former prime 
minister of Sweden, and Shriddath Ramphal, former secretary-general of the Commonwealth, are 
chairing the Commission.  
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CHAPTER III : PROMOTING AND FINANCING DEVELOPMENT 
The benefits of globalisation have not been shared by all, and more remains to be done for the 
poorest countries to avoid further exclusion and marginalisation. As outlined in Chapter one, 
even though in the past decade the share of the population living on less than one dollar a day 
has actually decreased to 24%, the number of people below the poverty line has remained at 
around 1.2 billion, with an additional 1.6 billion living on less than 2 dollars.  
The failure of poor countries to “catch up” has been attributed to poverty trap conditions of 
subsistence income, low savings and investment, low levels of education and high fertility. A 
related argument comes from those who stress that poor people remain poor or get poorer not 
because of globalisation, but because they are excluded from it. The logical response would 
be more openness to the world economy; however, as economic liberalisation may not 
necessarily promote equality convergence, accompanying policies are as important.  
In terms of development policy, it has become clear that measures in developing countries 
that strengthen economic growth alone are not enough. There is now a growing consensus 
that increased emphasis has to be put on poverty reduction, which should be the primary 
objective of development co-operation. This has been reflected in the Millennium Declaration 
of the UN General Assembly.100 It has also been recognised that measures should not be 
imposed from outside, but should be based on a participatory process.  
In addition, while for a long time the UN, World Bank and IMF were seen as offering 
different perspectives on development, these differences have now narrowed with the World 
Bank embracing the basic principles of social development and the UN giving more attention 
to macro-economic discipline and open markets.  
The concept of poverty has changed over the years. There is now agreement that poverty goes 
beyond the lack of income and financial resources, and includes non-monetary factors such as 
the lack of access to education, health, natural resources, employment, land and credit, 
political participation, services and infrastructures. These elements are seen as essential to 
allow people to take control of their own development, enjoy equality of opportunity, and live 
in a safer environment.  
The upcoming UN Financing for Development conference scheduled for March 2002 in 
Monterrey has focused the discussions on how best to achieve the overall objective of poverty 
reduction. Most of the issues at stake have been raised in the so-called Zedillo Report (United 
Nations (2001b)) commissioned to a High-level Panel by the UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan in December 2000. It focuses on the mobilisation of domestic and foreign resources 
(be it foreign direct investment or ODA), promotion of international trade, and sustainable 
debt financing. 
                                                
100 The Declaration spells out the following eight Millennium Development Goals: eradicate extreme 
poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower 
women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other 
diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; develop a Global Partnership for Development. On the 
need for specific and quantifiable development goals, see also the 1996 Report of the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC), the principal body through which the OECD deals with issues related to 
co-operation with developing countries.  
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Many of these elements will be touched upon in this chapter. A first part assesses the various 
existing instruments contributing to development processes and reduction of inequalities, such 
as ODA, debt reduction, market access and foreign direct investment, and looks at ways to 
improve their effectiveness for poverty reduction. The second part reviews various 
alternatives for financing for development, including fiscal mechanisms at the international 
level. 
A. Assessment of Existing Instruments 
A.1. ODA 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) is defined by the OECD as the sum of grants and 
concessional loans (i.e. with a grant element of at least 25%) undertaken by the official sector 
and with the primary objective of promotion of economic development. The measurement of 
ODA is, however, not straightforward. World Bank experts criticise it on three accounts101: 
under-estimation of aid content due to netting out102, misrepresentation of the correct level of 
concessionality (the loans are fully counted, even if the grant element may only be at 25%) 
and on the calculation of the grant element itself. Another criticism derives from the 
observation that donor countries have brought over the past two decades a variety of public 
expenditures under the heading of ODA, such as the cost of development administration, 
education costs for students from developing countries, emergency and disaster aid and 
cancellation of debts103. Calculations of ODA flows between 1990 and 1994 would have been 
35 to 42% lower, had the original definition been strictly applied. 
A.1.1. Trends in ODA and the 0.7% Target 
On the whole, trends in ODA have been disappointing. While total long-term capital flows to 
developing countries increased from $ 98 billion in 1990 to over US$ 295 billion in 2000, 
ODA stayed at US$ 53 billion over the same period (Table 2).104  
Table 2 : Net Long-term Flows to Developing Countries, 1990-2000 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Total (billion $) 98.5 123 155.8 220.4 223.7 261.2 311.2 342.6 334.9 264.5 295.8 
Official flows 56.8% 49.5% 36.3% 24.3% 21.5% 21.1% 10.3% 12.5% 16.3% 17.1% 13.0% 
Private flows 
of which: 
43.2% 50.5% 63.7% 75.7% 78.5% 78.9% 89.7% 87.5% 83.7% 82.9% 87.0% 
Debt flows 36.9% 30.3% 38.4% 29.5% 28.7% 30.6% 35.3% 32.4% 31.4% -0.3% 12.2% 
Equity flows 6.6% 12.2% 14.2% 30.6% 20.0% 17.5% 17.6% 10.1% 5.6% 15.7% 18.6% 
FDI 56.6% 57.5% 47.4% 39.9% 51.2% 51.9% 47.1% 57.6% 63.1% 84.6% 69.2% 
Source: World Bank (2001a). 
                                                
101  Chang et al. (1999). 
102 By netting out amortisation payments, the net flow of ODA, i.e. disbursements minus amortisation, 
underestimates the aid content of flows. As an example, a constant flow of identical highly concessional 
loans would represent a continuous cost for the donor but would lead to a zero net ODA flow, as 
amortisation flows would exactly match aid flows. 
103  Mertens (2001). 
104  OECD (2002). 
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In terms of percentage of DAC members’105 GNP, the share of ODA decreased from 0.33% in 
1990 to 0.22% in 2000 (back to the level of 1997),106 and hence further away from the 
recommended aid target of 0.7%. According to the 2001 DAC report, only five OECD 
members (Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) have reached in 2000 
the level of 0.7% GNP to be spent on ODA (figure 9), while the EU on average has reached 
0.33%.  
The origin of the 0.7% target dates back to the 1969 Pearson Report107, where it was 
calculated that a resource transfer of 1% of GNP would allow the 6% growth in developing 
countries judged necessary to lift them from aid-dependency. With private capital flows 
estimated in 1969 at 0.3%, official flows would have to bridge the gap of 0.7%.  At the time, 
it seemed to be an ambitious yet achievable goal. In reality, if in 1968 ODA level as a 
percentage of GNP was 0.48%, in the early 1970s it fell dramatically to between 0.30 and 
0.35% (probably also due to the oil-crisis), and it remained stable for twenty years. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, the end of the Cold War brought new hopes of a “peace dividend” 
from reduced military expenditures that could be used for development assistance, which 
were however not fulfilled as pointed out above. This may be linked to the recession of 1992-
93 and the donors’ efforts to bring their own budgets back into balance, but it also reflects the 
donors’ willingness to ensure an effective use of existing ODA resources before increasing 
the volume further (OECD (2000)). 
Over the years, all DAC members, except Switzerland and the United States, have accepted 
the 0.7% target, even if the degree of commitment has varied widely from firmly agreed 
budget allocations and target dates to more general statements. At the European Council of 
June 2001 in Göteborg, the EU committed to reach the UN target as soon as possible and is 
currently looking to have a clear road map for setting out the way it intends to reach these 
financing goals108.  
As far as non-EU donors are concerned, despite the reduction of its aid, Japan remains in 
2000 the leading country in providing bilateral ODA (USD 13 billion), with the United States 
the second largest provider (about USD 10 billion). The role of non-DAC members (former-
CMEA and Arab countries) peaked in the mid-70s, when they made available 30% of total 
ODA, while nowadays 95% of ODA is provided by DAC members. Figures for the CMEA 
were rather difficult to estimate though, as aid was often in kind at unpublished prices; 
moreover, aid from China was not included. More recently, new OECD donors are emerging 
such as Korea, Turkey, and three Eastern European countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland). 
                                                
105 The 23 members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD are: Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, United States, as well as the Commission of the European Communities. 
106 For comparison, in 1999 the ODA relative to all developing countries’ GDP was 0.6%, compared to 
1.4% in 1990 (UNDP (2001)); this decline is also evident for the LDCs, who saw their percentage fall 
from 11.6% to 7%, over the same period. 
107 Pearson (1969). 
108 See also conclusions of the Development Council of Ministers in November 2001. 
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Figure 9: Net ODA in 2000 – in % of GNI 
0,0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1,0
1,1
1,2
D
en
m
ar
k
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
Sw
ed
en
N
or
w
ay
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Be
lg
iu
m
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
Fr
an
ce
U
ni
te
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
Fi
nl
an
d
Ire
la
nd
Ja
pa
n
G
er
m
an
y
Au
st
ra
lia
Po
rtu
ga
l
C
an
ad
a
N
ew
 Z
ea
la
nd
Au
st
ria
Sp
ai
n
G
re
ec
e
Ita
ly
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
TO
TA
L 
D
ACP
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 G
ro
ss
 N
at
io
na
l I
nc
om
e 
(G
N
I)
UN Target = 0,7% of GNI
Unweighted average country effort = 0.39% of GNI
 
Source: OECD (2002) 
Apart from the amount of ODA provided to developing countries as a group, it is also worth 
looking at the destination of ODA. Most of European donors focus on sub-Saharan Africa, 
whereas other donors (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the United States, but also 
Germany and Spain) focus more on the Pacific region (Asia, Latin America, and Pacific). 
This regional orientation results in a higher proportion of aid being allocated by these donors 
to middle-income than is the case for most of the EU donors (OECD (2002)). Overall, two 
thirds of ODA flows (close to $40 billion) go to 88 developing countries that appear to be “on 
track” to halve poverty by 2015 compared to 1990 levels (one of the development goals 
endorsed by the UN General Assembly). The remainder goes to 55 developing countries, 
mostly LDCs, that are struggling to reach the international development goals and for which 
more aid would make a substantial difference. Recent World Bank estimates109 show that, 
irrespective of the 0.7% overall target, current levels of ODA would need to be doubled in 
order to help low-income countries to reach their 2015 development goals.  
The European Union is one of the major actors in international development co-operation. 
Whereas the European Commission and the EU member states together provide about 50% of 
world aid, the EC alone provides some 10% of the entire world aid. Its aid programme has 
continued to grow over a period during which many other donors’ programmes have declined. 
The total share of European aid managed by the Commission has gradually increased from 
7% thirty years ago to 17% today.  
                                                
109 IMF and World Bank (2001b). 
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Starting from a programme that originally included mainly Africa and few more countries in 
the Pacific and Caribbean (ACP countries), the EC has become global in its reach. New 
agreements, which go far beyond the traditional development aid, have been signed to cover 
Asian and Latin America developing countries (ALA programme), for the implementation of 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (MEDA programme), for the co-operation with the 
Central and Eastern European Countries and the New Independent States since 1990 (PHARE 
and TACIS programmes), and more recently specifically for the Western Balkans (CARDS) . 
EC external aid has also become more varied in nature. The vast bulk (some 90%) of EC aid 
is grant aid, with less than 10% provided as concessional loans. Hard loans, such as some 
European Investment Bank lending have also been provided, but these are not included in the 
EC aid budget. Exceptionally, macro-financial assistance has been provided which took most 
often the form of loans but increasingly also a combination of grants and loans. Under the 
former Lomé Convention the traditional forms of assistance to ACP countries (financial and 
technical co-operation) were joined by new aid instruments such as STABEX (system to 
stabilise export earnings) and SYSMIN (the special facility for the mining sector). The new 
Cotonou Agreement signed in June 2000 recognises the vulnerability resulting from high 
dependence on export earnings from the sectors of agriculture and/or mining and foresees 
additional support in case of serious falls in export earnings. In the new system, vulnerable 
ACP countries will be assisted in the framework of the overall programming process and in 
accordance with the country’s development strategy priorities. 
Over the past decades, the number of major donors has increased, and the number of bilateral 
and multilateral agencies and non-governmental organisations have increased even more. 
According to the World Bank (2000), in the 1960s five donors – France, Germany, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States accounted for some 90 % of donor assistance, whose 
combined share declined to less than 70% but was delivered through a greater number of 
agencies. This development, on top of the absolute and relative decline in ODA is obviously a 
problem for recipient countries and calls for donor co-ordination, specialisation and 
concentration. 
The World Bank and the IMF are two main players among multilateral institutions, providing 
support to implementation of the development agenda of beneficiary countries. Regional 
development banks (BAD, ADB, IDB, EBRD) co-ordinate closely their development 
assistance instruments with these two institutions. In terms of concessional flows by 
multilateral organisations over the period 1994-1998, IDA (World Bank group) accounted for 
an average 33%, the IMF for nearly 5%, the UN agencies system for 17%, with the European 
Commission accounting for 31%. Concessional arms of regional development banks (Inter-
American Development Bank, Asian Development Bank and African Development Bank) 
accounted together for 11% of total flows. 
A.1.2. Improving Effectiveness and the Quality of Aid 
The discussion on volume of aid has been paralleled by a discussion on the effectiveness of 
aid.  
The 1998 World Bank’s Assessing Aid report, based on a series of econometric studies110, 
showed that aid boosts economic growth and alleviates poverty only in those countries that 
                                                
110  Burnside and Dollar (1997) and Collier and Dollar (1999). 
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carry out sound economic policies and has no measurable effect in countries with poor 
policies. Sound policies include open trade regimes, fiscal discipline and avoidance of high 
inflation. The report concluded that a reallocation of aid to “good policy-high poverty” 
countries would increase the efficiency of assistance.  
Other studies have qualified these results. The economic model underlying the World Bank 
study is found to be rather sensitive to the choice of the variables.111 Also, aid can have a 
positive impact on economic growth in countries with a poor policy environment as long as 
the aid to GDP ratio is not high.112 It has also been claimed that cutting off poor performers 
from aid allocation may not always improve overall aid effectiveness. Where poor 
performance is caused by external shocks (e.g. terms of trade changes), continued assistance 
may prevent the country from entering a lasting recession.113 Lastly, uncertainty in aid flows 
(deviations from expected inflows) may have a negative impact on the level of investment in 
a country, which is in itself a principal determinant of growth. When such uncertainty is 
controlled for, aid may have a positive effect on growth even in a poor policy environment.114 
Conditionality and Ownership 
Most aid programs are conditional upon the implementation of certain policy reforms. 
However, it is increasingly accepted that the effectiveness of aid requires a national 
commitment to the reform process and that economic reforms can be supported but “cannot 
be bought”. This implies that the conditionality associated with adjustment lending is unlikely 
to stimulate reforms unless it is in line with the Government’s own programme. 
The criticism of conditionality dates back to the early 1980s and stemmed from the fact that 
the results of the structural lending were disappointing and in some cases even were perceived 
as harmful to economic growth.115 The initial reaction of the donor community was to 
increase the number of conditions and to shorten the period for the execution of programmes 
so as to stimulate developing countries to carry out the required reforms. However, recipient 
governments were unwilling to carry out these reforms because the conditions were perceived 
as inappropriate or as imposed without their direct involvement. 
The perceived failure of conditionality led to a new emphasis on ownership of the reform 
process by the recipient country’s government. The Comprehensive Development Framework 
(CDF) was introduced by the World Bank in October 1998, and launched in January 1999, as 
a concept for a holistic approach to development. The CDF seeks a better balance in policy-
making by highlighting the interdependence of all elements of development: social, structural, 
human, governance, environmental, economic, and financial. It promotes partnerships among 
governments, development co-operation agencies, civil society, and the private sector. Of 
particular importance is the emphasis on country ownership of the development process. 
Within this framework, the World Bank and the IMF subsequently launched in September 
1999 the Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) for low-income countries, to mainstream 
poverty reduction in Government and donor policies, in particular in those recipient countries 
that benefit from enhanced debt relief within the HIPC initiative. In support of the PRS of 
IDA eligible countries, the World Bank has developed the Poverty Reduction Strategy Credit 
                                                
111  Dalgaard and Hansen (2000). 
112  Hansen and Tarp (2000). 
113  Guillaumont and Chauvet (2000). 
114  Lensink and Morrissey (2000). 
115  Killick (1998). 
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(PRSC) and the IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) arrangements, successor 
to the ESAF. 116 
The European Commission has also shifted from traditional policy-based conditionality 
towards results-based assessments and related aid disbursements. The new orientations in 
macro-economic support therefore aim at increasing long-term sustainability of economic and 
social reforms, fostering government’s ownership of the programme and enhancing donor co-
ordination. The degree of implementation of the new approach varies among countries, 
according to the degree of achievements in developing well-articulated and coherent PRSP 
documents and establishing key performance-based indicators, as well as the availability and 
quality of data, the institutional capacity for their collection and assessments and the existence 
of a framework for improving public finance management to ensure that budget funds – 
government and donor alike – are properly spent and have maximum impact. The pilot 
exercise on the reform of conditionality carried out in Burkina Faso has been a key element 
for the Commission to set up these orientations. 
At the same time, the Commission has launched a fundamental reform of its external 
assistance, aiming to improve aid quality, cut implementation time, harmonise and simplify 
aid management. In particular, the Commission has undertaken to strengthen the 
programming process to ensure the consistency of strategies defined for all the developing 
countries and introducing a process of deconcentration and decentralisation intended to bring 
decision-making closer to partner countries.117  
Policy Coherence 
Promoting coherence between development policies and those of trade, security, investment, 
and the environment continues to be a major challenge for international donors. Incoherence 
is often caused by conflicting interests (e.g., geopolitical concerns, economic interests, 
solidarity) among the multiplicity of actors involved in development at international level. 
Incoherence is also created at the national level within the agencies of donor governments 
because of the plurality of decision-making bodies. Furthermore, in the past years there has 
been a proliferation of items on the development agenda. Development does no longer include 
only economic growth and elimination of poverty, but also gender equity, environmental 
sustainability, good governance, and respect of human rights.  
Within the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), efforts are being made to 
promote policy coherence for development. For example, the DAC and the Trade Committee 
will undertake a “common reading” of the Doha Trade Ministerial outcome and, together, 
assess its implications and directions for future collaborative work on the development 
dimension of trade. Also, the DAC Development Partnerships Forum brings together different 
OECD policy communities, developing country and private sector stakeholders to discuss 
how to attract private finance in the development process. These examples illustrate the “two-
way street” approach to promoting policy coherence, which goes beyond integrating the 
development dimension in the work of other policy communities, but also looks to integrate 
the policy findings of those communities into DAC work. 
                                                
116 Apart from greater ownership and poverty reduction focus, fiscal targets are more flexible, 
conditionality is more selective and there is more emphasis on measures to improve public resource 
management, transparency and accountability. 
117 See European Commission (2001) 
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The Treaty on European Union contains several references to policy coherence. The aim is 
that consistency of EU external activities as a whole be ensured in the context of its external 
relations, security, economic and development policies. The Council, Commission and 
Parliament all bear responsibility for increasing the level of coherence of policies that have or 
may have a bearing on the Union’s external performance. Ideally the different EC and also 
Member States’ policies should fit together, complement each other, and create positive 
synergetic effects. As a minimum, it should be ensured that these policies, and the activities 
implemented in the context of these policies, do not contradict or work against each other. 
The challenges are well-known – including the effects of trade, agriculture and fisheries 
policies on developing countries - and have been part of the development policy discourse for 
many years, and the efforts to integrate trade in development policy are an example of the 
pursuit of policy coherence. 
Untying of Aid 
One of the most extensively discussed cases of policy incoherence is tied aid. The question is 
whether aid should be freely available to buy goods and services from all countries (untied 
aid) or whether aid should be restricted to the procurement of goods and services from the 
donor countries (tied aid). One of the rationales of tied aid is to ‘buy political support’ for 
development policy at home, by benefiting domestic companies through public procurement.  
In May 2001, donors have reached an agreement on a DAC Recommendation to untie ODA 
to the least developed countries.118 The Recommendation also acknowledges that different 
approaches are required for different categories of ODA and that actions to implement the 
Recommendation might vary among donors in terms of coverage and timing. It should be 
noted that the recommendation only concerns the LDCs, which may not have the full supply 
capacity of public procurement; also, the recommendation does not cover technical co-
operation, nor food aid. 
The EU has accepted to implement the DAC Recommendation on the untying of aid to LDCs 
and several Member States are in the process of untying their bilateral aid beyond the scope of 
the recommendation. The Community has identified the measures necessary to implement the 
recommendation and will set in motion the necessary procedures. The Commission’s 
intention is to go further, with the support of Member States, e.g. though the revision of the 
ALA regulation, and to prepare a communication that would propose implementing the DAC 
recommendation through all its aid instruments. That would, in the case of the Cotonou 
Agreement, also require the consent of the ACP partners. 
Co-ordination and Complementarity 
The fragmentation of aid and poor co-ordination has been a major obstacle to aid 
effectiveness. If better policy performance in recipient countries is important, likewise donors 
should do more to ensure the effectiveness of aid. The inefficiency that arises from lack of 
donor co-ordination is an old, but still unresolved problem. Some attribute this lack of co-
ordination to the recipients’ lack of absorptive capacity, others to the different objectives that 
drive donor programmes and again others to the multiplicity of aid agencies, each pursuing 
their own priorities.119  
                                                
118 DAC Recommendation on Untying Official Development Assistance to Least Developed Countries, 
OECD, May 2001. 
119  Cassen et al. (1994), Alesina and Dollar (1998) and Kanbur and Sandler (1999). 
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All donors recognise the importance of partnership to address development more effectively. 
From the start of 2000, country-led poverty reduction strategies (in the light of the World 
Bank’s Common Development Framework) have provided a common ground for improving 
donor action at the country level in many of the poorest countries. At the sectoral level, the 
focus has been on harmonisation of operational policies and procedures in and between 
multilateral and bilateral agencies, which should eventually contribute to a decrease in the 
transaction costs of international ODA. Despite talk of better harmonisation, practice lags 
behind. An important immediate step is the sector-wide approach, by which financing is 
provided to an investment programme for a selected sector in its entirety, based on an 
evaluation of that sector’s policy framework and institutional strengths. Although progress 
has so far been limited, an important learning process is ongoing (World Bank (2001a)). 
As far as the EU is concerned, the Treaty establishes that the Community and the Member 
States shall co-ordinate their development co-operation policies and consult each other on 
their aid programmes, including in international organisations and during international 
conferences. Strengthening complementarity and moving towards a division of labour 
between the Community and the Member States is one of the principles agreed in the new 
policy framework adopted by the Council and the Commission. The concentration of 
Community activities in a more limited number of areas where it can make a special 
contribution and can have an added value to that of other development partners, and in 
particular the EU Member States, is fully consistent with this approach. The Council and the 
Commission have identified the following six priority areas: link between trade and 
development; support for regional integration and co-operation; support for macroeconomic 
policies and promotion of an equal access to social services (education and health); transport; 
food security and sustainable rural development; institutional capacity-building, particularly 
in the area of good governance and the rule of law. 
Concessionality 
There is an on-going discussion on increasing the share of development funding in the form 
of grants rather than concessional loans, as a way to better target poverty reduction and to 
prevent accumulation of unsustainable debt burdens.  
This also affects IDA, the concessional arm of World Bank lending, which is currently 
discussing its 13th replenishment120. Various alternatives are being assessed for the possible 
introduction of grants into IDA-schemes121. These range from providing up to 50% of IDA 
resources in the form of straight grants for IDA-only countries (i.e. equivalent to 40% of all 
IDA 13 funds), to limiting to 5-10% such expansion of grants. Also, a possible differentiation 
within IDA-only countries is considered, with very poor countries being given the highest 
level of concessionality, as well as post-conflict/post-disasters countries. 
While the introduction of grants could change the nature of IDA, and thus raise fundamental 
questions, it also has implications in terms of financing. Given that loan repayments from 
IDA credits contribute for around 40% to IDA replenishment, the introduction of grants will 
involve a cost in terms of foregone re-flows. This entails that either more resources from 
donors would be needed, or more grants to poorer countries would result in hardening terms 
for less poor IDA borrowers. These on-going discussions have also led to explore other routes 
                                                
120  IDA donors get together every three years to discuss IDA replenishments; the current IDA 13 concerns 
fiscal years 2002-2005. 
121  “Grants in IDA”, IDA, September 2001, available on http://www.worldbank.org/ida/ida13docs.html. 
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for providing increased concessionality, such as extended maturities, the abolition of the 
service charge in concessional loans (currently at 0.75% of disbursed balances), and the 
extension of the grace period. 
A.2. Debt Reduction 
The debt of developing countries continuously increased until the mid-1990s despite repeated 
debt relief actions provided by official and private creditors. This accumulation of debt not 
only prevented the debtors to face their repayment obligations but also further hampered their 
development. 
According to the debt overhang theory122, excessive debt burdens divert resources from key 
productive investments and discourage policy reforms which could promote growth. They 
constrain the ability of indebted states to finance basic expenditure, e.g. in the areas of 
education and health. This is particularly true for highly indebted poor countries, which need 
to target expenditures towards poverty reduction.  
Debt relief lowers the budgetary resources tied up in debt servicing and, if accompanied by 
the right economic policies, should contribute to creating a more stable macro-economic 
environment with lower interest and inflation rates conducive to saving, investment and 
sustainable growth. It should also allow the country to increase budgetary spending in social 
sectors, assuming that debt relief is not accompanied by a reduction in ODA. Through a 
reduction of the debt burden to a sustainable level, domestic and foreign private investment is 
likely to increase, as potential investors will be less concerned about higher taxes (including 
inflation) which could be imposed in the future to pay off the debt.123 The reduction will also 
increase the chances that the portion of the debt that remains outstanding will be repaid, 
which is beneficial for the creditor (and may in some cases even outweigh the cost of debt 
reduction). Finally, debt relief may improve the quality of the dialogue between the donors 
and the beneficiary countries, as it will refocus the discussion on priorities and reduce the 
preoccupation with the terms of refinancing the old loans.  
A.2.1. Trends and Figures 
Following a sharp rise in the 1970s which multiplied the debt stock by a factor of 8, the 
overall stock of external public debt of developing countries continued to rise, from US$ 377 
billion in 1980 (at the beginning of the debt crisis) to more than US$ 1600 billion in 1998. It 
decreased slightly in 1999 and 2000 (Table 3).  
Table 3: External Public Debt of Developing Countries, in billion US$ 
 1970 1980 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
          
Multilateral (incl. IMF) 8 61 242 356 345 353 420 424 410 
Bilateral 26 127 397 566 543 529 527 533 512 
Private 14 189 510 588 569 609 676 665 669 
Total 48 377 1149 1510 1457 1490 1623 1621 1591
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance 
                                                
122  See e.g. Claessens et al., (1996). 
123  World Bank, (2001a). 
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At the same time, the debt of the 42 heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) increased from 
about US$ 60 billion in 1981 to more than US$ 180 billion in 1995, and declined somewhat 
afterwards to about US$ 170 billion in 1999. Relative to GNP, the debt of developing 
countries doubled from 18% in 1981 to 37% in 2000. Over the same period of time, the debt 
to GNP ratio of HIPCs rose from about 50% in 1981 to a level of 110% in 1999, having 
peaked at more than 160% in 1994.  
According to Daseking and Powell (1999), factors contributing to the substantial rise in 
external debt in the 1970s and the 1980s included adverse terms of trade shocks, a lack of 
sustained adjustment, structurally weak debt management practices and political factors. They 
also emphasise “national interest” lending which suggests that, from the creditor government 
perspective, the motivation for a significant share of commercial lending or guaranteeing of 
loans to low income countries was the stimulation of their own exports. 
For developing countries in general, private creditors have been the largest creditor group 
over the last 20 years (followed by bilateral and multilateral creditors), even if their share 
decreased from about 50% in the 1980’s to slightly more than 40% in 2000. For the HIPCs, 
bilaterals have always been the largest creditors, followed by the multilaterals and, far behind, 
private creditors. For the group of 24 HIPCs benefiting from interim debt relief, the 
multilaterals have become the main creditors, with a share of 40% of total debt outstanding in 
2000. Claessens et al. (1996) underlined that creditors of the HIPCs are mainly official 
creditors (bilateral and multilateral) rather than private commercial creditors and that their 
primary objective was not profit maximisation, but that they had a set of more complex goals. 
It was therefore argued that the conventional approach for analysing debt issues needed to be 
adjusted to the specificities of these countries. 
A.2.2. Debt Reduction Mechanisms 
Where several players are involved (which is usually the case), debtors and creditors have 
generally found it preferable to reschedule debt in a concerted framework (Abrego and Ross 
(2001)). Such concerted action addresses the free-rider problem according to which creditors 
may try to avoid providing debt relief but would nevertheless profit from improved debt 
servicing capacity of a debtor country, once debt relief has been granted by others (see also 
Claessens et al.). This free-rider problem applies both within creditor groups (e.g. between 
different official creditors) and between different creditor groups (e.g. official versus private 
creditors). Another advantage of concerted action is that the negotiated agreement is generally 
based on a common framework and a common set of conditions, such as those defined in the 
context of an IMF programme. Such a framework increases substantially the likelihood that 
the debt relief will have a lasting positive impact on development.124 
Paris Club 
The Paris Club of official creditors125 provides a framework for rescheduling, on a case-by-
case approach, of sovereign-to-sovereign debt (publicly owed or guaranteed, with medium- 
and long-term maturities). Fulfilment of IMF conditionality and consensus between creditors 
are sine qua non conditions for reaching a debt relief agreement. Until 1987, Paris Club 
rescheduling involved mainly cash flow relief, which contributed to a continuous rise in debt. 
Creditors believed that the debt service problems of the poor countries would only be 
                                                
124  Daseking and Powell (1999). 
125 The Paris Club, which was active for the first time in 1956, includes nineteen permanent members 
countries. 
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temporary. While private creditors had typically reduced their exposure in these countries and 
cut their losses in response to their customers’ payment difficulties, official creditors provided 
comprehensive non-concessional flow rescheduling in the context of the Paris Club under the 
so-called ‘classic terms’. 
In the second half of the eighties, it became clear that low income countries (LICs) were 
facing solvency problems that required not only a temporary debt relief, but also a reduction 
in the level of debt. In 1988, the Toronto G-7 summit adopted a compromise, leading to a 
reduction of one third of the NPV of the LICs outstanding debt, including for the first time 
commercial export credit agency debt. The Toronto terms were granted to 20 LICs by the 
Paris Club until 1991.126 They were subsequently replaced successively by other terms with 
increasing NPV reductions,127 ending with the Cologne terms in 1999 providing a 90% 
reduction- or more if necessary - in the context of the Enhanced HIPC initiative (Cologne 
terms). 
HIPC Initiative and Enhanced HIPC Initiative 
The HIPC initiative, launched in 1996, started to deal with the debt burden owed to 
multilateral institutions, rather than merely concentrating on bilateral debt.128 Its principal 
objective is to bring the poorest countries' debt burden to sustainable levels, subject to 
satisfactory policy performance, so as to ensure that adjustment and reform efforts are not put 
at risk by continued high debt and debt service burdens. It has been underlined repeatedly, 
however, that the achievement of this goal will depend on whether or not funding used by the 
donor countries to finance the debt relief is obtained by cutting other forms of aid. 
Soon after the approval of the original HIPC initiative, doubts were expressed by NGOs and 
academic circles whether the debt relief envisaged was far-reaching enough. Criticism not 
only focused on the extent of debt relief and the targeted sustainability level (with obvious 
implications for the number of countries supported under the initiative) but it also questioned 
the wisdom of waiting until the completion point before debt relief is granted. This condition 
aimed to create a satisfactory track record to increase the chances that the debt reduction 
would have the desired positive effects on development and also aimed to address the moral 
hazard problem.129  
In 1999, following pressure from NGOs and the development community, the HIPC initiative 
was enhanced to provide “deeper, broader and faster” debt relief to those countries pursuing 
                                                
126 As far as the (highly-indebted) lower middle-income countries are concerned, the Paris Club creditors 
began in 1990 to grant them concessional debt reduction (for ODA only) in the form of flow 
rescheduling (Houston terms). 
127 From 1991 London terms (up to 50% reduction of the NPV of the LICs outstanding debt); from 1994 
Naples terms (up to 67% on both ODA and non-ODA credits to HIPCs); from 1996 Lyon terms (up to 
80% of NPV debt reduction to countries qualifying for the HIPC initiative). 
128 The HIPC Debt Initiative is open to the poorest countries, those that: (i) are eligible only for highly 
concessional assistance such as from the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) 
and the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF); (ii) face an unsustainable debt situation 
even after the full application of traditional debt relief mechanisms (including Paris Club agreements); 
and (iii) have a proven track record in implementing strategies focused on reducing poverty and 
building the foundation for sustainable economic growth.  
 Under the enhanced framework, a country’s debt is deemed unsustainable if the ratio of the net present 
value of external debt to export exceeds 150% (see http://www.worldbank.org/hipc for more details). 
129 Providing debt relief to those that are running bad policies while not supporting those that have been 
able to avoid a debt problem through serious adjustment and cautious borrowing practices may induce 
policy-makers to opt for the wrong policies (see e.g. Claessens et al.) 
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reform and poverty reduction.130 One of the major challenges, from the creditors point of 
view, has been to find the necessary resources to finance the increase in the costs resulting 
from the enhancement of the HIPC initiative. In order to finance the participation of the 
multilateral institutions in the initiative, a Trust Fund, managed by the World Bank, was 
established. 
Out of the 42 identified HIPCs, 24 countries have so far reached the decision point - when the 
debt relief is approved and interim relief begins - and 4 countries have reached the completion 
point – when the remaining amount of relief is committed irrevocably131. 
The EU has been a major player in the HIPC initiative. The Community, as a creditor132, has 
so far decided to contribute to the HIPC initiative for a total amount of € 360 million (40 
under the original and 320 under the enhanced initiative, all in favour of ACP countries). As a 
donor, the Community will contribute to the enhanced initiative for a total amount of € 734 
million (680 for ACP countries, 54 for non-ACP countries).133 As far as the implementation is 
concerned, the Community has already transferred € 304 million to the HIPC Trust Fund 
managed by the World Bank.134 As a creditor, there have been some delays in 
implementation, essentially due to the Commission’s internal reform and delays by recipient 
countries to respond to proposals of action. So far, the Community has provided grants for 
debt alleviation in favour of Uganda, Guyana, Burkina Faso and Mozambique, totalling about 
€ 38 million. 
London Club – Brady Plan 
As far as private creditors are concerned, the London Club provides a framework allowing 
debtor countries to restructure their debts owed to commercial banks, which is required by the 
Paris Club under the “comparable treatment” clause.135 Unlike the Paris Club, where the 
agreement with the debtor has to be unanimously approved, the negotiated agreement within 
the London Club needs approval of banks holding 90 to 95% of total exposure. Since there is 
no legal possibility to force dissident creditors to accept the negotiated agreement, and given 
the usually large number of creditors concerned, a minority of them can delay the process for 
years.136 Results of negotiations may vary from debt rollover to significant write-down.  
                                                
130 Deeper means that the relief would cut deeper into the debt by lowering the target sustainability ratios 
in order to ensure a permanent exit from the debt problem. Faster means that the so-called completion 
point under which full debt relief can be delivered can be reached earlier than the normal 6-year period 
of performance required under the original IMF/WB supported programs and during which countries 
had to implement a wide range of reforms in a satisfactory way. These modifications also resulted in the 
expected debt relief being broader by expanding the likely number of countries becoming eligible. 
131 Under the original framework, six countries (Uganda, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Guyana, Mali and 
Mozambique) had already reached their decision and completion points. 
132 The outstanding claims that the Community has on the HIPC’s concern mainly the so called special 
loans, which were granted to the ACP countries in the 1970’s and 1980’s, and risk capital loans 
managed by the EIB. 
133 Council Decision 98/453/EC of 6 July 1998 and ACP-EC Council of Ministers Decision 1/1999 of 8 
December 1999. 
134 € 10 million dedicated to Guyana (the sole non-African ACP country), € 240 million dedicated to 
African ACP countries, and € 54 million dedicated to Asian and Latin American countries. 
135 Given that there are generally more creditor commercial banks than creditor governments, a committee 
of about 15 banks is generally designated by the London Club to negotiate with the debtor. An active 
IMF agreement is a prerequisite for such negotiations. 
136  Radelet (1999). 
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The Brady Plan launched in 1989 offered creditor commercial banks the choice between 
providing new money or accepting a debt stock. The commercial banks generally chose the 
second option, where the principal and some of the interest of loans would be guaranteed with 
US Treasury bonds in exchange for a write-down of the amounts outstanding. Although the 
Brady Plan has benefited 15 middle income countries and no poor countries, the experience 
may contain useful lessons for other countries, such as the importance of implementing 
macroeconomic stabilisation and economic reforms prior to debt reduction (Claessens et 
al.(1996)). 
A.2.3. Continued Debate 
Whereas there seems to be a consensus that the enhanced HIPC debt relief is an improvement 
compared to the original initiative and earlier actions, there is an ongoing debate on whether 
the current action of creditors is sufficient to address the problems of the poorest countries. 
Impact and additionality 
According to recent analysis, the cumulative debt reduction provided by the Paris Club and 
multilaterals to the group of 24 HIPCs having already reached their decision point should 
attain 64% (expressed in 1999 NPV terms), which sounds impressive.137 In NPV terms, this is 
expected to deliver US$ 20.3 billion, including US$ 10.6 billion provided by multilateral 
creditors, while all HIPCs are expected to be granted a total of US 29.3 billion.  
However, Cohen (2000) argues that the type of calculations made above grossly overstate the 
benefits for the recipient country implied by the debt reduction. He estimates the average 
price of HIPC debt to be at 28%, but the marginal value of the debt (indicating the degree to 
which they will actually benefit from a certain amount of debt reduction) at only 10%. While 
recognising that the enhanced HIPC initiative “is clearly more generous, as it reduces the debt 
down to a point where the effect can be felt”, he calls for more transparency (through 
reporting losses of about 90% and the granting of actual debt relief for the remaining part). He 
argues that donor countries would as a result be less tempted to scale down ODA in line with 
debt relief and more inclined to respect the principle of additionality, which is necessary to 
ensure that the debt initiative has an overall positive impact on the country concerned. The 
concern about additionality is more generally shared (see also World Bank (2001a), Jubilee+ 
(2001), Eurodad (2001a)). 
Debt Sustainability and the Poverty Link 
It has been questioned whether the HIPC initiative will indeed ensure debt sustainability. The 
General Accounting Office of the US Congress (2000) as well as a number of NGOs138 have 
argued that the calculated debt sustainability levels are still too high. The difficulty of basing 
debt relief on highly volatile export earnings (determined among other things, by world 
growth, terms of trade and market access) has been addressed, at least partially, by the recent 
agreement by the International Monetary and Financial Committee that from now on each 
HIPCs debt sustainability is assessed at its completion point. This allows for the possibility of 
providing additional debt relief for those countries for which the debt situation has worsened 
due to exceptional factors which include bad growth performance and deteriorating terms of 
trade. 
                                                
137  World Bank (2001c). 
138  Jubilee +2000, Eurodad. 
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Others question whether the debt-to-export ratio is the appropriate criterion to judge 
sustainability. For example, Cohen (2000) presents econometric results that suggest that the 
debt-to-tax ratio would be a more appropriate primary indicator for assessing debt 
sustainability than the debt-to-export ratio. Sachs (1999) argues that the debt-to-export ratio 
ignores the fact that “debts were owed by governments, not exporters”, and that the ratio of 
debt to exports could conceivably measure the trade-offs between debt servicing and meeting 
basic human needs. He proposes that the cost of basic social needs and a government’s 
capacity to pay have to be better taken into account, adding that the net resource transfers of 
highly concessional assistance have to be increased to finance the budget rather than off-
budgetary programmes.139 
NGOs argue along similar lines, underlining that even the enhanced HIPC initiative is not 
sufficiently contributing to poverty reduction.140 They suggest to base the assessment of debt 
sustainability on poverty reduction: budgetary resources would be reserved, in a first stage, 
for expenditures which are necessary to fight poverty (such as education, health and basic 
infrastructure); in a second stage, to service the domestic debt; and only in a third stage to 
service the external debt. The size of the poverty-reducing expenditures would be derived 
from the country-owned PRSPs.  
From this perspective, any low-income country that suffers from high level indebtedness 
coupled with low government revenues and widespread poverty would be eligible for a debt 
relief initiative. But by putting debt repayment as the last priority of expenditures, the 
beneficiary countries might have more difficulties in gaining investor confidence and 
financial market access. Moreover, this proposal raises the important issue of the availability 
and the programming of resources to finance the debt relief as well as the moral hazard issue.  
In this context, it is also worth mentioning that according to the World Bank, social 
expenditures in the 24 enhanced decision point countries are estimated to have increased by 
an average of US$ 1.7 billion during 2001-2002.141 At the same time, it is worth noting that 
systems that track the execution of overall spending on poverty related programmes need to 
be further developed.  
Irrespective of other ongoing debates, it is generally recognised that the beneficiary countries 
have a very important responsibility in pursuing the right policies, in the framework of a well 
designed PRSP which will determine the future trend of economic growth and new external 
borrowing and therefore ultimately its long-term debt sustainability. The balance between 
conditionality (track record of good policies) on the one hand and poverty focus and 
immediate relief on the other has been shifted towards the latter through the Enhanced HIPC 
initiative, but not all would agree that this shift has been sufficient. 
                                                
139 At the same time, he advocates a cancellation of debt servicing on old debts. According to Sachs, debts 
owed to bilateral creditors, IBRD and IMF should be forgiven, while IDA would need to be only 
forgiven in case IDA debt servicing was imposing large net resource costs on a particular country. 
140  Eurodad (2001a). 
141  World Bank (2001c). 
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In this context, it is important to note that several creditor countries have decided to cancel the 
total of their eligible claims towards HIPC countries. Also, at the initiative of the 
Commission, the Council decided in May 2001 to alleviate all special loans granted to least 
developed ACP HIPCs that would remain after the full implementation of the enhanced HIPC 
initiative. This decision, which has been endorsed by the Joint EU/ACP Ministerial Council, 
would lead to a further € 60 million debt relief. 
Is the HIPC Initiative Reaching a Sufficient Number of Countries? 
The question whether the HIPC initiative is making a sufficient impact on the world debt and 
development situation is not only raised with regard to those countries that are expecting to 
receive debt relief under present mechanisms, but also regarding those that may not benefit 
under current circumstances.  
A first group to consider is the countries in conflict which are in principle eligible for the 
HIPC initiative but have not qualified yet. Out of the 14 countries which have so far not yet 
benefited from debt reduction in the context of the HIPC initiative, 9 countries are considered 
as conflict- affected. There is a common understanding on the need to facilitate HIPCs 
emerging from conflict crisis to qualify for debt relief and the initiative has been taken by the 
G-7 to reinforce the political dialogue with these countries. On the other hand, it is difficult to 
conceive fast-tracking of debt relief for regimes engaged in acts of aggression or internal 
repression.142 
A second consideration is to review whether it may be possible to make more countries than 
the 42 HIPCs qualify for HIPC or other debt relief. This issue has received new impetus 
following the 11 September events which have raised the question to what extent 
impoverished countries provide a breeding ground for terrorism. One possibility may be that 
in the light of the latest events and the slowdown of growth more countries may qualify for 
this or other debt relief. The other option would, of course, be a review of the level and nature 
of the eligibility criteria which is linked to the sustainability discussion referred to above. 
The Financing Issue 
Obviously any idea to provide deeper or broader debt relief meets with very important 
financing constraints. It was already difficult to mobilise the financing for the Enhanced HIPC 
initiative (especially for multilaterals such as the African Development Bank). Moreover, 
there is a possibility that the recent slowdown in growth and the decision to make an analysis 
at the completion point could imply further costs. On the other hand, there seems to be some 
consensus that the current debt situation of developing countries is not only the result of bad 
policies in those countries. Against this background, any examination of this question will 
obviously have to weigh, in a comprehensive and forward-looking way, the global costs of a 
possible perpetuation of the debt problem against the costs of providing additional relief 
(which would obviously have to also be addressed in a comprehensive way). 
A.3. Integration into the Global Trade System 
Efforts to integrate developing countries into the global trade system and other development-
oriented policies, in particular ODA should be seen as complementary aspects of an overall 
strategy towards sustainable global development, and more specifically targeting economic 
                                                
142 See also Group of Seven (2001a). 
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growth and poverty reduction. Several studies have shown that there are links between trade, 
development and poverty reduction.  
Firstly, there is an acknowledged positive relationship between trade and economic growth.143 
Secondly, there seems to be a positive relationship between growth and reduced levels of 
poverty. Growth tends to benefit all sectors of society ‘raising all boats’ and thereby bringing 
the poor above the poverty line. There is clear evidence of such an effect in East Asia, where 
six out of ten were living on under $1 a day in the mid-70s, while today it is two out of ten, 
and where, beyond conventional economic indicators, other indices of development such as 
literacy, life expectancy, and levels of political liberty have also shown an upward trend.  
Establishing a direct link between trade and poverty reduction is more complex. Several 
studies have found an empirical positive relationship between trade openness, growth and 
poverty reduction.144 However, others have questioned the robustness of such studies, 
particularly the appropriateness of the indicators used for openness (Rodrik (2000)). These 
criticisms highlight the difficulty in proving the empirical link conclusively through cross-
country empirical analysis in a context where so many other factors are at work. In addition, 
they indicate the importance of adopting sound economic policies and flanking measures to 
help ensure that the economic and development benefits of trade openness can be realised. 
Moreover, there is some evidence that the poorest sections of the population may be the most 
vulnerable to short-term restructuring costs of trade opening, particularly terms-of-trade 
changes or higher volatility.145 Increased openness may also reduce the capacity of protecting 
strategic industries, as well as increase the risk of anti-competitive behaviour by large foreign 
companies.146 These potential negative effects must be anticipated and appropriate policies 
adopted in tandem with liberalisation if the positive impacts of openness are to be felt 
throughout the population. 
Although there is extensive debate on the extent to which openness stimulates poverty 
reduction, there is less controversy on the fact that it has a role. Few economists would now 
argue that closed economies foster growth and, indeed, there are no examples of closed 
economies that have shown sustained rapid growth. Therefore, it appears that trade openness 
is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for growth and poverty reduction, as well as being 
to some degree an outcome of them. To ensure a positive impact, additional policies, 
including sound social and economic policies, regulatory frameworks conducive to trade and 
investment and adequate re-distributive and retraining policies are required. 
In many developing countries, domestic reform and increased trade liberalisation will not be 
adequate to ensure extensive increases in exports. Trade-related technical assistance and 
capacity-building are important tools to help countries make use of the opportunities for 
trade-based growth. Many countries simply lack the administrative capacity to fulfil the 
various requirements (e.g. health and safety standards, rules of origin, intellectual property 
rights protection) for market access, preferential or MFN (Most Favoured Nation) based. 
                                                
143  Dollar (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995), Edwards (1997). 
144  e.g. Dollar and Kraay (2001). 
145  Lundberg and Squire (1999). 
146  McCulloch et al. (2001). 
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A.3.1. Trends in Trade 
If oil trade is excluded (where exports have fallen significantly in dollar terms) developing 
countries have made significant gains in recent years and are thus, at a general level, more 
integrated into the world economy (see figure 10). In the past decade the share of developing 
countries in global non-energy exports rose by almost 7%, reaching 25% in 1999, while their 
share remained stable at around 39% in total exports including energy (World Bank (2002a)). 
This rise was mainly due to manufactured goods, whose share of developing countries’ 
exports increased from 25% in the early 80’s to 70% in 1999. Developing countries are in 
particular exploiting their comparative advantage in labour intensive manufactures. Their 
share of world trade in these sectors rose over ten percentage points in the 1990’s to 53%. 
One should, however, observe that these favourable tendencies are highly concentrated in the 
emerging market economies such as Mexico, Chile, Brazil, China, Taiwan China, Malaysia 
and Thailand. Virtually all the least developed countries are not part of this trend. 
Figure 10: Developing Countries’ Exports by Sector (Euro billion) 
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Source: UN Comtrade database 
Exports to the EU have shown strong growth. The EU is the main trading partner for much of 
the developing world: more than half of developing countries exports to the Triad147 go to the 
EU, with which developing countries as a group are now in surplus (figure 11). In 2000, 
developing countries accounted for 42% of extra-EU imports. 
                                                
147 Triad refers to the three largest trading powers; i.e., the EU, the US and Japan. 
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Figure 11: EU Trade with Developing Countries (Euro billion) 
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Source: Comext Database, Eurostat. 
A.3.2. The Challenges of Integration 
The main tools for fully integrating developing countries into the global trade system and 
thereby enabling sustainable development, are trade liberalisation, trade related capacity 
building and accompanying policies. Each of the three aspects requires action at international 
and domestic levels, by developed and developing countries alike. 
Trade liberalisation  
Improved market access has the potential to bring major welfare gains, especially to the 
developing world. A recent study by the World Bank (2001a) considered the impact of full 
trade liberalisation (an admittedly unlikely immediate prospect) and concluded that 
developing countries would see increases in welfare of up to US$ 539 billion per year if 
dynamic impacts on productivity are taken into account. A major part of this gain is due to 
reductions in developing countries’ own protective tariffs. This lowers import prices for 
consumers and for producers using imported intermediate goods and encourages the re-
allocation of domestic resources towards production in sectors in which developing countries 
have a comparative advantage. 
Developing countries’ exports still tend to be disadvantaged as regards market access, at least 
if one regards MFN tariff rates only. Their tradable output often has a high component of 
agricultural and labour-intensive manufacturing goods (such as textiles). These goods often 
face the highest trade barriers in developed country markets as well as in neighbouring 
regions. The World Bank has calculated that exports of agricultural and labour intensive 
manufactures face tariffs of, on average, twice the level of other goods. Figure 12 shows that 
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the highest rates are still in developing countries, but developed countries also practice tariff 
escalation148.  
Figure 12: Tariff Escalation  
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Source: World Bank (2001b) 
Reducing tariff peaks and tariff escalation is therefore important to increased market access. 
In the case of non-agricultural products, this is indeed an agreed objective for the trade 
negotiations in the WTO that were launched at the 4th WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha 
in November 2001. Developing and developed country high tariffs should be addressed in this 
context. In fact most of the welfare gains forecast by the World Bank come from the 
elimination of tariffs between developing countries, rather than improved access to developed 
markets. 
The impact of tariff peaks and tariff escalation in developed country markets is to a large 
extent offset by preferential access, such as, for the EU, the GSP scheme, bilateral free trade 
agreements or the EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement. The Generalised System of Preferences 
(GSP) provides preferential access to the EU market to beneficiary countries and therefore 
enhances their export earnings, promotes their industrialisation and encourages the 
diversification of their economies. However, if beneficiary countries were better equipped to 
meet procedural and technical requirements (e.g. sanitary and phytosanitary standards, 
customs and transport procedures, etc.) they could increase their utilisation rate and compete 
more efficiently on international markets. The new EU GSP Regulation, adopted in December 
2001, for the period 2002-2004, further simplifies the rules and harmonises procedures 
making the instrument more user-friendly and effective. The unilateral EU ‘Everything But 
Arms’ (EBA) initiative launched in early 2001 opened EU markets to all LDC exports, by 
                                                
148 Tariff escalation signifies that higher tariffs are applied to processed goods than to corresponding 
primary goods. 
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allowing duty and quota free access. This market access should enable them to exploit 
economies of scale to develop industries which were previously unviable149.  
At the May 2001 3rd UN Conference on LDCs, all industrialised countries for the first time 
committed to the objective of duty and quota free access for all exports originating in LDCs. 
Such an emulation of the EU EBA by other major industrialised nations would contribute 
significantly to LDCs’ opportunities for trade based growth 150. Studies of the impact of EBA 
have forecast large increases in welfare as a result – between US$ 400 and US$ 317 million 
depending on the study.151 However, even prior to the adoption of EBA, levels of protection 
against LDC exports were far higher in other QUAD152 countries than in the EU (figure 13). 
Thus if all Quad members were to adopt similar measures, the welfare impact would be much 
higher (US$1.8 bn-2.5bn). 
Figure 13: Pattern of Protection Facing LDC Exports (pre-EBA) 
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An equally important element for development is the liberalisation of trade in services. In 
contrast to removing or lowering tariffs at the border, this encourages and requires policy 
reform. Furthermore, restrictions on trade in services do not increase government revenues in 
the form of tariffs but raise the costs for consumers thus affecting the economy at large. In 
other words, increasing efficiency in the services sector would have direct welfare effects by 
reducing costs of services for consumers and governments alike. However, it should be borne 
in mind that effective services liberalisation (e.g. telecommunications liberalisation) may 
involve costs to the domestic government in the form of establishing effective regulatory 
agencies. 
                                                
149 As the EBA only concerns LDCs which often have a very small productive capacity, with a very weak 
exporting base, the overall effectiveness of the EBA on poverty reduction may be limited. 
150 The EU was the major destination for LDCs’ exports even before EBA was adopted. In 1998, the EU 
accounted for 56% of their total exports. Moreover, the EU already had very low tariffs for LDC 
imports; exports of the main products liberalized by EBA were, however, very low. Eliminating 
protection will certainly enhance trade in the products concerned. 
151  UNCTAD (2001), Ianchovichina et al. (2001). 
152 The QUAD comprises the EU, the US, Japan and Canada. 
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Improved market access is a prerequisite to increase trade and hence trade-generated growth. 
Trade liberalisation, including in sectors of interest to developing countries, and underpinned 
by stronger and more transparent multilateral rules, will be pursued in the context of the WTO 
trade negotiations, launched at the 4th WTO Ministerial Conference under the Doha 
Development Agenda (see Box 2). 
Box 2: The Doha Development Agenda 
1. Multilateral trade liberalisation provides the framework and the engine of world growth through 
a more efficient global division of production. At the November 2001 WTO ministerial meeting in 
Doha the world’s trade ministers - the majority of which represent developing countries - agreed to 
launch a new round of multilateral negotiations on trade liberalisation and related rulemaking in the 
WTO - the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), which is more ambitious than any previous efforts.  
2. At Doha WTO members committed to focusing on the interests and concerns of developing 
countries, thus ensuring that trade negotiations contribute to development. The new talks are expected 
to lead to the further opening of global markets and the facilitation of trade, especially in those areas 
where the developing world is most competitive.  
3. The launch of the new round of trade negotiations now can boost growth at a critical juncture for the 
world economy. But the Doha Development Agenda also represents a fundamentally different 
approach to trade policy, launching broad negotiations under an overarching sustainable development 
objective, supported by trade related capacity building to help countries participate effectively. In this 
respect, the inclusion of environment on the international trade agenda is also groundbreaking; it 
should provide an instrument for improved global governance in this crucial area. 
4. The DDA epitomises the integrated approach to harnessing globalisation promoted by the EU, 
and creates the basis for further changes in the global system. The inclusion of talks on a range of 
trade related issues such as competition, investment, trade facilitation and government procurement 
after the next WTO ministerial conference in 2003 should ensure that market liberalisation takes place 
in a broader regulatory framework, helping countries manage and maximise the benefits of reforms. 
5. The agreement reached in Doha to negotiate a multilateral framework for transparent, stable and 
predictable conditions for investment, is an important factor in this context. Participation to such a 
framework agreement is expected to provide greater certainty and to reduce the perceived risk for 
potential investors, thus helping to increase the inflow of foreign direct investment – which is an 
increasingly important source of development financing; it helps to promote a healthy balance of 
trade, it encourages efficient production and stimulates technology transfer. 
6. The negotiation of a framework on competition, as agreed in Doha, is expected to complement the 
investment agreement by helping countries to address anti-competitive practices by foreign or 
domestic firms and build efficient market structures, to the benefit of consumers and their economy 
more broadly. Directly related and important for the economic efficiency of countries, is also the 
agreement to negotiate, after the 5th WTO Ministerial, a multilateral agreement on transparency in 
government procurement.  
7. Inefficient use of resources and infrastructure, time-consuming customs procedures and red tape 
continue to be a major constraint on developing country export performance. An agreement on trade 
facilitation in the WTO would aim to streamline procedures, cutting costs and red tape. The agreement 
reached in Doha to negotiate trade facilitation therefore constitutes an important contribution to 
development.  
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The effect of non-tariff measures on developing country exports is also important. In 
particular technical standards (TBT) and standards applied for health and safety reasons (SPS) 
can significantly impact the export opportunities of developing countries. While this is an 
issue that will require increased attention over the coming years, it is clear that the answer 
does not lie in a lowering of justified standards. Key instruments to help countries meet 
standards include support for their participation in international standard setting bodies and 
capacity building directed at relevant public and private sector actors. Similar challenges exist 
in the context of rules on intellectual property (the TRIPS Agreement), where support is vital 
to countries lacking domestic capacity to implement the agreement. 
In the agricultural field, there is an evident need to reduce trade-distorting domestic support 
including all forms of export subsidies and to improve market access to address developing 
countries’ interest in special and differential treatment, as well as the importance of non-trade 
concerns of agriculture such as food security, as was agreed in the WTO Ministerial in Doha.  
The recent outcome of the Doha ministerial conference sets an agenda that all members fully 
benefit from the expansion of trade and that particular attention be paid to the needs and 
concerns of developing countries and the world’s most fragile economies, in particular 
concerning food security, which is a key issue for most developing countries.  
Food security is a multidimensional issue which needs to be addressed with coherent and 
long-term multi-sectoral strategies, both from an international and domestic point of view. 
Together with political dialogue and development co-operation trade is a key component of 
EU external action to contribute to poverty reduction. 
Some developing countries have been disappointed by the lack of realisation of opportunities 
created by the Uruguay Round or by the extent of such opportunities. A number of developing 
countries perceived these as ‘broken promises’ (Oxfam (2001)) of developed partners. Their 
complaints sometimes refer to inadequate efforts made in areas like increased market access 
for developing country exports, such as dismantling of agricultural protection or improved 
access for textiles and clothing, but more often addresses the balance of the agreements as 
such and specifically a perceived bias in the Uruguay Round outcome towards developed 
country interests.  
This disappointment with previous WTO agreements led to an ambitious work programme in 
the WTO relating to existing agreements, materialising in a ministerial decision at the 4th 
WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha in November 2001, which comprehensively addresses 
issues relating to implementation153.  
Beyond the multilateral level, regional liberalisation can be an important stimulus to further 
integration in the global economy. The number of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) has 
been multiplying in recent years. RTAs should reinforce co-operation on regulatory policies, 
including on the environmental and social dimensions of sustainable development, 
particularly in a North-South context. In addition they effectively lock-in necessary domestic 
policy reforms (in the political and economic area), enhancing their credibility and 
transparency. In both these respects, a very successful example are the Europe Agreements 
between the EU and the countries of central and eastern Europe (CEECs), which have 
underpinned CEECs economic transition over the last decade. 
                                                
153  Doha also clarified the key issue of access to medicines in developing countries, with the recognition 
that TRIPS does not prevent members from taking measures to protect public health. 
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A key element in regional integration initiatives is the issue of regulatory approximation 
which increasingly emerges as a necessary prerequisite for attaining sustainable development 
objectives. Tariff dismantling at the border is one necessary step in the process of trade 
liberalisation. For goods and services to move freely among the parties, addressing trade-
impeding regulatory barriers effectively is also essential. Therefore deeper integration or 
greater convergence/approximation of rules and regulations can help to fully achieve the 
potential gains from RTA participation. 
In particular, progress towards the objective of liberalising trade in services and investment, 
should be accompanied by a common regulatory framework in areas such as competition 
policy, public procurement, rules of origin, intellectual and industrial property and norms and 
standards. This may increase the scope for benefiting from trade liberalisation inter alia 
contributing to the creation of an environment capable of attracting investment opportunities, 
but attention must be given to potential administrative costs of implementation for developing 
countries and the need to avoid the creation of overlapping sets of rules. 
The costs of adjustment to trade liberalisation are a significant challenge to developing 
countries. The inclusion in RTAs of efforts to agree to common disciplines for regulatory 
regimes exacerbates such a problem. Flanking policies are therefore paramount to help offset 
the significant loss of government tariff revenue and increased opportunity cost of 
administering RTA rules.  
It is often argued that for most developing countries and especially for the poorest ones, a 
North-South RTA with a large industrial country is likely to be superior to a South-South 
RTA among developing countries, provided the right design encourages the necessary 
domestic reforms. 
However North-South and South-South integration can be complementary. The EU in most of 
its RTA initiatives promotes regional integration along South-South-North lines, where the 
advantages of trade liberalisation between a developed North and a developing South (locking 
in reforms, credibility, good governance, convergence, access to large markets, FDI 
incentives, technology transfers, etc.) are combined with the benefits of regional integration 
among the developing countries themselves (economies of scale, increased bargaining power, 
larger markets attracting more FDI, etc). 
Trade-related Capacity Building 
In addition to trade preferences, a comprehensive approach is required to enhance trade 
capacity if developing countries are to take advantage of the opportunities that trade 
liberalisation offers. Measures would include increased levels of comprehensive trade related 
technical assistance and capacity building to help countries participate effectively in the 
multilateral trading system. In the short term, such assistance should focus on the ability of 
countries to participate effectively in the WTO trade negotiations, both as regards substance, 
by identification of interests and objectives, and the more process-related aspect of 
developing their negotiation capacity and skills. In the WTO, the Doha Development Agenda 
Global Trust Fund has been created to ensure funding of the WTO technical assistance 
programme that is being implemented to assist developing countries in relation to new 
negotiations. Other international organisations, such as UNCTAD and the World Bank as well 
as specialised agencies such as the World Customs Organisation and the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation, are also important contributors of trade related technical assistance and 
capacity building to help countries participate in the multilateral trading system. 
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Co-ordination of this support is important to ensure complementarity and avoid overlap. 
Multilateral programmes, such as the Integrated Framework for Trade-related Technical 
Assistance to the Least Developed Countries and the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance 
Programme, which involves several donor agencies, are examples of co-ordinated multilateral 
programmes, targeting the poorest countries (Least Developed Countries and Sub-Saharan 
African countries respectively). 
In the medium- to long-term, assistance should be directed at building countries’ capacity to 
implement the negotiation outcome, including assistance for regulatory and administrative 
capacity, and to make use of the market access opportunities by building trade capacity. In 
this context, private sector development is also important.  
Viable and effective trade related technical assistance and capacity building in the longer term 
requires mainstreaming of trade into development programming and into the overall 
development strategies of developing countries as defined in Country Strategy Papers or 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. As regards the EU, trade and integration into the world 
economy have been identified as one of six priority objectives for development policy. 
Accompanying Policies 
Appropriate accompanying policy frameworks and good governance are essential elements of 
a strategy to ensure that all countries benefit from the opportunities for growth and 
development created by trade and investment liberalisation. The introduction of economic 
reform and flanking policy measures will often require support from the international 
community by co-operation to support economic reform and enhance the stability, 
transparency and credibility of the policy environment in developing countries, where 
domestic savings and investments are low (as e.g. the EC is already doing through partnership 
agreements, such as MEDA and the Cotonou agreement with the ACP countries). 
Governance at a global level, by international co-operation and rule-making, can help support 
and lock in domestic reform, thus providing greater stability and predictability. As regards 
trade policy, a rules-based multilateral trading system is likely to be the best guarantee for a 
stable, international macro-economic framework and predictability in trade and investment 
conditions world-wide. In addition to the positive impact on export conditions, such an 
international framework could help to support and sustain the necessary domestic policy 
reforms. The DOHA WTO meeting agreed to negotiate international frameworks of rules on 
investment, competition, government procurement and trade facilitation is significant in this 
context.  
A framework of rules on investment, under which countries would subscribe to fundamental 
principles such as non-discrimination, transparency and predictability, would help to underpin 
national investment regimes, while leaving the formulation of such regimes to the 
governments themselves. Participation in such an agreement would provide greater certainty 
and reduce the perceived risk for potential investors. It would also contribute to creating an 
environment more conducive to domestic and foreign investment, which can bring 
technology, employment and growth, build capacity and improve the trade performance of 
countries, and would be particularly important for low-income developing countries. 
As regards competition rules, negotiations in the WTO will aim at agreeing on a basic 
framework agreement, including core principles of domestic competition regimes, modalities 
to benefit from international co-operation and support for capacity building in developing 
countries. This would not entail a harmonisation of domestic laws and there would be 
  90   
flexibility as regards the introduction of domestic competition law or the maintenance of 
exclusions from the application of such law. A multilateral agreement on competition would 
complement an investment agreement by helping countries to address anti-competitive 
practices by foreign or domestic firms and build efficient market structures. The introduction 
of domestic competition policies would help countries to manage large investors and ensure 
economic efficiencies, thus increasing the benefit to the local consumers and economy.  
Further negotiations have also been agreed to clarify and improve anti-dumping rules with a 
view to limiting possible abuse by both developed and developing countries.  
The negotiation of an agreement on trade facilitation in the WTO will aim at streamlining 
customs procedures, cutting costs and red tape, which continue to be a major constraint on 
developing country export performance. A trade facilitation agreement would imply 
significant savings, in particular for developing countries, by helping governments to improve 
efficiency of controls and, ultimately, ensure higher revenue intakes. The gains are expected 
to be particularly important for small and medium-sized enterprises in developing countries, 
for which the costs of compliance with trade procedures are proportionately higher and a 
disincentive to international trading. Simplified trade procedures are also frequently cited by 
business groups as constituting an important factor in FDI decisions. 
Negotiations on trade and environment, which were launched at the 4th WTO Ministerial, are 
equally important for developing countries. Not only do they aim at addressing particular 
market access concerns of developing countries; the increased certainty that would follow 
from a clarification of the interface between trade rules and multilateral environment 
agreements would ensure predictability in market access conditions, thus limiting the risk of 
abuse of environmental considerations for protectionist purposes. It would also provide 
developing countries with opportunities regarding increased exports of environmental 
products. 
A.4. Attracting Foreign Direct Investment  
In recent years, FDI154 has received increasing interest from policy-makers, due to its growing 
economic importance for both developed and developing countries. Sales by foreign affiliates 
are now more than twice than world total exports of goods, implying that firms use FDI more 
than they use exports to service foreign markets155.  
The on-going preparations of the Financing for Development Conference also stress the 
important role that FDI can have for economic development and hence poverty reduction156, 
through technological transfer, productivity increases or enhancement of export capacity. At 
the same time, anti-globalisation protesters point at the negative side-effects that multi-
national companies can have on the host economy: rent-extraction, crowding-out of domestic 
investment, repatriation of profits, as well as the irresponsible exploitation of natural 
resources. 
                                                
154 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is defined as an investment involving a long-term relationship and 
reflecting a lasting interest and control (usually above 10%) of a resident entity in one economy in an 
enterprise resident in another economy (OECD (1993)). This definition captures both ‘green-field’ 
investment (i.e. when a new plant is built in the host country) and ‘brown-field’ investment (i.e. the 
partial or total acquisition of existing local firms). 
155 UNCTAD (2001). 
156 See the Revised Draft Outcome, UN (2001a). 
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A.4.1. Trends and Figures 
One of the most positive trends in developing countries has been the increasing importance 
that private capital flows have assumed over the past decade. Private capital flows totalled 
87% of all net long-term capital flows to developing countries in 2000 (Table 2, section 
A.1.1); between 1990 and 2000, they averaged 75%. Among these, FDI is by far the largest 
and most stable source of capital, at around US$ 180 billion in 2000 (70% of total private 
flows).  
Figure 14: Distribution of World Inward FDI Stock (%) 
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Source: World Investment Report (UNCTAD) various issues. 
However, on a global scale developing countries only attract marginal amounts of FDI: in 
2000, 21% of total FDI inflows were in developing countries.157 On the other hand, the 
importance of developing countries as hosts has been slightly growing in the past two 
decades, with their share in inward FDI158 stock going from 26% in 1980 to 31% in 2000 
(Figure 14). FDI inflows in percentage of gross fixed capital formation, a good measure of the 
importance of FDI in the economy, have also steadily grown for the developing countries: 
from an average of 5% between 1989 and 1994 to 11% between 1995 and 1999.  
In the geographical distribution of FDI, major differences exist among developing regions 
(UNCTAD (2001)). Africa has actually seen its share of inward FDI stock within developing 
countries being reduced from 10% in 1980 to 5% in 2000, while a less dramatic reduction has 
been observed for Latin America and the Caribbean countries (from 36% to 31% over the 
same period). Foreign investors in the past 20 years have favoured Asia, which has witnessed 
an increase from 53% in 1980 to 64% in 2000; the most spectacular increase has been seen in 
China, which saw its share growing from zero to nearly 20% over these two decades. 
                                                
157  UNCTAD (2001). 
158 Inward FDI stocks are estimated as the cumulation of inward FDI flows (UNCTAD (2000)). 
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FDI is also very concentrated within each region, with the three top recipients accounting for 
more than half of FDI inflows. In 2000, Angola, Egypt and Nigeria represented 50% of total 
FDI inflows into Africa; Brazil, Argentina and Mexico 66% in Latin America and the 
Caribbean; while Hong Kong (China), China and South Korea accounted for 80% of FDI 
inflows to Asia. Even though this high concentration is often proportionate to the size of the 
country (which mostly reflects the amount of potential sales), it also illustrates the fact that 
many countries have not yet been able to attract the full potential flow of investment, 
notwithstanding their liberalisation efforts.  
The main source countries of FDI into developing countries are also differentiated by region. 
For Africa, main sources have traditionally been France, the UK the US, and to a lesser extent 
Germany and Japan. Canada, Italy and the Netherlands have recently gained in importance. In 
Latin America and the Caribbean, after the US and Japan, Spain is the largest single investor 
in the region. In Asia, the US, Japan and European countries are all investing, while Asian 
countries themselves are investing in the region (e.g. South Korea). 
A.4.2. Impact of FDI on Developing Countries 
The economic literature tends to agree on the overall positive effect of FDI on economic 
growth in the host economy159. A distinction can be made between the impact of FDI at a 
microeconomic level and at a macroeconomic level. At the microeconomic level, the channel 
of this effect mostly goes via technological transfer, whereby contagion and knowledge 
diffusion improves productivity and efficiency in local firms in various ways, and hence 
growth. One of the channels is through backward and forward linkages between multi-
national enterprises (MNEs) and local firms. The former refers to linkages between MNE and 
local suppliers, who benefit from better organisational structures and management skills learnt 
from contacts with foreign firms. Local suppliers may also have to meet higher standards of 
quality or delivery speed, if they want to deal with foreign firms. The overall result is that 
technological transfer gradually makes local labour more skilled, and hence local suppliers 
become more competent at producing the required intermediate goods for the MNEs. 
Similarly, forward linkages concern all spillovers towards distributors, again in terms of 
organisational or managerial skills transfer.  
Active technological transfer arises when training of local employees by ‘imported’ 
managers, either in technical skills or in more intangible ones (such as marketing, customer 
service, etc.), leads local workers to end-up creating their own firm. Passive technological 
transfer arises when local firms see their profits threatened by more efficient MNEs and 
therefore have to increase productivity by introducing new technologies or even just by being 
more efficient in their production process. 
The empirical evidence on positive FDI spillovers is mostly consistent for developed 
countries, while it is more mixed for developing countries (Blomstrom, Globerman and 
Kokko (2000)). Evidence on Latin American middle income countries shows positive 
spillovers for Mexico (Kokko (1994)) and Uruguay (Blomstrom et al. (1994)), while Aitken 
and Harrison (1991) find no evidence for Venezuela. 
From a theoretical point of view, the beneficial effect of FDI should be particularly strong in 
developing countries, as foreign technology may be the only source of innovation, given the 
few resources available at both private and government level to invest in R&D. However, 
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developing countries may not have the minimum level of knowledge that is necessary to 
‘absorb’ the foreign technology (Borensztein et al. (1998)). This technology gap between 
foreign and local firms may prove particularly large in the case of ‘resource-based FDI’ such 
as for oil or gas extraction, where the gap between the MNE and its environment is so wide 
that the dynamic benefits of technological transfer do not arise (Lim (2001)). The recurrence 
of the theme of ‘absorptive capacity’ therefore emphasises the role to be played in developing 
countries by human capital and investment in education.  
The effects of MNEs on the market structure of the host country are not entirely clear. 
Through technological transfer, MNEs may force local firms to become more efficient and 
increase the general level of competition. However, they may also force out inefficient firms 
and become monopolists, given their better use of economies of scale and firm-specific assets, 
in which case FDI could lead to lower welfare in the host country. Moreover, MNEs may 
intentionally choose sectors where competition is low, or where entry barriers, such as high 
sunk costs, exist, to impose a monopolistic structure. Competition policies and their effective 
enforcement are important instruments to address this aspect. The nature of FDI is also 
relevant: a green-field investment, e.g. the establishment of a new plant, may indeed reduce 
the concentration of the market, while a simple acquisition leaves it unchanged or increases it. 
Unfortunately, the empirical evidence on this subject has been inconclusive and the impact of 
FDI on market structure remains an open question.160  
In developing countries market structures tend to be imperfect, with a low degree of 
competition. If this is coupled with a restrictive inward investment regime (e.g. with 
mandatory joint partnerships or domestic content requirements) it may lead to attracting less 
efficient MNEs or those that use older technology (Moran (1998)), which therefore do not 
generate strong positive spillovers. Moran also points out that a liberal trade and investment 
climate is also conducive of export-oriented MNEs, which due to their exposure to 
international competition often bring new technology. 
At a macroeconomic level, three main issues arise within the impact of FDI on developing 
countries: domestic investment, employment and trade. Most government policies are 
especially designed in order to attract FDI flows that would benefit these three aspects, as 
illustrated by Sun (1998) for the Chinese case. Domestic investment fuels growth; if FDI is 
conducive to greater investment, it will indirectly induce development. In this respect, joint-
ventures allow local firms to gain the much needed financial and physical resources for new 
projects. This is often the only way for developing countries to get financial resources, 
especially when markets are too restrictive to be attractive for foreign portfolio investors.  
Again the form of FDI matters for its impact on domestic investment.161 Acquisitions are 
merely a change of ownership, while green-field FDI has an immediate impact on domestic 
investment. The other side of the coin may be a ‘crowding-out’ effect on domestic investment 
by FDI, especially when local resources (capital or labour) are scarce. As mentioned above, 
better organised and financially sounder MNEs may out-compete local firms and they may 
therefore capture the best investment opportunities in developing countries. The empirical 
evidence generally shows that MNEs have a positive impact on domestic investment.162 
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As far as employment is concerned, the effects are on the number of employed people or on 
their wages. In developing countries, it is most likely that MNEs will employ labour-intensive 
processes, precisely in order to take advantage of low labour costs, hence increasing 
employment opportunities. In terms of wages, since MNEs ‘export’ their knowledge-capital 
to combine it with cheaper labour, often wages offered by foreigners are higher than 
elsewhere in the local economy. As a result, MNEs may increase the wage gap between 
‘skilled’ (relative to the average local workers) and ‘unskilled’ workers in the developing 
country, hence posing problems of rising inequality.163  
Trade and investment are complementary aspects of countries’ integration in the global 
economy. Empirical studies usually show that FDI can enhance the export capacity of the host 
country and this is especially true when foreign investors use the host country as a platform 
for exporting, rather than for selling in the local market.164 In this sense trade and investment 
can be seen as complementary and countries with open, predictable trade policies can more 
fully contribute to FDI’s growth potential.165  
The fear that some may have that FDI could lead to a deterioration in the trade balance of the 
developing country seems to be unjustified. Vertically integrated MNEs would usually use 
imported intermediate goods, which impacts negatively on the trade balance; however, this is 
offset by the fact that they will also export back their final product and that the value of final 
goods will exceed that of the intermediate goods. In terms of spillovers, export-oriented 
MNEs may also benefit local firms through backward linkages, i.e. by purchasing 
domestically produced intermediate products and by improving their ‘market-access’ 
capability at an international level, and eventually lead to an increase in direct exports from 
local firms, with a positive effect on the trade balance.  
Overall, the impact of FDI on growth in developing countries depends on various elements 
directly linked to policy choices: a minimum level of human capital, a competitive economy 
with liberal investment climate and a liberalised trade regime.  
A.4.3. The Challenge of Attracting FDI 
Given the perceived benefits of FDI on the host economy, developing countries elaborate 
initiatives to attract foreign investors (such as tax holidays or other fiscal incentives) while at 
the same time designing schemes to encourage as many positive spillovers as possible (e.g. by 
imposing joint-ventures, local content requirements or the use of specific technologies).  
When looking at the determinants of FDI, it is clear that many are exogenous to government 
policies, such as geographical position, country size and availability of natural resources. The 
most robust empirical finding concerns country size, with which FDI is positively 
correlated.166 Beyond these, necessary conditions include economic, political and regulatory 
fundamentals (such as good governance, rule of law and intellectual property rights 
protection) that ensure a stable environment for foreign investors. These are first and foremost 
the responsibility of local governments. Several empirical studies show in fact that corruption, 
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complex and non-transparent regulatory frameworks, as well as weak property rights all 
hamper FDI.167 
The liberalisation efforts in developing countries have accelerated since the 1990s with, for 
example, the elimination of licensing requirements, opening of previously closed sectors, 
unlimited foreign ownership, or making tax systems more neutral.168 Moreover, trade and 
foreign exchange transactions were further liberalised and the functioning of financial markets 
was improved. A series of survey studies between 1987 and 1999 on 28 developing countries 
show that all these countries improved their investment climate, with beneficial effects on 
attracting FDI.169 Efforts of developing countries in this direction can only be welcome, while 
it should be clear that most responsibility lies at home, rather than with the international 
community. 
The desirability of active government investment-promotion policies, in addition to these 
necessary conditions, is not entirely clear. Evidence shows that such policies do have a strong 
positive impact on attracting foreign investors.170 However, the cost of ‘marketing’ the 
potential host country abroad can be a real issue for some developing countries with scarce 
resources. Moreover, sector-specific promotion programmes in particular can create major 
distortions in the allocation of investment resources within a country.171 The main role and 
challenge for international institutions should therefore be to create mechanisms that facilitate 
FDI more globally.  
Some mechanisms are already in place, such as the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA), created in 1988 (World Bank Group) to promote FDI into emerging market 
economies. MIGA offers political risk insurance (guarantees) to investors and lenders, and 
helps developing countries attract and retain private investment. Moreover, MIGA's guarantee 
coverage requires investors to adhere to high social and environmental standards. 
Making sure that all developing countries with a proper investment climate fulfil their 
potential in attracting foreign investors is crucial. Advisory services, such as the Foreign 
Investment Advisory Service, created in 1985 within the World Bank, can help countries to 
reach their potential for attracting FDI, especially when disadvantages due to reputation 
effects are present (as in the case of Africa). Studies on herd behaviour within FDI have in 
fact shown that for investors entering a new market it may be an important signal to see that 
other investors are already established in the host country.172 This may in turn induce more 
and more investors to explore business possibilities in that country. Similarly, some 
developing countries may be ‘stuck’ in a no-FDI position, only because there never was an 
investor in the first place.  
From another perspective, investment agreements may also be helpful in ensuring that 
appropriate protection to foreign investors is guaranteed. At a bilateral level, the network of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) has considerably expanded since the 1980s: in 1998, 
39% of BITs were signed between developing countries, while 36% were signed between 
developing and developed countries.173 Regional agreements involving investment 
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frameworks have also proliferated throughout the developing world (within ASEAN, 
CAEMC, WAEMU and MERCOSUR).  
As far as EU initiatives are concerned, most bilateral agreements create the conditions for 
encouraging inward direct investment with partner countries, through the establishment of 
regulations on investment and the repatriation of profits, as well as provisions for investment 
promotion and protection (examples include Stabilisation and Association Agreements in the 
Balkans, Agreements with ex-CIS countries and Euro-Med agreements). Within the Cotonou 
Agreement signed on 23 June 2000 with ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) countries, an 
Investment Facility has been put in place, which allows amongst other things to provide 
guarantees in support of foreign investment.  
While bilateral investment treaties may be a useful tool in ensuring and sustaining stability in 
investment relations with important recipient countries, the sheer number and complexity of 
such treaties are problematic, not least for developing countries with limited regulatory and 
administrative capacity. A multilateral framework of rules would be more cost-effective, and 
in addition provide a higher level of transparency and stability, while ensuring non-
discrimination. These benefits are particularly important for developing country governments. 
The failure in 1998 of the MAI (Multilateral Agreement on Investment) launched within the 
OECD in 1995 (giving non-OECD members only observer status), indeed showed that the 
proper forum for such an agreement should be a comprehensive multilateral one. Developing 
countries in fact resisted the loss of discretion in policy instruments, even though a “tie one’s 
hands” strategy may increase credibility in providing a sound investment climate. At the Doha 
Conference of November 2001, the 144 members of the WTO have agreed on the case for a 
multilateral framework on FDI, that will be negotiated after the 5th Ministerial meeting of 
2003. Thus, during the next few years the main policy challenge concerning FDI, for 
developed and developing countries alike, will be the negotiation, within the WTO, of the 
right framework on investment. This should help to ensure transparency, predictability and 
non-discrimination for FDI, and hence support higher levels of FDI worldwide. 
B. Alternative Financing Instruments 
Over the years, a number of other financing instruments have been proposed to complement 
official development assistance. As several of them, including the Tobin tax, take the form of 
international taxes, they are treated as a group (section 1). Two other proposals, an SDR 
(Special Drawing Rights) allocation and the De-tax, are discussed in section 2. 
B.1. International Taxes 
The issue of an international tax to finance development is not new. International taxes have, 
for example, been suggested as part of a solution for development both in the North-South 
Report, by the group chaired by Willy Brandt in 1980, and in Our Common Future, the report 
of the World Commission on Environment and Development chaired by Gro Harlem 
Brundtland. The discussion on international taxes has mainly taken place within the 
discussion on financing of the United Nations and its activities.174  
In addition to financing development, international taxes have been proposed as a way to 
finance the provision of global public goods. Proponents argue that global public goods are 
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best dealt with and financed at the global level. As efforts to provide a more safe, healthy and 
stable world benefit all, some international taxes could in this context be seen as a charge paid 
by those that benefit from these efforts.175 
Several tax bases have been proposed. A tax on currency transactions has so far received the 
greatest attention. Other proposals have discussed a tax on global activities or on the use of 
global public goods. Examples on proposed tax bases include, for example, air transport or 
airfreight, telecommunications and postal services, maritime shipping, trade, arms export, and 
carbon dioxide emissions. The issue of international taxes was raised again in the recent 
Zedillo report.176 
This section focuses on four proposals, which are most often referred to within international 
fora. The purpose is to assess the feasibility and to discuss the implementation issues of these 
international tax proposals as well as their efficiency and potential revenue. The taxes under 
review are a tax on currency transactions, a tax on carbon dioxide emission, a tax on aviation 
fuel and a tax on arms exports.  
B.1.1. Taxes versus National Contributions 
The principle of a tax is that it is levied on certain activities to finance public goods without 
being earmarked. This enables resources to be used in the most optimal way when 
circumstances change. While an international tax offers the same financing flexibility as ODA 
resources financed out of national budgets, international taxes, once agreed, would become 
compulsory and would circumvent the current difficulty of voluntary contributions from 
governments.  
However, developing international taxes would be a major challenge to international co-
operation and co-ordination, both to reach a political agreement in principle and to work out 
the legal and administrative infrastructure ensuring a proper implementation of the tax. 
Moreover, an international tax could be seen as less fair from an equity point of view than 
contributions based on GNP.  
The EU experience shows how difficult it is to establish supra-national taxes. The EU has 
developed a secure and efficient system to finance its policies. It enjoys a fair degree of 
financial autonomy, although the lack of a transparent link between the taxpayer and the 
beneficiary of the revenue is seen as an element of the democratic deficit of the EU 
institutions. The revenue side of the budget is closely linked to common policies, with 
genuine own resources (customs duties) and receipts from the application of a uniform rate to 
a harmonised VAT base. Reforms in the 1980s have, however, shifted the emphasis towards a 
contribution system, mainly because of equity considerations (UK correction in 1984, 
introduction of the GNP contribution and the capping of VAT resource in 1988). This move 
away from supranational taxes has taken place despite the existence of an advanced economic 
and political integration with the corresponding well-developed institutional and legal 
framework. As the current framework of non-EU international co-operation has not reached 
such a degree of integration, the feasibility of reaching agreement on introducing international 
taxes and making them operational can be questioned.  
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While the distinction is not always easy to make, it may be important to distinguish between 
charges and taxes in this context. A tax is, according to the OECD working definition, a 
compulsory unrequited payment to the government. This definition excludes charges and 
penalties, but includes for example social security contributions since they are compulsory. A 
charge represents, on the other hand, a payment for a specific service. The individual user is 
able to derive a particular benefit or service from the charge, and the proceeds are earmarked 
to a specific use.177 When discussions have taken place in international fora, for example on 
the aviation fuel tax, some have argued that it might be easier to organise the financing of 
specific international public goods through charges or other economic instruments instead of 
taxes.  
B.1.2. The framework of International Tax Proposals 
International tax proposals generally have a dual objective. They aim to raise revenue as a 
means of funding development or the provision of global public goods, but they are also seen 
as useful policy instruments to correct for economic distortions and externalities by inducing 
a change of behaviour through changing the relative prices between different activities. Some 
of the externalities are global by nature, thereby justifying a response at the global level. 
1. Currency Transaction Tax (CTT) 
The tax that has raised the most attention is the tax on foreign exchange transactions. As 
discussed in Chapter II, Nobel Prize winner James Tobin launched in 1972 the idea of a tax 
on foreign exchange transactions to discourage short-term speculative capital flows. Tobin’s 
main concern was that the margin for manoeuvre of the monetary authorities in industrialised 
countries had been significantly reduced by the increased capital mobility. The Latin 
American and Asian crises in the 1990s have reopened the debate on the link between 
financial crises and capital mobility in unstable economic areas, with a special focus on 
‘peripheral currencies’. This gave rise to new proposals, in particular by Spahn (1996) and 
Schmidt (1999). Apart from its proclaimed potential to stabilise exchange rate markets, 
proponents of the tax have highlighted the potential proceeds of such a tax, and suggested 
turning it into an attractive source of additional revenue for the fight against poverty.  
2. Carbon Tax  
An international carbon tax has been discussed as a way to internalise the negative 
environmental effects of carbon dioxide emissions, through putting a price on emissions. The 
main advantage of a tax, compared to regulations, is that it induces emitters to choose an 
efficient, cost-minimising pattern of abatement. For this to be the case, the tax should be 
applied at a uniform rate across different users. As an international tax would equalise the 
marginal cost of emission reductions across the world, the emission reductions would be 
allocated so that the total costs for the world are minimised. However, the effects on different 
countries would be different in terms of national costs, depending on weather conditions, the 
energy supply mix and the industrial structure. Another advantage of environmental taxes is 
that they induce technological change, as savings in terms of reduced tax payments can be 
realised for all emitters. 
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Taxes on energy and carbon emissions have been extensively discussed. A tax on oil as a 
source for financing development was for example suggested in the Human Development 
Report of 1994178, which proposed a US$1 per barrel tax on oil consumption and the 
equivalent on coal. However, the issue of an international carbon tax has mainly been 
discussed in relation to the negotiations on the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) as an instrument to reduce emissions. There was a discussion on 
the concept of a tax in the beginning of 1990’s. However, the agreement reached in Kyoto in 
1997 sets emission targets for the individual states and the EU, while leaving it to the 
countries to decide how this will be accomplished. At an international level, the Kyoto 
protocol focuses on other economic instruments: emission trading, joint implementation and 
the clean development mechanism.179  
The issue of a global carbon tax was raised again in the Zedillo Report.180 According to this 
proposal, industrialised countries should transfer a share of their carbon tax receipts that 
correspond to an agreed base rate to the international level, while developing countries would 
be allowed to recycle all their tax receipts into their own economies. The Report finds an 
international carbon tax more promising as a source of funding international development 
than a tax on currency transactions. 
3. Tax on Aviation Fuel 
A tax on fuel used for international aviation is an indirect tax on emissions from aviation. 
Like the carbon tax, the tax would internalise external costs by putting a price on the 
emissions of aviation. It would also result in a more equal treatment in terms of internalising 
external costs across different transport modes181. This argument also holds with respect to the 
tax treatment of domestic and international aviation, as some countries already tax domestic 
flights. 
A tax on international aviation fuel has also been discussed as a source of funding of 
international development, but it has primarily been discussed as an instrument to mitigate the 
emissions of green house gases, in particular carbon dioxide. The aviation industry has grown 
considerably over the last 20 years, with an annual average growth in passenger-kilometres of 
7,4% since 1980. The Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) special report on 
aviation and the global atmosphere projects a growth of 5 % per year between 1990 and 2015, 
with fuel consumption and emissions growing 3 % per year over the same period. Aeroplanes 
accounted for about 2 % of total carbon dioxide emissions in 1992. This corresponds to 13 % 
of carbon dioxide emissions from transportation.182  
The issue of a tax on international aviation has been raised in several international fora, for 
example in the UN Commission on Sustainable Development. A tax on aviation fuel has been 
discussed within the European Union on several occasions. The European Union favours an 
international initiative on a tax on aviation fuel in the context of the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO)183. However, the current policy of ICAO, which remained 
unchanged by the 33rd ICAO Assembly in October 2001, is that it recommends the reciprocal 
exemption from all taxes on fuel taken on board by aircraft in connection with international 
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air services. As an environmental economic instrument, the ICAO favours an open emission 
trading system and at the meeting in October, the Assembly requested the development of 
guidelines for emission trading for international aviation.184 
4. Tax on Arms Trade 
A tax on arms trade or production surfaced in the debate on international taxation in the UN 
framework on global taxes in the 1990s185. Such a tax was considered as a legitimate 
contribution in the framework of initiatives of prevention of conflicts and peacekeeping. 
Various possibilities have been mentioned in the debate: a tax on production versus a tax on 
trade and a tax encompassing all conventional arms or just limited to land mines. However, 
no concrete proposal has been put forward. The French Minister of Finance has reactivated 
the proposal as an alternative to the currency transaction tax in the summer of 2001, with a 
main focus on the exports of arms186. 
B.1.3. Provisions and Features of the Tax Proposals 
1. Geographical Scope and Coverage 
The risk of relocation of taxable activities constrains the ability of national governments to tax 
them unilaterally. In the case of an immobile tax base, a unilateral tax would have an 
immediate impact in terms of competitiveness losses in relation to regions that do not apply 
the tax. The result would primarily be a loss of trade. If the tax base is mobile, this process is 
reinforced thought relocation of the taxed activity. Thus, unilateral taxes run the risk of 
affecting international flows and market shares, with corresponding effects on employment 
and wealth in affected regions. Furthermore, tax competition models demonstrate that co-
ordination of tax policy between a group of countries or within a region is beneficial only if 
the mobility of the tax base is limited to the geographical border of the countries that co-
operate187. Therefore, the introduction of a new tax by a group of countries of a region is 
likely to be more acceptable for less mobile tax bases. The tax would, in this case, have 
limited effects on relocation and competitiveness. The risk of relocation of economic 
activities is very high in the case of the tax on currency transactions, due to the high mobility 
of the tax base. The new technologies of electronic settlement systems make it easier to 
relocate financial centres to non-taxing jurisdictions. This is shown by the creation of the 
Eurodollar market in London after the introduction of the “Interest Equalisation Tax”, a US 
Tobin-like tax. Given the nature of the two-sided tax, only if both sides of a transaction are 
conducted in a tax haven, would the tax be avoided in full. One partner will not have an 
incentive to shift his business to the haven unless the other does so at the same time. This 
lock-in effect can prove to be discouraging, but if not, the volume of the relocated activity 
will be extremely difficult to recuperate.188 A unilateral application of the currency tax base 
could constitute a disincentive to the use of the taxed currency for the citizens, institutions and 
companies operating outside the currency zone. A unilateral geographical tax at, for example, 
the EU-level with respect to non-EU currencies clearly has a risk of relocation and 
substitution through other currencies.189  
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From this perspective, implementing a sustainable CTT would require a multilateral 
approach, including the willingness to apply the tax in the major financial centres. 
While Tobin initially launched his proposal with the US in mind, shortly after the breakdown 
of Bretton Woods190, the Spahn variant is specifically aimed at the peripheral currencies vis-à-
vis the dollar, which accounts for about 20 % of total currency transactions191. In Spahn’s 
view, there will be three key currency zones in the future: the dollar, euro and yen zone. Other 
currencies will be linked unilaterally to one of the key currencies, by stabilising the exchange 
rate or by applying the Spahn tax.192 In contrast, Schmidt’s proposal covers all currencies.193  
There may be greater scope for co-operation on a regional level for the three other taxes under 
review (the carbon tax, the international aviation fuel tax and the tax on arms exports) as they 
have less mobile tax bases. However, partial relocation or tax planning activities might take 
place.  
An extensive geographical coverage may also be essential to secure the effectiveness of a tax 
on aviation fuel. A tax on international aviation fuel with a limited geographic scope could 
result in an increase of emissions. An airline’s desire to reduce fuel costs could cause planes 
to be re-routed, particularly on long-haul flights. Taxes could also be avoided by tankering, 
which is when an aircraft takes on more fuel than is needed for a flight to avoid purchasing 
more expensive fuel at the next stop. However, this also requires using additional fuel to carry 
the extra fuel load. In a study for the European Commission on an EU-tax on all departing 
flights within EU, it was estimated that tankering could reduce the tax revenue by 25% and 
the emission reduction by up to 70%.194  
Implementing a tax on arms exports is facilitated by the high concentration of this industry in 
a limited number of countries, mainly the US, France, the UK and Russia, although 
concentration is difficult to measure exactly as arms export volumes are not regularly 
published nor stable over time. The French proposal estimates that the US, France and the UK 
accounted for 70% of the world arms exports between 1993 and 2000. Major exporting 
countries have made strong political commitments to support the control of arms exports and 
to reach a greater transparency in the arms trade. Major initiatives in this direction are, in 
particular the UN resolution to establish the UN register for conventional arms in 1991, the 
Wassenaar Arrangement approved in 1996 and the European Code of Conduct on Control of 
Arms Exports adopted in June 1998.  
The major exporters could play a leading role in a tax initiative, although it has never been 
mentioned in any of these frameworks. The risk of relocating arms production might not be a 
major threat due to the high technology content of some segments of the arms industry and 
the importance of state contracts in the turnover of arm industries. However, during the 
1990s, the military industry has been increasingly privatised and arms production has been 
internationalised through cross-border joint-ventures or mergers of arms producing 
companies195. Therefore a tax applied unilaterally by the major exporters might reduce the 
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competitiveness of the domestic industry and could therefore require a wider coverage other 
than the major exporters. 
 
2. Tax Base 
The base for the tax needs to be clearly and unambiguously defined in order to facilitate equal 
collection and enforcement across nations. In order to capture the economic benefits of the 
taxes as presented above, the tax base generally needs to be as broad as possible. Defining a 
common tax base is seen as technically difficult for the tax on currency transactions and not 
straightforward for the exports of arms, while technical solutions might exist for carbon or 
aviation fuel taxes.  
In the case of a tax on currency transactions, it is difficult to define the tax base. Introducing 
exemptions for obvious non-speculative transactions (such as traveller’s currency exchanges 
and other clearly-defined non-speculative banking operations) and thresholds (to reduce the 
cost of smaller cross-border transactions) could open the door to tax avoidance. In the case of 
thresholds, it is of particular importance to take into account the costs of splitting transactions, 
both at the retail and at the wholesale market. It has been debated whether all spot market 
transactions, financial derivatives or financial markets as a whole, excluding the issuing of 
bonds and shares, should come under the scope of the tax.  
Whether the tax should apply within a given country or to specific transactions regardless of 
where they take place remains an open debate. The field of application of a CTT can be 
defined geographically, can be based on the currency involved, or on a combination of both. 
A geographical definition implies that all foreign exchange operations executed on a territory 
are subject to the tax, independent of the currency. In contrast, if the base is the currency 
involved, it is the conversion itself that is taxed independent of where the transaction took 
place. In this view, all conversions in the taxed currency would be taxed even outside the 
relevant currency zone. Combining both options raises the question of whether both 
conditions should be applied or whether only one would suffice for taxation. If both 
conditions need to be fulfilled, only the conversions in the taxed currency executed within its 
currency zone would be taxed. In the second interpretation, all conversions within the 
currency zone are involved, independent of the currency, and all transactions in the taxed 
currency, independent of where the transaction takes place.196  
Instead of taxing individual buying and selling operations, Schmidt proposes to tax net 
positions at the level of a centralised settlement system. This would circumvent enforcement 
problems related to the identification of intermediary transactions and financial derivatives. 
However, the Schmidt proposal still hinges on the coverage of electronic settlement systems, 
which are less used by developing countries. The settlement systems are developed on a 
voluntary basis to reduce settlement risk. There are neither reporting obligations nor 
standardised formats for supplying detailed information. Using these systems for a CTT 
would affect their structure and their legal status. Moreover, foreign exchange transactions do 
not necessarily involve banking operations and positions can be netted out between 
companies.197 The CTT enforcement mechanism should also capture the non-banking part of 
the tax base in order to prevent the substitution of bank trading through non-taxable foreign 
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exchange activities. Even for inter-bank operations, the settlement systems include 
transactions that should not be part of a CTT base.  
To be effective, a carbon tax needs to cover all fossil fuels according to their carbon content 
as well as all uses and users. One possibility is to levy the tax close to the source of the 
extraction of the fuel (“upstream tax”) in order for the price signal to create a broad set of 
market responses as possible. This could be implemented at the mouth of a mine for coal, at 
the refinery gate for oil or at the pipe for gas. In contrast, the current European Community 
legislation on excise duties follows the destination principle; that is the tax is paid where the 
product is consumed. In practice, the tax is charged when the product is released for 
consumption, which will differ according to the product. To facilitate the trade in excisable 
products within EU, a system of suspension arrangements has been created under which 
taxable products can be moved without levying the tax within the EU. Depending on the stage 
at which the products are taxed, similar arrangements would have to be developed at the 
global level. 
A tax on international aviation fuel could either be based on emissions, such as carbon 
dioxide, energy content or fuel price. A flat rate per tonne would give a different result than a 
percentage of the price, as fuel prices differ widely among regions198. As there are a limited 
number of actors and well-defined procedures for international flights, it should be relatively 
easy to define the taxable event. 
A tax on arms exports could be technically defined as a customs duty, although customs 
duties are more commonly used on imports and the monitoring would be done through 
customs. One of the bottlenecks in the international fight against the proliferation of arms is 
the precise common definition of arms. Within the EU, the trade of conventional arms is 
regulated by Article 223 of the Treaty, and thus not a Community competence. The definition 
of the tax base could rely on the international agreements for arms control. The UN register 
for conventional arms, the Wassenaar arrangement and the European Code of Conduct on 
Control of Arms Exports have all defined lists of arms equipment. They have also adopted 
reporting obligations and systems of exchange of information between participating countries 
in their efforts to improve transparency. Several technical difficulties would need to be 
clarified, in particular whether the tax base would be limited to conventional arms or would 
include non-conventional arms, whether it would be limited to military weapons or would 
include small arms. Only the Wassenaar Agreement covers goods with dual uses, mainly high 
tech equipment or biological goods, which have both civilian and military applications. But 
the main difficulty for using these frameworks for tax purposes is that none of the agreements 
are m legally binding. In practice the reporting of exports of arms remains voluntary and is 
incomplete, ambiguous and not uniform across countries199.  
3. Tax Rate 
In the case of a tax on currency transactions, there is no agreement on the exact tax rate to be 
applied. For the tax to be effective, the rate should be sufficiently high to provoke the desired 
effect. Current proposals vary from 0.003% to 0.25%. Spahn has introduced the notion of a 
prohibitive rate for the purpose of banning speculation on the foreign exchange markets. 
However, there is no agreement as to what rate is prohibitive. The answers have ranged from 
10%-50% to 30%-100%.  
                                                
198 Michaelis (1997).  
199 Carlman (1998). 
  104   
According to economic theory, environmental taxes should be set at a rate such that the 
marginal damage cost is equal to the marginal cost of emission reduction. The implementation 
of the tax would then lead to a situation where the marginal abatement cost is equalised across 
emitters. However, the damage cost is very difficult to estimate in practice.200 The damage 
cost estimates presented here are based on stabilising the concentration of green house gases 
in the atmosphere on a level equivalent to a doubling of pre-industrial levels. The IPCC 
Second Assessment Report (1996) presents an interval of estimated values, which range from  
$5 to $125 (US 1990) per tonne of carbon emitted. A study for the European Commission 
presents a narrower interval of $ 9,1 to $ 65,1, with a median value of $ 28 per tonne of 
carbon emitted (U.S. 1997).201 These estimates represent a wide range and a great uncertainty 
in terms of determining an optimal tax level for carbon dioxide emissions.  
4. Revenue 
The revenue of a tax will depend on the level of taxation and the related behavioural change, 
as well as on several other factors, such as the geographical application of the tax.  
Part of the interest for a tax on currency transactions in the current debate is its potential 
revenue collection. The French Treasury, the Finnish Ministry of Finance and the Belgian 
High Council for Finances present estimates of the tax proceeds and sensitivity of the results 
to various parameters. They start from the 1998 daily volume of currency transactions close to 
US$ 1500 billion as estimated by the BIS. Assuming a price elasticity of between –1.5 and 
0.5, allowing for fraud or tax avoidance of up to 25%, the proceeds of a tax with a rate of 
0.01% to 0.1% would be within the range of US$ 20 and 200 billion. Earlier estimates had 
been even higher, mentioning several hundred billion US-dollars. The more recent Spahn and 
Schmidt proposals, which apply the tax to a limited part of the base, would provide 
significantly lower revenues than these estimates. However, all these calculations are 
hypothetical and the absence of experience with such a tax makes it difficult to provide 
reliable estimates. 
The same caveat holds for other international taxes. The models that simulate the effects of a 
carbon tax usually use the tax as an instrument to equalise marginal costs across users and 
nations. The focus is to evaluate the effects on the total economy, not on the generated tax 
revenue. The revenue is also channelled back into the economy in the different ways, which 
affect the result. Thus, it is difficult to give estimates on the potential revenue. However, 
estimates quoted in the debate range from US$ 66 billion for the UNDP(1994) proposal of 
US$1 per barrel of oil to US$ 750 billion per year according to Cooper (1998), using OECD 
model results for 2020. Cooper refers to global carbon emissions of 5,2 billion tonnes, 
implying an implicit tax rate of US$ 144 per tonne of carbon. Recent estimates of the 
marginal cost of carbon to implement the Kyoto Protocol targets would result in tax revenues 
in the lower range of this interval, if such targets would be implemented with a carbon tax. 
All these estimates point to large uncertainty, like in the case of the tax on currency 
transactions. As aviation fuel only constitutes a small part of the total use of fossil fuels, the 
revenue potential of a tax on aviation fuel is considerably lower. 
No revenue figures have been mentioned in the discussion on the tax on exports of arms. As 
mentioned above, there is no precise estimate of the volume of arms trade. The volume is 
estimated to be in the range of €30 to 50 billion per year depending on the year and the 
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source. The Third annual report of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms exports indicates that 
export licenses issued by Member Sates amounted to roughly €15 billion in 2000. Carlman 
(1998) quotes a figure of US$ 10.8 billion for the 1997 US exports. UN data are more out of 
date but are still broadly in line with these figures. Whatever rate is applied, this tax base 
would not, in any case, generate proceeds of the order of magnitude mentioned for the tax on 
carbon dioxide or currency transactions.  
5. Efficiency and Equity 
Efficiency relates to the extent to which the tax will contribute to its objective and at which 
cost. As a general principle, it depends on the price elasticity of the tax base and the 
possibilities of relocation or substitution, which might reduce the tax base if a tax is 
introduced. Very little is known or can be measured in the cases of taxes which have not been 
applied in practice, such as a tax on currency transactions or exports of arms. The assessment 
of environmental taxes can draw on national or regional experiences, raising, however, the 
issue of computing a world-wide impact. 
Equity is the second dimension to consider when assessing the impact of a tax. Horizontal 
equity refers to the principle that “equals should receive an equal treatment”, while vertical 
equity refers to the progressivity of the tax among taxpayers. In the framework of an 
international debate, equity would, however, focus on the impact of the tax on the distribution 
of income between countries.  
Very few studies have investigated the issue of equity for the currency transactions tax. In this 
context, most of the focus has been on how to avoid that the tax penalises hedging activities 
on the retail market, as including hedging activities would result in a shift of the tax burden to 
households' and corporate sector's normal trade and investment activities. The overall impact 
of the tax on currency transactions on world income distribution depends primarily on the 
currencies covered by the tax. 
As fossil fuels generally have negative price elasticity, even if it is low, a carbon tax would 
reduce emissions. Simulations of the impact on the economy generally indicates a negative 
effect on GDP growth at the national level, but the results depend heavily on how tax receipts 
are redistributed. Analysis of the distributional effects of carbon and energy taxes show that 
the effects on the income distribution of these taxes are generally regressive to neutral in 
relation to income in developed countries. Few studies have been done for developing 
countries, but the results of one study from Pakistan indicate that a carbon tax could be 
income neutral to progressive. The consequences in terms of total costs of an international tax 
would be very different for different economies202. This reflects large differences among 
countries in both the structure of energy use and in the available technology. Generally 
developing countries are more carbon intensive in relation to GDP than developed 
countries203. This translates into greater percentage losses in relation to GDP for developing 
countries of an international carbon tax. However, the net effect on different countries will 
depend heavily on how the revenue is allocated. In addition, there is the efficiency gain of the 
optimal allocation of emission reductions across the world, in comparison to a situation with 
uncoordinated taxes on the national level.204  
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An international tax on aviation fuel could contribute to reduced emissions from aviation. An 
increase in the cost of fuel would be passed on to airline customers and would result in a 
lower demand for air travel and freight. It would be expected that airlines would also respond 
by reducing their fuel consumption through changes in their operations, as well as through the 
use of more energy efficient aircraft. Both these responses would result in lower emissions. 
Airline profits would though be negatively affected, particularly in the short-term. An 
international tax on aviation fuel would also affect parts of the world differently. Nations or 
regions that are dependent on long distance transport for trade and tourism would be 
disproportionately affected when compared to other countries. However, the overall effects 
are dependent on the level of the tax rate.205 It should also be noted that other economic 
instruments, for example emission trading or revenue neutral charges, could be equally 
efficient environmentally.  
A tax on arms exports would undoubtedly be seen as a way of strengthening the commitment 
of arms exporting countries towards arms control initiatives. Whether arms purchases are 
price elastic and whether a tax would effectively reduce arms trade is open to debate. The 
overall effect of the tax on arms exports would need to be gauged against other forms of 
government support in the form of export guarantee credits, loans or grants to arms producing 
companies. Carlman (1998) mentions that ‘more than half of the US weapon sales are now 
financed by taxpayers instead of foreign arms purchasers’ and indicates ‘similar tendencies in 
other major arms supplier countries.’ It might therefore be more effective to withdraw 
subsidies than to introduce a new tax to curb proliferation of arms at the world level.  
B.1.4. Legal Basis and Compatibility with Existing Legislation 
An international co-operation on taxes could be undertaken in different institutional 
frameworks. One possibility is to establish a form of an internationally agreed code of 
conduct, which is not legally binding. The implementation of the tax would then take place in 
countries by national authorities. However, a code of conduct would still give room for tax 
competition through differences in the implementation and the interpretation of the code. In 
order to avoid the problems raised here, extensive international co-ordination would need to 
be based on a legally binding international agreement. The agreement would need to address 
all issues of the definition of the tax base, the level of the tax rate, the implementation and 
administration of the tax, in order to minimise the risk of tax avoidance. It would need an 
extensive coverage of countries in order to facilitate the implementation of the tax. Otherwise, 
there would be a risk of relocation of financial centres, polluting industries or flight hubs. 
An international tax could be collected by the individual countries or by an international 
organisation. Both approaches raise questions on administration, compliance, audit, collection 
and costs. The key issue is how to ensure universal application, compliance and enforcement. 
In the case of collection at the national level, it would require an unprecedented degree of co-
ordination among countries, such as a world wide exchange of information. Differences in 
legislation, in administrative standards and in application could give rise to relocation to 
places where the standards are known to be lax. An international body, such as an 
International Tax Organisation (box 3) would potentially solve some of these difficulties, but 
it would imply that the national governments would have to recognise the competence of the 
international body in defining the tax provisions, and collecting and controlling the revenue. 
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Box 3: Towards an International Tax Organisation? 
 
The final report206 of the High Level Panel on Financing for Development, chaired by Ernesto Zedillo, 
calls on governments to “consider the benefits of” an International Tax Organisation (ITO). To some 
extent, the call for an ITO flows from other parts of this report, in particular the suggestion that the 
world should introduce global taxation for the solution of global problems. In other words, a system of 
global governance dealing with issues such as development assistance, humanitarian aid and other 
global public goods requires global as well as sovereign taxes to finance them properly.  
The panel’s case for an ITO rests on three main pillars: (i) the tax systems of most countries developed 
at a time when trade and capital movements were heavily restricted. In today’s increasingly global 
economy, the avoidance of double taxation therefore rests on conventions agreed by individual 
governments, but the report criticises these as “complex” and “in some respects arbitrary”. (ii) The 
taxes that countries can impose on transportable goods and on mobile factors is “constrained” by the 
tax rates of others. Tax competition is leading to “tax degradation”, and increased tax evasion with 
respect to income from capital located outside the taxpayer’s country of residence. (iii) Given the 
panel’s call for global taxation to finance global public goods, there would be a role for an ITO in 
developing and implementing such taxes. 
It is clear that the panel sees the main benefit of an ITO as a way of combating tax evasion and 
restraining harmful tax competition. These would, it claims, contribute to increased tax revenues from 
dishonest taxpayers and mobile factors of production. The report claims that most people would regard 
this as an “unambiguous gain”. 
Activities207 under the umbrella of the ITO could include: (i) identification of main tax trends and 
problems, and compilation and/or generation of relevant statistics and tax information, leading to the 
publication of an annual Tax Developments Report; (ii) provision of technical assistance to countries; 
(iii) development of international norms in tax policy and administration; (iv) acting as an arbiter and 
provider of surveillance over individual country, regional and global developments. The panel report 
adds a number of other possible functions of an ITO: (v) developing a system of unitary taxation of 
multinationals; (vi) promoting and enforcing a personal tax system whereby nationals are taxed on 
their world-wide income regardless of where they reside.  
The panel acknowledges that other organisations are already addressing these issues or the effects of 
them – the OECD, UNCTAD and the IMF are mentioned. However, it argues that OECD membership 
is restricted - implying, although it does not say so specifically, that not enough countries have a voice 
in this organisation. The suggestion appears to be that an ITO would pull together the disparate work 
already being done, although again this is not explicit. In short, the tasks concerned would be better 
tackled at a global level.  
Existing international institutions could also manage an international tax. However, this 
would require a substantial extension of their mandate and competence. Tobin has suggested 
that the revenue from a tax on currency transactions could be allocated to the Bretton Woods 
institutions, which also could be given a role in the administration of a tax. The Conference of 
the Parties under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is currently 
the forum for the international work and negotiations on climate change, and could play a role 
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in implementing an international carbon tax. For an international tax on aviation fuel the 
ICAO could play a role in the implementation and administration of a tax: 187 countries of 
the world’s 194 (February 2001) are members of ICAO.  
An international tax raises issues of compatibility with other international agreements as well 
as with national policies. A tax on transactions between the euro and currencies of other EU 
Member States is likely to be found contrary to the Treaties. Furthermore, the compatibility of 
a CTT applied by EU Member States vis-à-vis the rest of the world with the Community’s 
obligations within the WTO remains to be explored. 
A carbon tax could also raise problems of compatibility at the international level. The 
international community has already agreed on other instruments to reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions in the Kyoto protocol. At the national level, an international carbon tax could imply 
a loss of domestic revenue for those countries, including some Member States, that have 
already implemented a tax. For the Member States of the EU, there is also a question of 
compatibility with the Mineral Oil Directive (92/81EEC) as this directive exempts certain 
uses of fuel from excise duties on mineral oils. 
A tax on aviation fuel, including a carbon tax, would raise problems of compatibility with the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention) from 1944. The 
Convention provides that fuels on board on aircraft in transit should be exempt from customs 
duty, inspection fees or similar national duties or charges. In addition, numerous legally 
binding bilateral Air Service Agreements, which exist between individual states usually 
contain clauses to the effect that both fuel in transit and fuel supplied in the territory of the 
contracting party should be exempt from fuel taxes. This is consistent with the ICAO policy, 
“which recommends inter alia the reciprocal exemption from all taxes levied on fuels taken on 
board by aircraft in connection with international air services”.208 Furthermore, ICAO also 
recommends that environmental levies on air transport should be in the form of charges rather 
than taxes. Thus, the funds collected should be used within the aviation industry to mitigate 
the environmental impact of emissions from aviation. The 33rd session of the ICAO Assembly 
in September-October 2001 did not bring any change in this policy.209  
A tax on exports of arms is likely to generate fewer problems of compatibility with 
international trade treaties. At the EU level, arms exports are not part of the Community trade 
regime although goods with dual uses are. 
B.2. Other Proposals 
B.2.1. The De-Tax 
The De-Tax is a more recent proposal to provide additional financing for development 
purposes. Building on an Italian idea that goes back to the early nineties, it has been launched 
as an alternative to proposals for compulsory financing through taxation. Under this scheme, 
consumers would be invited to allocate a 1% rebate, granted by the vendor, on the value of 
their purchases to an international development project which the vendor has chosen to 
support. The government would exempt this contribution (it would ‘de-tax’ it) from VAT and 
company income tax. Apart from this tax subsidy, the role of the government would be 
limited to monitoring the ethical funds and their activities.  
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The De-tax scheme does not require an international agreement neither for the collection nor 
for managing and spending resources. It is completely voluntary as within each country, 
citizens and businesses are free to decide to participate.  
The scheme looks attractive because, as is the case with the Tobin tax, potential revenue looks 
high. Even if only a minor part of shops and enterprises agree to participate in the scheme, 
and assuming that a significant number of customers endorse the project chosen by the 
vendor, the revenue could be substantial. 
The voluntariness of the De-tax is, however, also its main weakness. The system rests 
fundamentally on the assumption that enterprises are prepared to forgo, on a permanent basis, 
1 percent of their turnover. In terms of profit margins, this share will be much more 
substantial. While the system does provide an incentive through the tax rebate (which 
amounts to an involuntary contribution by all taxpayers), it is unclear why retail sellers and 
businesses would be motivated to participate in this particular scheme.  
B.2.2. An SDR Allocation 
Since the creation of the Special Drawing Right (SDR) by the IMF, proposals have been made 
for using SDR allocations for purposes other than the original one, which is coping with a 
long-term global need for international liquidity. The possible use of SDR allocations for the 
provision of development finance was already mentioned in the discussions leading to the 
creation of the SDR210, and proposals of that kind have resurfaced regularly, most recently in 
the Zedillo report211 and by George Soros212.  While the Zedillo report does not elaborate on 
the post-allocation redistribution scheme, Soros explicitly proposes to redistribute the 
allocated SDRs through trust funds to specific countries and/or to finance the provision of 
global public goods. 
The SDR was conceived in the 1960s as a response to the perceived inability of the 
international monetary and financial system to ensure adequate growth of international 
liquidity. Under the Bretton Woods gold exchange standard, international reserve creation 
was basically constrained by gold production and by claims on the reserve-currency country, 
a role assumed since World War II by the USA213.  The growing concerns about the limits of 
international reserves creation was stated in two studies by the IMF and the G-10 which led to 
the proposal for the creation of new reserve assets214, and to the creation of the SDR in 1969 
through the first amendment of the IMF Articles of agreement.   
The SDR is an artificial currency unit defined as a basket of the major currencies. The 
objective of the SDR was to supplement IMF members' existing reserve assets (official 
holdings of gold, foreign exchange, and reserve positions in the IMF). They are created 
through a process of allocation. A decision to allocate SDRs is made by the Board of 
Governors on the basis of a proposal by the Managing Director with the concurrence of the 
Executive Board, and requires an 85 percent majority of the total voting power. Two 
allocations of SDRs have taken place, the fist one in 1970 and the second one in 1981. On 
both occasions, SDRs were allocated in proportion to the quotas of Fund Members agreeing 
to this allocation.  
                                                
210 IMF (1987). 
211 United Nations (2001b). 
212 Soros (2001). 
213 This problem was first formulated by Triffin (1961). 
214 Ossola (1965). 
  110   
The SDR should be seen as a means to obtain other reserve currencies from other Fund 
members. The system functions because Fund members holding less SDRs than their 
cumulative allocations pay an interest rate on this negative balance while the ones holding 
more SDRs than those received in allocations receive an interest to compensate for the yield 
lost on the exchanged reserve currencies. The SDR interest rate is the average interest rate of 
short-term instruments in the main reserve asset currencies.  
The conditions that could lead to an SDR allocation are contained in the Fund’s Articles of 
Agreement. Article XVIII refers to the existence of a long-term global liquidity need but 
refrains from specifying how this need is to be assessed: “In all its decisions with respect to 
allocation and cancellation of SDRs, the Fund shall seek to meet the long-term global need, 
as and when it arises, to supplement existing reserve assets in such a manner as will promote 
the attainment of its purposes and will avoid stagnation and deflation as well as excess 
demand and inflation in the world.” Experience has shown that it is not straightforward for an 
85 % majority of the IMF Board to agree on the existence of long-term global need. This, 
together with the changes that took place in the international monetary system since the 
establishment of the SDR mechanism (suspension of gold convertibility, elimination of par 
values, evolution of international capital markets, and increased number of reserve currencies) 
explain why only two general allocations took place. 
Decisions on an SDR allocation have, however, not solely been taken in light of a perceived 
global liquidity need. In 1997, the IMF Board of Governors acknowledged that the benefits of 
the SDR mechanism had not accrued equally to all IMF members: the early Fund members 
had been allocated SDRs twice, the ones who joined the IMF in the 1970s once and the rest 
(one fifth of the Fund membership which joined the IMF after the last SDR allocation took 
place in 1981) never. The Board therefore decided on a fourth Amendment to the Articles to 
allow for a one-time specific SDR allocation that would increase the ratio of allocated SDRs 
to quota for all IMF members to a same threshold. This allocation, which would result in a 
doubling of the amount of existing SDRs, has yet to enter into force. It will become 
operational when IMF members having 85 % of the total voting power will have accepted it, 
which will be the case with the acceptance by the US.  
Proposals for SDR allocations such as the ones proposed by Soros and the Zedillo report 
attempt to bridge the “discrimination” between, on the one hand, countries that issue reserve 
asset currencies, and thus have access to almost spontaneous financing, and, on the other 
hand, developing countries that have hardly access to capital markets. The argument is that an 
SDR allocation provides all IMF members with additional “owned” reserves. These additional 
reserves could result in increased financial markets confidence. These reserves could also be 
used by developing countries, which are constrained in their ability to tap private capital 
markets at a reasonable cost, to buy the needed investment goods. The effect of a general 
allocation would be boosted if it were combined with a redistribution scheme that would put 
the SDRs that are allocated the creditor countries in a common pool.    
The objectives of these proposals need, however, to be reconciled with the principles and 
procedures that govern the allocation and the use of SDRs.  
It can be questioned whether it is appropriate to use monetary creation (which is what an SDR 
allocation is all about) to finance development. Opponents to proposals for using allocated 
SDRs to finance development have since the creation of the SDR argued that, as a principle, 
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considerations for the management of international liquidity and for the transfer of real 
resources cannot be reconciled in a single decision215.  
The creditor countries, as main IMF shareholders, also underline the importance of IMF 
conditionality. Conditional financing through the normal IMF facilities is more useful than 
the unconditional net use of SDR holdings because conditionality ensures that adjustment 
accompanies financing in debtor countries. They also fear that an SDR allocation would 
permit a spending spree by developing countries on unnecessary goods. 
The SDR mechanism is also not cost-free. As already indicated, members holding less SDRs 
than their cumulative allocations pay an interest rate on that negative balance. While the 
interest rate charged for the use of those SDRs would probably be lower than the market rates 
for developing countries, this charge would also be substantially higher than the rate charged 
by the IMF under its concessional window.  
Finally, an SDR allocation and/or amendment to the IMF Articles of agreement requires the 
acceptance of IMF members having 85 % of the total voting power, which makes it a rather 
lengthy, cumbersome and uncertain process, as shown by the equity issue allocation.  
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